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Executive summary 
Analysis of the behaviour of participants in the accounting standard-setting 
process: the IFRS lease project 
Introduction 
This dissertation examines participants’ behaviour in the lease standard-setting 
process –conducted jointly by the IASB and the FASB as part of the convergence 
agreement to replace current standards. The proposed standard has attracted 
international attention due to the introduction of the full capitalization model (The 
Economist, 2013), which will have significant economic consequences on financial 
information of companies (PwC, 2010; Fito et al., 2013). Additionally, the over-average 
comment letters submission, 1,745, most of them opposed (Barral Rivada, 2014) and 
the long process show the high controversially of the proposal. For these reasons, the 
lease proposed standard is suitable for this research.  
Comment letters submitted to the formal discussion are public and accessible, more 
than other participation method, and are used as a proxy for lobbying, supposing no 
hidden activities. Lobbying theories assume that constituents participate shaping to 
persuade regulators seeking to affect accounting rules for self-interest reasons (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978; Sutton, 1984; Watts, 2006). However, the constituents’ 
participation is also a signal of the regulators’ legitimacy and the standards’ quality 
(Durocher and Fortin, 2011). In this context, the academic knowledge about participants’ 
opportunistic behaviour – lobbying – may increase transparency around standard-setting 
process, which may help the regulators’ decision-making to be monitored, necessary to 
guarantee users’ confidence in final standards.  
This dissertation attempt to add a new perspective by examining the factors that 
determine the decision to submit comment letters in the lease accounting standard-
setting process. All documents published and comment letters submitted are included, 
even those received after the most recent draft. The study also reveals that previous 
findings, which have identified the factors that influence a firm’s decision to lease 
(Morais, 2013) and the characteristics that explain preferences for off-balance-sheet 
financing (Barone et al., 2014) may be connected with constituents’ lobbying attitude. 
Executive summary 
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Purpose and structure 
The general purpose of this dissertation is the explanation of the lobbyists’ behaviour 
in the lease standard-setting process based on country level and firm level variables.  
To address this goal, we raised four specific objectives that correspond to the 
chapters in which the thesis is divided: 
Chapter 1 gives an analysis of the lease accounting proposal from a critical 
perspective. The study include a comparative analysis between the current standards 
and the new lease projected standard (DP2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6), a review of 
proposed changes from conceptual and practical perspective and the identification of 
critical issues in the proposal. Moreover, the positions expressed by regulators, 
participants and academic research are reviewed to understand the ongoing debate.  
Chapter 2 provide an overview of lobbying literature. That is, the theoretical 
framework that explain how political forces influence the regulatory process, the 
empirical researches about of behaviour of lobbyists and the potential of comment letters 
as a tool to participate in the lobby accountant standard process. 
Chapter 3 introduces an empirical analysis to test the influence of institutional, 
economic, cultural and other social factors on the geographical intensity of participation 
in the lease standard-setting process. The study examines 1,630 comment letters 
submitted from more than 45 countries. 
Chapter 4 presents an empirical study to identify explanatory factors that predict the 
behaviour of non-financial listed companies with respect to the lease standard-setting 
process by distinguishing three different degrees of intensity in lobbying activities, 
depending on the level of participation in the different discussion periods. The study 
include quantitative and qualitative factors. 
Sample and methodology of empirical analysis 
First, for the analysis of determinants of the geographical lobbying intensity in chapter 
3, the sample is composed by the comment letters submitted to the three published 
documents: 302 comment letters corresponding to the DP 2009; 788 and 655 comment 
letters corresponding to the ED/2010/9 and to the ED/2013/6 respectively. They have 
Executive summary 
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been categorized by country of origin. After excluding indeterminate and supra-national 
respondents, the final sample includes 1,630 comment letters. To test the hypothesis we 
use non-parametric univariate tests (Mann-Whitney-U test and Kruskal–Wallis test) to 
detect statistically differences among countries. The analysis have been repeated for the 
sample of comment letters corresponding to each of the three documents separately. 
We also examine the comments letters submitted considering all the consultation periods 
together (named pool sample). 
Second, to examine the corporate lobbying intensity in chapter 4, we focus in 306 
non-financial listed companies that have participated during the lease standard-setting 
process. To test the hypothesis, we conduct several statistical analysis: (1) Pearson and 
Spearman correlations (2) non parametric univariate test (Kruskal-Wallis test) and (3) 
multivariate discrete choice model to explain the decision to submit a comment letter with 
three levels of lobbying intensity.  
Main results 
1st) Doctrinal positions’ analysis has shown a lack of consensus on the lease 
accounting criteria. Despite historical differences among the IASB and the FASB, the 
common new proposed standard, introduces the right of use, rather than the current 
ownership one which generates polemic. This change will have strong economic 
consequences exposed ex ante by academics. Other detected critical issues are: 1) the 
definition of lease; 2) and 3) the reflection of leases in the lessees’ balance and the 
income statement; 4) lessor accounting; 5) renewal periods and contingent payments. 
2º) There is an extensive theoretical framework for the study of accounting lobby, 
based on three widely accepted theory: the positive accounting theory, the economic 
theory of democracy and the coalition and group influence theory. In the overview of 
empirical application we identify three primary approaches focused mainly on: 1) 
understanding participation, 2) content analysis 3) examining influence on regulators. 
3rd) Empirical evidence shows that the country’s characteristics may influence the 
decision to lobby by their memberships. These factors are: institutional enforcement –
rule of law and investor protection; economic factors –country's wealth and capital 
market development –; cultural values –professionalism, conservatism and secrecy – 
and corruption perception. 
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4th) The findings reveal that the level of participation intensity is determined by the 
length of the comment letters and some business characteristics such as size, 
profitability, age, industry and managerial ownership (when directors own more than 5% 
of the shares).  
Conclusions 
Lease accounting has evolved from a complete lack of registration of assets and 
liabilities in the balance sheet to the current partial capitalization model and is moving 
towards to the full capitalization model in the new approach. Antagonistic positions have 
been expressed by regulators, companies, professionals, and academic research, 
showing the strong polemic about the pertinence of the standard and the existing 
pressures around the process. The publication of the final standard has being postponed 
several times, therefore the process is being particularly long compared with other 
projects. 
This thesis empirical evidence suggests that constituents behave in an opportunistic 
manner according to Watts and Zimmerman (1978) postulates, consistent with previous 
findings in other projects. More active lobbyists have intensively participated throughout 
the lease standard-setting process to protect their own interests and influence the 
outcome defending the status quo. Resources, needs, experience, credibility, expected 
influence, peer pressure, etc., are important factors to lobby decision bases in a rational 
choice (Sutton, 1984). We observe lobbying behaviour is not only motivated by particular 
interest parties’ circumstances but also influenced by countries’ traditions and conditions. 
Differences in institutional, economic and cultural environment creates participation 
biases and different entry barriers among countries.  
In the lease standard-setting process, constituents from wealthy countries with higher 
enforcement level, less corrupted, more transparent, less conservatives and with a 
preference for the professional judgement are more likely to lobby in this process. 
Additionally, large and experienced business groups belonging to more affected 
industries are those who lobby with more intensity. Also, the evidence suggests when 
they invest more in the reasoning of comment letters they are lobbying intensively. These 
findings contributes to predict the intensity of pressure from constituents, mainly in 
particularly controversial projects as the lease one.  
Resumen 
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Resumen 
Análisis del comportamiento de los participantes en el proceso de elaboración de la 
norma contable: el proyecto de NIIF de arrendamientos 
Introducción 
Esta tesis analiza el comportamiento de los participantes en el proceso de 
elaboración de la norma internacional de arrendamientos. Consideramos este proyecto 
idóneo para nuestro estudio por varias razones. 1) Su carácter global: el IASB y el FASB 
están trabajando conjuntamente para obtener una norma común que sustituya a los 
estándares actuales. 2) Su carácter enormemente controvertido (The Economist, 2013): 
la propuesta supone un cambio sustancial de modelo basado en la capitalización del 
derecho de uso y tendrá un efecto muy relevante en la información financiera de las 
empresas (PwC, 2010; Fito et al., 2013). 3) Las circunstancias del largo proceso de 
elaboración -  la polémica se refleja en las 1.745 cartas de comentario enviadas por los 
interesados, número superior al de otros proyectos (Barral Rivada, 2014) – que nos 
permiten estudiar la participación en los tres documentos publicados. 
Las cartas de comentarios son un método público de participación, accesible y 
formal y se utilizan como proxy de lobby, suponiendo el reflejo de otras actividades 
invisibles. La literatura previa (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Sutton, 1984; Watts, 2006) 
sostiene que la participación está motivada por intereses egoístas de determinados 
grupos de poder que pretenden influir en los reguladores. Sin embargo, la participación 
de las partes interesadas también es necesaria para obtener legitimidad procedimental 
y mejorar la calidad de las normas (Durocher y Fortin, 2011). Por lo tanto, el 
conocimiento académico sobre el comportamiento oportunista de los participantes - 
lobby - puede aumentar la transparencia en torno al proceso de normalización, así como 
su control, necesarios para garantizar la confianza de los usuarios en las normas finales. 
En este trabajo pretendemos agregar una nueva perspectiva mediante el examen 
de los factores que determinan la decisión de enviar cartas de comentarios para la 
discusión pública de la norma de arrendamientos. Además, se analiza la participación 
durante todo el proceso, incluyendo el último borrador publicado. Adicionalmente, 
conectamos los factores relacionados con la decisión de arrendar (Morais, 2013) y las 
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preferencias por la financiación fuera de balance (Barone et al., 2014) con la decisión 
de hacer lobby. 
Objetivos y estructura 
El objetivo general de esta investigación consiste en la explicación del 
comportamiento de los grupos de presión en el proceso de elaboración de la norma 
contable de arrendamientos en función de variables a nivel de país y a nivel de empresa. 
Cuatro objetivos específicos desarrollan este objetivo general y determinan la 
estructura de la tesis:  
En el capítulo 1 se presenta un análisis crítico de la propuesta de norma internacional 
de contabilidad de arrendamientos. El estudio incluye un análisis comparativo entre las 
normas actuales y la nueva propuesta (DP2009, ED/2010/9 y ED/2013/6), una revisión 
conceptual y práctica de los cambios planteados en el nuevo estándar, así como la 
identificación de los conceptos controvertidos. Además, se estudian las posiciones 
expresadas por los reguladores, los participantes y la investigación académica para 
comprender el debate existente.  
En el capítulo 2 se proporciona una visión general de la literatura previa sobre lobby 
en los organismos contables. Esto es, se analizar el marco teórico que explica cómo las 
presiones de grupos de poder influyen en el proceso de normalización, se examinan las 
investigaciones empíricas que analizan el comportamiento de los participantes y el 
potencial de las cartas de comentarios como una herramienta para participar en el 
proceso de normalización contable.  
En el capítulo 3 se presenta un análisis empírico para verificar la influencia de los 
factores institucionales, económicos, culturales y otras características sociales de un 
país, en la intensidad de participación geográfica en el proceso de establecimiento de la 
norma de arrendamientos. El estudio examina 1.630 cartas de comentarios enviadas 
desde más de 45 países.  
En el capítulo 4 se presenta un estudio empírico para analizar los factores que 
determinan la presentación de cartas de comentarios por entidades cotizadas no 
financieras para la discusión pública del proyecto de arrendamientos, teniendo en 
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cuenta diferentes niveles de intensidad de participación. El estudio incluye factores 
cuantitativos y cualitativos.  
Muestra y metodología del análisis empírico 
En primer lugar, para el análisis de los determinantes de la intensidad geográfica de 
lobby, la muestra está compuesta por las cartas de comentarios enviadas como 
respuesta a los tres documentos publicados: 302 cartas de comentarios 
correspondientes al DP 2009; 788 y 655 cartas de comentarios correspondientes a los 
ED/2010/9 y el ED/2013/6, respectivamente. Las cartas se han clasificado según el país 
de origen. Tras excluir las cartas de origen indeterminado y supranacional, la muestra 
final incluye 1.630 cartas de comentarios. Para probar la veracidad de las hipótesis, 
utilizamos los análisis univariantes no paramétricos (Mann-Whitney-U y Kruskal-Wallis) 
para detectar si existen diferencias estadísticamente significativas entre la intensidad de 
lobby de los países. Los análisis se han repetido para la muestra de cartas de 
comentarios correspondientes a cada uno de los tres documentos por separado. 
También examinamos las cartas de todos los períodos de consulta en conjunto.  
En segundo lugar, para examinar la intensidad de lobby de las empresas, nos 
centramos en 306 sociedades cotizadas no financieras que han participado en el 
proceso de elaboración de la norma de arrendamientos. Las variables corporativas han 
sido extraídas de la base de datos OSIRIS para  cinco años (2009-2013).Los métodos 
estadísticos utilizados para probar la veracidad de las hipótesis son los siguientes: (1) 
análisis de correlaciones de Pearson y Spearman, (2) análisis univariantes (Kruskal-
Wallis), (3) desarrollo de un modelo de elección discreta multivariante (probit ordenado), 
en el que se identifican los factores que determinan las probabilidades de participar con 
mayor o menor intensidad durante el proceso de elaboración de la norma -distinguiendo 
tres grados de intensidad.  
Principales resultados 
1º) El análisis histórico y actual de las posiciones doctrinales expone una falta de 
consenso sobre el “deber ser” de la contabilidad de arrendamientos. Los cambios 
propuestos por el proyecto de norma, como la introducción del derecho de uso, genera 
polémica tanto desde una perspectiva conceptual como práctica. Los conceptos más 
controvertidos de la propuesta son: 1) la definición de arrendamiento; 2) el 
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reconocimiento contable en el balance y en 3) la cuenta de pérdidas y ganancias del 
arrendatario 4) la contabilidad del arrendador; 5) períodos de renovación y pagos 
contingentes. 
2º) Existe un amplio marco teórico para el estudio del lobby, basado en tres teorías 
ampliamente aceptadas en contabilidad: la teoría positiva de la contabilidad, la teoría 
económica de la democracia y de la teoría de la coalición y la influencia del grupo. 
Además, en la revisión de los estudios empíricos identificamos tres enfoques 
principales: 1) los estudios que se centran en la participación, 2) los estudios que 
analizan el contenido de las cartas de comentario y 3) los estudios que analizan la 
influencia de los participantes en la norma final. 
3º) La evidencia empírica sugiere que las características de los países influyen en la 
decisión de sus miembros de enviar cartas de comentario para discutir la propuesta de 
norma de arrendamientos. Los factores que influyen son: 1) los factores institucionales, 
como la fortaleza del imperio de la ley o el nivel institucional de protección del inversor; 
2) el entorno económico, como el nivel de riqueza y el grado de desarrollo de los 
mercados de capitales; 3) los valores culturales (profesionalidad, el conservadurismo, el 
secreto) y 4) el nivel de percepción de la corrupción.  
4º) La evidencia obtenida muestra que el grado de intensidad de participación de las 
empresas se ve influenciado por la longitud de las cartas de comentarios y las 
características corporativas como el tamaño, la rentabilidad, la antigüedad, el sector 
económico y la propiedad de participación accionariales por parte de los directivos.   
Conclusiones 
La contabilidad de arrendamiento ha pasado de una ausencia total de registro de los 
activos y pasivos en el balance al modelo de capitalización parcial actual. Ahora, con la 
nueva propuesta se plantea un modelo de capitalización total. La propuesta ha generado 
polémica desde un punto de vista conceptual y también desde la perspectiva de las 
consecuencias económicas. Las partes interesadas: los reguladores, empresas, 
profesionales y académicos han expresado sus opiniones sobre la pertinencia de la 
norma, la mayoría en desacuerdo. Esta controversia añade presión a la toma de 
decisiones de los reguladores y ha retrasado el consenso necesario entre las partes 
interesadas para la publicación de la norma final. 
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Esta evidencia empírica sugiere que los participantes se comportan de una manera 
oportunista en línea con los postulados de Watts y Zimmerman (1978), y en consonancia 
con los resultados anteriores en otros proyectos. Los grupos de presión más activos han 
participado intensamente en todo el proceso de elaboración de la norma de 
arrendamientos para proteger sus propios intereses e influir en el resultado defendiendo 
el status quo. Los recursos, las necesidades, la experiencia, la credibilidad, influencia 
esperada, la presión de grupo, etc., son factores importantes para la decisión de ejercer 
lobby de acuerdo una elección racional (Sutton, 1984). Observamos que el 
comportamiento de los grupos de presión no sólo está motivada por determinadas 
características e intereses propios, sino también la influencia de las condiciones, 
tradiciones y valores de los países de los participantes. Las diferencias en el entorno 
institucional, económico y cultural crea sesgos en la participación geográfica. 
En el proceso de elaboración de la norma internacional contable de arrendamientos, 
los miembros de países ricos con mayor nivel de cumplimiento de la ley, menos 
corruptos, más transparentes, menos conservadores y con una preferencia por el criterio 
profesional son más propensos a ejercer presión en este proceso. Además, los grupos 
empresariales grandes y experimentados pertenecientes a sectores más afectados son 
los que participan con más intensidad. Asimismo, la evidencia sugiere que la realización 
de cartas más largas y elaboradas implica un esfuerzo que permite a las empresas 
participar durante todo el proceso de forma más intensa. Estos resultados contribuyen 
a predecir la intensidad de la presión que los interesados ejercerán en un proyecto, 
principalmente en aquellos proyectos particularmente controvertidos como es el de 
arrendamientos. 
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Introduction 
The international accounting harmonization process has recently intensified. The 
international accounting standard-setter, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) has made considerable efforts to improve the quality and comparability of 
financial statements internationally. In this sense, one of the IASB’s main objectives has 
been the convergence of international accounting standards with those of the US in 
partnership with the US national standard-setter, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB). 
As part of this ambitious project, the IASB and the FASB included in the agenda the 
development of a common standard for leases to replace the current standards and 
introduces a substantial change in the accounting model based on the capitalization of 
the right of use. It is expected to have a material effect on firms’ financial information, so 
it is generating a lot of attention and controversy. 
In this dissertation, we have analysed the proposed standard for leases, considering 
both the content and the standard-setting process. This project is a special case study 
to examine participants’ behaviour in the regulatory process.  
Interest of the research topic 
We study the intensity of participation and the factors considered determinants to 
understand the political force of interest groups in an accounting standard-setting 
process that may significantly modify financial statements. In our opinion, this study is of 
interest for academics, and especially regulators, as it can help them predict participants’ 
behaviour. Standard-setters should improve the impartiality and efficiency of the process 
based on these predictions. Additionally, this study addresses the interesting question of 
why there is greater persistence in lobbying for a specific project, a certain group of 
countries, and a particular group of companies. 
Having the FASB and IASB work together to develop a common standard makes 
the regulatory preparation process more interesting and international. The FASB’s 
strength lies in its historical significance, its ability to implement accounting standards 
that affect companies in a single country, and its recognition as an authority to export 
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their proposals beyond its borders. The IASB, it is recognized for the high technical 
quality of its standards and their strong implementation after many countries have 
recently adopted IFRS (e.g., for listed companies in the European Union). National or 
supranational governments provide these private regulators with political legitimacy, so 
standards are imposed in their areas of control. However, regulators also need technical 
and procedural legitimacy. In the context of our work, there is a consensus in previous 
studies that the submission of comment letters brings legitimacy and quality to the 
standard-setting process. 
According to institutional theory, there is pressure and political forces around the 
standard-setting process because accounting rules have an impact on business 
reporting, economic operations, and markets. Therefore, there are varying interests 
expecting diverse outcomes from the standard-setting process. In this context, there are 
constituents that participate in the standard-setting process, with the goal of persuading 
standard-setters to legislate according to their own-interests, and eluding the main 
objective of standards: enabling general, efficient decision making. This behaviour is 
called political lobbying (Zeff, 2002).  
There are several reasons to study the lobbying behaviour around the process to 
revise the leases standard. This project introduces significant changes from both the 
conceptual and practical perspectives. The main innovation is that all leases that are 
non-cancellable freely by both parties would be reflected in the assets and liabilities of 
the lessee's balance sheet, with the exception of short-term leases. This is a change 
from the current partial capitalization model to a full capitalization model, one of the main 
points of disagreement. 
There are different perceptions about the economic consequences of change. Some 
argue that the new lease accounting model would have international, industry-wide 
effects on firms’ financial statements, increasing the assets and liabilities recognized. It 
would also impact some important financial ratios, such as the leverage ratio. However, 
these claims are mitigated by an impact assessment and the fact that analysts and 
professional investors currently consider this effect in their calculations. 
There are other critical matters that present conceptual problems (e.g., the lease 
definition). The accounting approach for each of these has been modified and 
reformulated from the first to the last document issued by standard-setters, which gives 
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an idea of the changes made since the project was conceived. Additionally, while the 
initial goal of the project was the convergence between international and US standards, 
there are some critical matters where standard-setters have reached different solutions 
(for example, the choice of a dual or single model to recognize expense in the lessee’s 
income statement).  
During the three consultation periods opened after the publication of each draft 
(DP2009; ED/2010/9; ED/2013/6), the IASB and FASB have received one thousand 
seven hundred forty five comment letters, most of them against the proposal, exceeding 
the average number of responses from previous projects. In addition, the publication of 
the final standard has being postponed several times, so the process has been 
particularly long compared with other projects. 
The ongoing debate about the merits and demerits of the new lease accounting 
standard has become an important issue attracting attention from scholars, 
professionals, and the media. For these reasons, we consider the lease project an 
appropriate case to analyse the lobbying behaviour through comment letters submitted 
during the standards-setting process, given the high level of controversy and debate. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain lobbyists’ behaviour in the accounting 
standard-setting process for leases using country and firm level variables. This general 
objective has four specific objectives. 
The first objective is to understand the debate, both among academics and among 
professionals and regulators, around the proposed standard for leases. The controversy 
around the proposed standard makes it suitable for a lobbying study. We thus analyse 
the lease accounting standard-setting process by analysing the current and projected 
new lease standard (DP2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6), the changes proposed from 
the conceptual and practical perspectives, the critical matters, and the antagonistic 
positions expressed by regulators and academic researchers.  
The second objective is to provide an overview of the recent literature on lobbying. 
Therefore, we establish three sub-objectives to develop an orderly review. First, we 
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present theories about how political forces influence the regulatory process. Second, we 
review the different lines of empirical research related to lobbying behaviour, depending 
on the objectives, methodology, and theories. Third, we examine the extent to which 
comment letters are perceived as a useful lobbying tool for interested parties. 
The third objective is to obtain empirical evidence about how institutional, 
economic, cultural, and other social characteristics of the countries in which the parties 
are located influence the intensity of participation in the lease standard-setting process. 
This objective generally assumes that the behaviour of individuals and businesses is no 
stranger to the institutional, economic, and cultural context of the country they belong to. 
To achieve this empirical objective, we compile the comment letters submitted for the 
three documents issued by the IASB and FASB before the final rule is published, the 
discussion paper of 2009, and the first and second exposure drafts of 2010 and 2013. 
These projects have received 302, 788, and 655 comment letters, respectively, on the 
IASB and FASB websites.  
The fourth objective is to find explanatory factors that predict firms’ behaviour in 
the lease standard-setting process, distinguishing between three degrees of lobbying 
intensity based on participation during the three discussion periods. The sample is thus 
composed of comment letters submitted by 306 listed non-financial corporations in 
response to the discussion paper and the two exposure drafts provided jointly by the 
IASB and FASB. The explanatory factors include corporate variables and the qualitative 
characteristics of the comment letters. 
Thesis structure 
The thesis includes five chapters: two theoretical chapters, two empirical chapters 
and the last chapter outlining the conclusions. The first four chapters correspond to the 
specific objectives described above, and are summarized below.  
The first chapter presents the study object of this thesis: the proposed IFRS for 
leases. Before analysing the standard, we describe the financial theories that establish 
the lease as a source of financing for assets, widely examined in earlier studies and used 
in business. After a brief review of accounting for leases, we explore why the IASB and 
the FASB were prompted to amend the current regulation (i.e. the deficiencies in the 
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current standards). We then discuss the change in the accounting approach proposed 
by the reform, identifying each critical matter related to the fundamental accounting 
concepts discussed from a conceptual point of view. Additionally, we provide an 
extensive review of the lease accounting literature that focuses primarily on empirical 
studies analysing the economic impact of capitalizing operating leases.  
The discussion about the adequacy of the lease project as a conceptual framework 
and the evidence from empirical studies examining the negative consequences of the 
standard provide a basis for understanding some of the allegations made by some 
opponents. The reader should understand the importance of this standard, since its 
controversial character and circumstances make it ideal for a study of lobbying, both for 
its complex and innovative content and the long standards-setting process.  
In the second chapter we present the theories that explain lobbying behaviour in 
the lease standard-setting process. The underlying theories in the lobbying studies are 
based on the main accounting theories. However, they have also their roots in other 
sources of knowledge, such as microeconomics, political science, or psychology. We 
dedicate a chapter to analysing the framework because it is a key to understanding the 
lobbying phenomenon and the empirical research questions.  
This chapter divides the empirical studies into three main approaches: 1) a focus on 
analysing participation; 2) a focus on content analysis; 3) exploring the relationship 
between inputs (comment letters) and outputs (the final standards). This chapter 
emphasizes the extensive literature on lobbying activities that seek to influence 
standards-setter and providing a solid theoretical basis for assumptions. Moreover, 
among the existing methods to participate in the standard-setting process, empirical 
research mainly focuses on the formal methods considered necessary to provide 
legitimacy and quality, specifically, the comment letters submitted to the IASB and the 
FASB by stakeholders as a proxy to reflect lobbying. 
Based on the theoretical framework established in the previous two chapters, the 
third chapter contains the first empirical analysis of the thesis from a positivist 
perspective. We examine the 1,745 comment letters submitted during the three 
consultation periods during the lease project to identify the country factors that influence 
geographic lobbying intensity. To understand the empirical research in this chapter, we 
provide a brief review of the cross-country accounting literature. Consecutively, we 
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propose several working hypotheses in four groups and present the variables. 
Additionally, we describe the selection of the sample of work and the methodology to test 
the hypotheses. Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to verify the robustness of the 
evidence.  
In the fourth chapter, we develop an empirical study examining the factors 
determining the submission of comment letters in the leasing project with different levels 
of intensity for non-financial listed companies. We review the literature analysing 
company participation in the accounting standard-setting process. After presenting the 
research design and hypothesis, methodology, and variables, we conduct a series of 
empirical tests that lead to a multivariate discrete model that explains the intensity of 
corporate involvement in the different consultation periods depending on company 
characteristics and the length of the comment letters. We then assess the robustness of 
the model using several sensitivity analyses. 
The fifth chapter concludes the thesis and links the conclusions to the specific 
objectives, as well as offering a final reflection. This chapter also addresses the study's 
limitations and possible future lines of research related to the investigated topics. 
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Chapter 1 
The new challenges for lease accounting 
1.1. Introduction to the chapter 
Leases are one of the instruments most commonly used by companies to finance 
resources. The widespread use of the lease contract as a way to finance capital goods 
was introduced during the industrial revolution and is currently at its height. Therefore, 
lease accounting is a highly relevant area in financial statements, and it is logical that 
the development of lease accounting standards would attract the attention of most 
companies and those individuals who would use these standards as either preparers or 
users of financial statements. 
In this chapter, we outline the evolution of lease accounting regulation, focusing 
principally on the common lease standard project; this project is being developed by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) to replace the existing rules. We describe the practical 
implications of the proposal as evidenced by prior literature and we also collect the 
primary reactions to it. The controversy generated around the lease accounting standard-
setting process makes it a perfect issue with which to study the lobbying phenomenon. 
Several reasons support our decision to select the lease standard as the subject of 
this thesis. First, the lease project model challenges how leases have been considered 
in accounting from a conceptual and practical perspective. Apart from the adoption of a 
“right of use” model, rather than the current ownership model (Biondi, Bloomfield, Glover, 
Jamal, Ohlson, Penman, Tsujiyama, and Wilks, 2011), there are some critical accounting 
matters that hinder reaching a consensus. Second, the new approach could have a 
significant impact on relevant accounting measures (such as debt, return on assets, 
operating net income), which would imply a major change in how investors assess the 
profile of a company. Finally, it is a highly debated standard generating strongly 
conflicting opinions among political forces and participants. During the three consultation 
periods held since 2009, the standard-setters have received more than one thousand 
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and seven hundred comment letters, and the lease accounting standard-setting process 
has not even been concluded.  
Lease accounting treatment has evolved from a complete lack of registration for 
assets and liabilities to the current partial capitalization model: International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 17 and Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) Topic 840. With this new 
proposal, standard-setters intend to go one step further and move towards a full 
capitalization model. All leases that are not freely cancellable by both parties would be 
reflected on the balance sheet with the exception of short-term leases. Both standard-
setters show strong support for the “right-of-use” model. However, to date there have 
been some divergences about the recognition of expenses on the lessee’s income 
statement.  
The new approach would affect the financial statements of companies across all 
industries. Authors such as Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998), Fülbier, Silva and 
Pferdehirt (2008) and Fito, Moya and Orgaz (2013) and companies as 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2010) have examined the potential increase in assets 
and liabilities due to operating lease capitalization, and their results show that some 
financial ratios such as gearing ratios would be affected. Some business sectors are 
worried about the increase in companies’ risk profiles, which could affect credit and 
expenses as well as cause a possible loss of employment (i.e., see the report 
commissioned by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other trade groups, 2012). 
However, other authors demonstrate that the amount of off-balance sheet assets and 
liabilities proceeding from operating leases has been adjusted by analysts and is already 
included in stock prices and interest rates (see, for example, Moody’s, 2006; Boastman 
and Dong, 2011; Krische, Sander and Smith, 2012; Altamuro, Johnston, Pandit and 
Zhang, 2014), reducing concern about the recognition of assets and liabilities from lease 
contracts.  
This project has been highly controversial from the beginning. It was introduced to 
the common agenda of IASB and FASB in 2006 after the SEC (2005) required a change 
in lease accounting upon finding $US1.25 trillion of operating leasing off-balance sheet. 
During the lease standard-setting process, one discussion paper (March, 2009) and two 
drafts (August, 2010 and May, 2013) have been published for public discussion, 
receiving 302, 788 and 655 comment letters, respectively. The number of responses, 
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most of them objecting to the proposal, has surpassed the average number of comment 
letters for other projects (Barral Rivada, 2014), demonstrating strong polemics. Also the 
date of the final standard has been delayed several times, so that the due process for 
lease accounting has been particularly long as compared with other projects such as the 
Business Combinations standard (IFRS 3) or the Joint Arrangements standard (IFRS 
11). 
The structure of the chapter is established as follows: section 1.2 explains the 
presence of the lease as a source of financing for businesses; section 1.3 describes the 
evolution of lease accounting standards, including the current standards and the 
proposed standard to change the lease accounting standard; section 1.4 shows the 
critical issues in the proposed standard; section 1.5 describes the practical implications 
of the proposed lease standard focusing on its economic consequences; section 1.6 
summarizes some of the main responses to the proposed new standard; and section 1.7 
provides some final conclusions. 
1.2. The lease contract as a source of financing 
1.2.1. Lease versus buy 
Almost every type of company needs resources to function. Some of these assets 
are considered core assets because of their importance to the business of the company. 
The lease contract is one way to finance these assets. People have understood the 
usefulness of lease contracts for business from the very beginning: the first evidence for 
the existence of lease agreements are found in Mesopotamia five thousand years ago 
(Ortúzar Solar, 1995). 
In 1976, Myers, Dill and Bautista analysed cash flows based on the decision to lease 
or purchase, and they confirm that there are no differences in special conditions such as 
the absence of tax and transaction costs. They argue that the choice between leasing 
and buying depends on non-financial benefits (such as the maintenance or repair costs 
for the asset) because the purely financial costs of both options are equivalent, assuming 
that both parties are subject to identical interest and tax rates and that transaction costs 
are ignored.  
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The decision to lease versus buy has mainly been studied in the field of finance and 
specifically in the field of capital structure. Some important authors in this line of research 
are Myers et al. (1976), Smith and Wakeman (1985), Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), Eisfeldt 
and Rampini (2009).   
For accounting, the determinants of operating and finance leases can differ due to 
different treatment by national and international lease standards. Morais (2013) 
summarizes the main lessee firm characteristics by investigating: (i) size; (ii) industry; 
(iii) nature of assets; (iv) leverage and financial constraints; (v) taxes; (vi) management 
compensation; (vii) ownership structure.  
These studies are only mentioned to provide an idea of the extent and relevance of 
the field, but we do not delve into these theories because they could be highly developed, 
and this is not within the objective of this thesis. However, linked to these studies is the 
concept of complementarity or substitutability between lease debt and other types of 
debt, which is explained in the next section.  
1.2.2. The relation of lease debt and other type of debt 
 Some authors question the relation between debt created from the lease contract 
and other types of debt, questioning whether they are substitutes or complementary.  
Representatives of these theories are found in the studies of, i.e., Ang and Peterson 
(1984), Lewis and Schallheim (1992), Yan (2006), Deloof, Lagaert and Verschueren 
(2007) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009).  
The idea that lease and non-lease debt are substitutes is based on one of the 
fundamental statements of the lease valuation formula created by Myers et al. (1976): 
the assumption that lease debt displaces other types of debt. This statement implies that 
an increase in one leads to a decrease in the other. Authors such as Beattie, Goodacre 
and Thomson (2000), Yan (2006) and Deloof et al. (2007) studied whether non-lease 
debt and leases are substitutes with differing coefficients of substitution.  
In this line, Beattie et al. (2000) distinguish three variants of the theory involving 
different magnitudes for the replacement rate: first, the most traditional financial theory 
maintains that cash flows from leases are equivalent to cash flows from debt (a ratio of 
one to one); second, a theory supports differences between nature and the conditions of 
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lease and debt contracts leading to a lease with less debt capacity than the equivalent 
debt from purchase (the replacement rate is less than one); finally, other researchers 
argue that when a company leases a core asset that must be specific to the company, 
moral hazard may be greater (the replacement rate may be greater than 1). The third 
theory is connected with the idea of the complementarity of lease liability and debt.  
In the cited paper, Beattie et al. (2000) published an empirical analysis with the main 
objective of investigating the extent to which pure debt and a lease could be replaceable 
elements by analysing factors that include both debt and leases. The novelty of the study 
was its use of estimated debt from operating leases in addition to capital leases. They 
empirically demonstrate that leases and debt are partial substitutes: 1 British pound of 
lease debt moves about 0.23 British pounds of other non-lease debt. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that lessors have certain risks that are inherent in debt 
contracts. 
In contrast, Lewis and Schallheim (1992) demonstrated analytically that lease and 
debt could be complementary elements and not exclusive. The antecedent of the study 
was the earlier work of Ang and Peterson (1984), who showed that companies with high 
debt levels may also have high levels of leasing. They presented a model making two 
assumptions: first, they consider that substitution occurs between tax deductions from 
debt and those from other elements that are not debt; second, they assume that leasing 
provides the opportunity to transfer or sell those tax deductions that are not from debt, 
i.e., if the lessee can find a lessor that has a high probability of using these tax
deductions, the lessor would pay more for them than they are worth to the lessee 
(reducing the lease). Reducing the tax deductibility of the lessee motivated an increase 
of its proportion of debt relative to other similar companies that do not use the leasing. 
In this sense Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) present another model of greater 
borrowing capacity due to leasing. First, they assume that the ability to recover the asset 
is a major benefit of the lease. This ability to recover the asset implicitly allows the lessor 
to offer more credit than any other lender whose debt is guaranteed by the same asset. 
The borrowing capacity of the lease then exceeds the capacity of indebtedness via 
secured debt. Therefore, the lease will be more valuable for companies that are 
constrained to borrow. However, the agency cost of the separation of ownership and 
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control of the leased assets counteracts the above effect. The positive net effect allows 
lessors to offer leases to companies that have more limited credit. 
Despite the previous debate, it has been demonstrated that companies consider 
leases to be a source of financing. The decision to lease and the reasons for increasing 
the lease portfolio depend on several variables such as tax rates, dividend policies, 
finance ratios and, also, accounting. 
1.2.3. The presence of leases in the economy 
The pervasive use of lease contracts as a common economic operation across all 
industries, primarily as a financing source, makes accounting for leases a sensitive issue 
for interested parties. The European Federation of Leasing Company Association1, 
which represents the leasing and automotive rental industries in Europe publishes the 
figures for European leasing market (including financing and operating leases) every 
year. In 2013, data for the leasing market amounted to 256 billion of newly created leases 
and 734 billion in outstanding operating leases, which is very similar to the figures for 
2012 (Leaseurope, 2013). These data give us an idea about the extent of the leasing 
market in Europe. Other parts of the world also have similar big data that support the 
extensive generalized use of leases.  
There are some industries that are more intensive in using leases than others, 
particularly for operating leases. This is the case for the services sector, which includes 
the retail, hotel and commercial airlines subsectors. Another sector with a high demand 
for lease contracts is the industrial sector, which includes subsectors that extensively 
use leases, such as trucking or railway freight.  
In 2005, the North American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gauged 
that there was $US1.25 trillion in off-balance sheet obligations arising from non-
cancellable operating leases. The SEC warned of this issue in the economy and 
encouraged regulators to take action to avoid staggering off-balance sheet leases. Put 
in perspective, this figure is approximately 31 times that of the obligations recognized on 
1 It is estimated that Leaseurope represented approximately 92% of the European leasing market in 2012. 
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the balance sheet. The SEC finding has been supported by other research such as 
Franzen, Rodgers and Simins (2009), who show that from 1980 to 2007, the operating 
leases increased by 745%, while there has been a simultaneous decrease in leasing 
operations. 
Cornaggia, Franzen and Simin (2013) document that the trend towards moving 
leases off-balance sheet occurs in all sectors and is not easily explained by the 
theoretical economic factors determining the decision to buy versus lease. They find that 
moving lease liabilities off-balance sheet 1) enables companies to better manage debt 
covenants that limit the costs of debt or equity and (2) decreases the scrutiny of 
institutional investors and that (3) the companies investigated by the SEC or the 
Department of Justice for financial misrepresentation have high levels of unexplained 
exposure to operating leases. These findings support the need to change the accounting 
policy for leases. 
The existence of an enormous amount of off-balance sheet financing through lease 
contracts increases the motivation of regulators to reform the accounting principles 
applicable to leases. In the next section, we explain both the existing standards and the 
new approaches to the process of accounting for leases.  
1.3. The evolution of lease accounting regulations 
The method of accounting for leases has been considered in the accounting 
literature to be one of the fundamental issues of normative accountancy. “A lease 
involves the acquisition of resources in exchange for a commitment from the lessee to 
make lease payments to the lessor, and so, accounting for leases correctly is essential 
to gain an understanding of the financial situation and results of companies that use 
leases” (Villanueva and Mellado, 2013, p. 377). The following section analyses the 
existing principles applicable to accounting for leases and the primary proposed 
changes, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
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1.3.1. Existing standards – IAS 17 and ASC topic 840 
The existing standards, IAS 17 and ASC topic 840 agree in the definition of a lease. 
Current international and North American accounting standards follow a methodology 
based on a distinction between two types of leases: leases similar to purchasing an asset 
(finance leases) and leases similar to a service (operating leases). Despite agreement 
on the general principle, the methodology or regulatory approach used to implement this 
principle is very different. 
IAS/IFRS focus on the economic substance of the lease transaction, i.e., on the 
economic effect, rather than on the legal form of the arrangement. US GAAP places less 
emphasis on the economic substance, defining many concepts based on quantitative 
breakpoints or bright lines. This difference in philosophy can also be appreciated in the 
extent of the guidance. US GAAP covers a much wider range of situations than IAS/IFRS 
(e.g., arrangements dealing with the construction and rental of an asset, leveraged 
leases, specific criteria for property leases, etc.). 
The main criticism of the current accounting is that this classification allows tenants 
to not recognize the obligations under the lease on their balance sheets when leases are 
classified as operating leases. This phenomenon has worried the US and European 
authorities for some time, and concern was aggravated by the financial scandals in 2001 
and 2002, such as Enron and Worldcom, which were related to off-balance sheet 
accounting (Mills, 2008). 
The weaknesses of current legislation were identified by Biondi et al. (2011) in the 
following list: (i) small changes in a transaction cause large differences in accounting 
because of the classification criteria between operating and financial leases; (ii) the rules 
and numerical thresholds of US standards allow the company managers structuring 
transactions to achieve the accounting treatment they want; (iii) lessee and lessor 
accounting are asymmetric; (iv) scope exceptions create loopholes that can be used by 
managers to thwart the standard (Jamal and Tan, 2010); (v) the execution of service 
contracts is not reflected in the balance sheet; (vi) managers can use options, renewal 
terms and contingent payments to avoid the purpose of the rule (Jamal and Tan, 2010); 
and (vii) managers can use special purpose entities to record off-balance sheet leases. 
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These weaknesses are known by both regulatory authorities and academic 
research. However, in addition to improving the shortcomings of current legislation, the 
ideal is to achieve a high quality lease standard. As Thomson states in his doctoral thesis 
(2003), which in turn uses the reports issued by institutions and American accounting 
authorities, a high quality accounting standard for leases should address the deficiencies 
of current accounting regulations and improve decision making by reflecting the 
substance of the lease and economic reality; increasing consistency and comparability 
by limiting alternative accounting treatments; providing information that was not 
previously available; minimizing manipulation of the rules by adopting a treatment based 
on concepts and clear, understandable and practical principles; and presenting 
information on a cost-benefit basis. 
Therefore, the IASB and the FASB started the process of reviewing lease accounting 
with some primary objectives: to converge as much as possible to support comparability; 
to elaborate a coherent and consistent standard based on principles that could reflect 
the complexity in business operations; and to limit or eliminate the possibility for having 
off-balance sheet debt and assets from operating leases.    
1.3.2. Proposal of a new lease standard in the IASB-FASB convergence project 
The project began to take form within the G4+1 group, composed of accounting 
regulators from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and the IASC (the predecessor of the current IASB), which was set to begin a process 
of international accounting convergence. In 1996, the group issued Accounting for 
Leases: A New Approach (McGregor, 1996). This document examined the gaps in 
national and international accounting standards for leases and proposed to unify the 
accounting criteria for all leases to improve the comparability and utility of financial 
statements. 
Later, in 2000, the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) published a discussion 
paper entitled Leases: Implementation of a New Approach (Nailor and Lennard, 2000), 
in which a working team of the G4+1 supported that all leases should be reflected in 
financial statements in a similar manner and following the usual requirements for fixed 
asset and debt accounting. The concept of the right of use as an asset thus arises.  
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Finally, in 2006, the boards of the IASB and the FASB decided to add the lease 
project to the agenda of the convergence framework. The project launched with the 
publication of Discussion Paper, Leases: Preliminary Views (March 2009). In August 
2010, an exposure draft of the standard was published, and it proved to be highly 
controversial. During the comment period on the exposure draft, the IASB and the FASB 
received over 788 comment letters. After analysing the comments received and 
conducting fieldwork, the boards decided to substantially amend the initial proposal. In 
May 2013, a revised exposure draft was issued, which received 655 comment letters. A 
new re-deliberation period is currently underway. The definitive lease standard is 
expected in the fourth quarter of 2015 as showed in the figure 1.1. Project stages.  
Figure 1.1. Project stages 
 
  
Under the convergence agreement, the IASB and the FASB are developing a 
common lease standard to replace those currently in force (IAS 17 and ASC 840). The 
ultimate aim is to develop new principles that allow the assets and liabilities associated 
with lease contracts to be reflected on the balance sheet. Under current standards, the 
assets and liabilities associated with lease contracts are not reflected on the balance 
sheet when the lease is classified as an operating lease. Furthermore, although the initial 
objective of the standard-setters was to converge, the last tentative decisions from the 
standards setters set out different proposals for some critical issues.  
However, the IASB and the FASB converge on most of the subjects in this standard, 
especially in the main objective of the project, the balance sheet recognition of all leases. 
Further, the converged decision are the definition of a lease, lease reported on lessee’s 
balance sheet, the measurement of lease liabilities and lessor accounting. The different 
decisions are lease expenses in income statement and cash flow statement (IASB, 2014, 
August). 
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1.4. Critical issues for lease accounting 
We have selected some critical issues that present conceptual inconsistencies: 1) 
definition of a lease; 2) balance sheet – lessee accounting; 3) Income statement – 
income statement; 4) lessor accounting; 5) evaluation and registration of the lease term 
and contingent payments. The selection have been made through a deductive logical 
analysis, examining the three documents published by regulators and considering the 
comment letters’ conceptual arguments in response to the standard-setters’ questions 
during the process.  
1.4.1. Definition of a lease 
In ED/2013/6, a lease is defined as “a contract that conveys the right to use an asset 
(the underlying asset) for a period of time in exchange for consideration” (IASB, 2013, 
p.13). Under current standards, the accounting for an operating lease and a service
contract is the same broadly speaking, so differentiation is not significant. However, this 
situation changed with the new lease standard. Therefore, the distinction between a 
lease and a service is now critical because it determines whether a lessee recognizes 
assets and liabilities. The line of off-balance sheet accounting is displaced from operating 
leases to services.  
The two conditions imposed by the proposed standard are the use of an identified 
asset, either explicitly or implicitly specified, and control over its use for an agreed period 
(directing the use of the asset and obtaining substantially all of the economic benefits 
from directing its use). This approach is in line with that established by Interpretation 
Standard IFRIC 4 Determining whether an arrangement contains a lease, which 
addresses agreements that do not have the legal form of a lease but convey the right to 
use an asset (or assets) in exchange for a fee. Therefore, the definition does not present 
conceptual problems; however, attention is focused on the two required conditions that 
have been clarify to reduce the risk of inconsistent application (IASB, 2015, February).   
The service components of contracts would be separated from the lease 
components, allowing lessees to use estimations to separate payments between lease 
and service components in a contract. The new standard would apply only to the lease 
components.  
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1.4.2. Balance sheet - Lessee accounting 
Under the proposal, lessees should recognize the rights and obligations derived 
from lease contracts on the balance sheet. An entity may opt to account for short-term 
leases (up to a maximum of 12 months) by applying current operating lease accounting. 
The choice of accounting treatment for operating leases must be consistent for each 
class of asset.  
De Martino (2011) studied the practical effects of the DP published in 2009. As a 
critical point, he disapproved of the exclusion of leases as a function of the period – short-
term leases – as it could generate a preference for contracts with shorter maturities 
accompanied by implicit and flexible renewal clauses. This adaptation of contracts for 
accounting manipulation can generate inefficiencies in contracts. He prefers the criteria 
based on the relevance. 
The boards continue to support the criteria of short-term leases, although they would 
be disclosed in notes (IASB/FASB, March 2014). However, the IASB is considering an 
exemption for the lease of small assets (for example, laptops) to address worries of the 
preparers of financial statements about the increase in costs to apply the new approach 
to large volumes of small items.  
The asset and liability is initially recognized at the present value of the minimum 
lease payments using the rate charged by the lessor. If this rate is not known, the 
lessee's incremental borrowing rate shall be used. An expense directly associated to 
entering into the contract is included in the initial amount of the asset. Furthermore, the 
boards also decided to apply the lease accounting at a portfolio level, considering similar 
leases’ contracts (IASB/FASB, March 2014).  
This approach, in which all leases are accounted for under the same principles 
(apart from some limited exemptions for expedience), tries to prevent small differences 
in the form of the transaction from resulting in major differences in how it is accounted 
for. Under the existing “all or nothing” approach to lease accounting, there is almost no 
real difference between two leases, for instance, committing companies to pay 89% and 
90%, respectively, of the leased assets’ values, yet that 1% difference can mean that 
one lease must be placed on the balance sheet and that the other can be kept off (Biondi 
et al., 2011). García Suárez (2011) argues that this simplifies the comparability of 
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financial statements globally. Regulators hope to improve the quality of accounting 
standards.  
1.4.3. Income statement - Lessee accounting 
After the problems posed by the latest draft (2013), where a dual model had been 
suggested (depending on whether the consumption of the asset was insignificant or not), 
the IASB and the FASB have maintained different positions concerning the recognition 
of lease expenses on a lessee’s income statement. The IASB has tentatively decided to 
go back to a single lessee model that would require the recognition of interest and 
amortization for all leases recognized on a lessee’s balance sheet. To the contrary, the 
FASB preserve the dual model. This latter implies two expense recognition methods for 
the lessee’s income statement, depending on the existing classification between finance 
leases and operating leases. The table below shows the treatment for each case. 
Table 1.1. Reflection of leases in the income statement by the lessee (new dual model 
proposed by FASB) 
Type A. Finance leases  (single model 
proposed by the IASB) 
Type B. Operating leases 
Two expense components are recognised: 
amortisation and interest.  
Declining total expense: the interest expense 
falls as the debt is repaid. 
A single lease expense is recognised. 
The expense is recognised on a straight-line 
basis over the lease term. 
The consequences of this classification proposed by the FASB lead to a different 
accounting treatment for lessees’ income statements. The FASB maintains this solution 
for practical considerations, but this difference increases the difficulty of comparability. 
Moreover, the type B operating lease requires a method for increasing depreciation to 
offset the decreasing interest expense that would be reflected in a linear leasing 
expense. Straight-line depreciation has been discussed by the accounting literature; it 
presents some conceptual problems.  
Jennings and Marques (2013) compare straight-line depreciation with present-value 
depreciation. They demonstrate that present-value depreciation affords information that 
more faithfully reflects the economic substance of the transaction. Furthermore, they find 
that investors value firms as if the operating lease assets were capitalized and 
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depreciated using a present value approach. As for financial ratios, they perceive that 
comparability is further increased with the present-value method. Consequently, there is 
no evidence favouring straight-line over present-value depreciation.  
Zeff (2014, p.55) calls this method of depreciation the annuities method or the 
compound interest method, as it leads to an increase in depreciation expense and is 
compatible with capital budgeting methods for evaluating investment decisions. Another 
way to look at it is that the depreciation expense each year represents the implicit 
repayment when the present value of the stream of annual cash flows is calculated. This 
current value becomes the cost that the company is willing to pay for the asset to achieve 
the required return on investment. 
However, as Zeff (2014, p.55) argues, the annuity method is not acceptable in the 
United States, mainly because it is too subjective. Regulators are aware of this 
prohibition, as document ED 2013 paragraph BC36 (a) explains the rejected the use of 
this method. However, whether or not aware of the coincidence, this method is proposed 
for the real estate industry (type B); therefore, we again find a contradiction in its 
preamble. 
The conceptual weakness with the use of this method of amortization is that it is not 
proposed as a better method of depreciation for operating leases: in that case, he would 
have considered this method of depreciation for accounting for all leases. However, it 
has been proposed out of necessity only to leases relating to real estate to achieve the 
objective of periodic linear expenditure. 
The IASB approach (a single model for lease accounting) is more consistent with 
the general accounting criteria of fixed assets and normal debts and, in consequence, is 
sounder conceptually.  
1.4.4. Lessor accounting 
Since the commencement of the revision of the lease standard, lessor accounting 
has suffered different changes, every one of them highly criticized by interested parties. 
The first draft (ED/2010/9) proposed a dual model whereby the lessor had to recognize 
an asset representing its right to receive payments from the lessee. In that approach, 
there were two possibilities for the credit side depending on the contract and the 
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approach: (i) recognize a lease liability while also recognizing the underlying asset 
(transaction recording approach) and (ii) derecognize the asset corresponding to the 
underlying asset transferred to the lessee and continue recognizing a residual asset 
representing the rights to the underlying asset at the end of the lease period (approach 
focusing on the disposal of assets). 
In the second draft (ED/2013/6), the proposed standard establishes a treatment for 
lessors symmetrical to that for lessees. The treatment is dependent on whether an 
insignificant part or more than an insignificant part of the asset has been transferred to 
the lessee. Type A, in which more than an insignificant part of the asset is transferred 
(assets other than a building, i.e., a machine), follows the "receivable and residual" 
model: a profit is immediately recognized on the portion of the asset considered to have 
been transferred. This amount is the difference between the present value of the lease 
payments receivable and the carrying amount of the portion of the asset transferred; no 
income from the residual portion of the asset is recognized (until the residual asset is 
sold or re-leased). For type B, where an insignificant part of the underlying asset is 
transferred (typically a building), the lessor accounting proposed was similar to the 
current treatment of operating leases.  
However, the feedback received for these two proposals indicated that the costs 
associated with the changes in lessor accounting at this time would outweigh the 
benefits. Finally, after a period of reflection, the IASB and the FASB have tentatively 
decided to leave current lessor accounting unchanged for the new Lease Standard and 
to return to it in the future.  
The accounting literature has shown less interest in studying lessor accounting. 
However, there are some studies that address it. Thus, we observe publications related 
to the registration and assessment of residual value (Powers and Revsine, 1989; 
Bauman and Francis, 2011) and to the value of the creditors’ right. In fact, the 
memorandum prepared jointly by the IASB and FASB for the international meeting of the 
Joint Working Group on International Leasing, held in London on February 15, 2007 
(IASB/FASB, 2007), summarizes the state of art in lease accounting and emphasizes 
some areas of lease accounting that have not been enough investigated, such as lessor 
accounting.  
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An important facet of the leases is the inverse relationship between rent payments 
and residual values. All else held constant, leases with large residual values allow the 
lessor to offer more competitive prices than contracts with smaller residual values. 
However, companies with large residual values require payback from the sale or the re-
lease of the asset. Therefore, lessors may have incentives to report inflated residual 
values. In this case, essentially, inflated residuals mask dependent losses (Bauman and 
Francis, 2011). Uncertainty about residual values is usually one of the biggest risks to 
the lessor and can be solved with residual value guarantees. Therefore, the information 
provided in the report on the residual value and the guarantees associated with it is 
essential for users of financial statements, such as lenders or investors. 
1.4.5. Evaluation and registration of the lease term and contingent payments 
Many leases include contingent variables whose future realization is uncertain, for 
example, clauses with options for renewal or termination, contingent rents or residual 
value guarantees. To address such clauses, regulators face two opposing problems. On 
the one hand, both renewal or termination options (Jamal and Tan, 2010) and contingent 
rents (Song, 2014) are a tool for structuring contracts. In addition, consistent with agency 
theory, evidence shows that auditors usually agree with clients in managing these 
clauses (Kadous, Kennedy and Peecher, 2003). On the other hand, both renewal or 
termination options and contingent payments are not present obligations. Therefore, the 
requirement to register them at the beginning of the contract contradicts the definition of 
liabilities in the conceptual framework.  
In a practical sense, Biondi et al. (2011) argue that if the standard requires 
capitalizing all contract options, there is a high probability that companies only include in 
contracts those clauses that will certainty occur. 
1.4.5.1. Renewal or termination options 
The initial consideration of renewal options within the lease period has been 
discussed. Some evidence suggests that renewal options are used to move a portion of 
lease financing out of balance (Hyatt and Reed, 2007). 
The 2013 draft stipulates that renewal options or termination of the contract shall be 
included if there are significant economic incentives to exercise these options, 
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considering factors based on the contract or on the asset, factors that are specific to the 
entity and the market (IASB, 2013, p.17). IAS 17 and ASC 840 make mention of the 
terms "reasonably certain" or "reasonably assured". The introduction of the term 
"significant economic incentives" adds a high level of subjectivity to the standard but 
includes a wider range of action that the term "reasonable certainty". 
The final tentative decision of the boards to date is that “when determining the lease 
term, an entity should consider all relevant factors that create an economic incentive to 
exercise an option to extend, or not to terminate, a lease. An entity should include such 
an option in the lease term only if it is reasonably certain that the lessee will exercise the 
option having considered the relevant economic factors.” (IASB/FASB, March 2014, p.1). 
The purchase options should be treated equally. In addition “a lessee should reassess 
the lease term only upon the occurrence of a significant event or a significant change in 
circumstances that is within the control of the lessee.” (IASB/FASB, March 2014, p.1). 
That represents a return to the origin, to the existing standards. This position 
simplifies the implications of the lease term in the future standard, sacrificing the goal of 
fighting against the use of renewal and termination options as a manner for hiding part 
of the debt of lease contracts. Perhaps regulators have made this concession to 
encourage the adoption of the final standard and so the main change proposed is the 
recognition of assets and liabilities for all long-term non-cancellable leases. 
1.4.5.2. Variable lease payments 
Initially, the lease proposal intended to recognize the debt of almost all contingent 
rent to avoid contract structuring. However, this measure was highly controversial 
because interested parties considered it to be conceptually inconsistent. The most recent 
tentative decision made by the boards confirmed that only variable lease payments that 
are in substance fixed payments and lease payments that depend on an index or a rate 
should be capitalized. Contingent rents based on performance or the use of an asset will 
not increase the asset or liability in any case. When they are generated, they will be 
recognized in the income statement. 
Reassessments of contingent payments have raised larger doubts among interested 
parties. For example, KPMG (2013, CL199) is not in accordance with the revaluation of 
variable payments because they feel this should be limited to highly inflationary 
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economies. In the comment letter submitted to ED/2013/6, PwC (2013, CL301) considers 
it appropriate to re-measure the assets and liabilities generated by the variable payments 
based on the variability of an index or a rate, but they do not believe it should be required 
at each reporting date in the absence of a contractual change in cash flow. They feel this 
is an unnecessary burden for preparers if the amount is irrelevant. 
As to this point, the IASB and the FASB arrived at different conclusions. The IASB 
establishes that “a lessee should reassess variable lease payments that depend on an 
index or a rate when the lessee re-measures the lease liability for other reasons (for 
example, because of a reassessment of the lease term) and when there is a change in 
the cash flows resulting from a change in the reference index or rate (that is, when an 
adjustment to the lease payments takes effect) (IASB/FASB, April 2014, p.1). In contrast, 
the FASB only permits reassessing variable lease payments when the lessee re-
measures the lease liability for other reasons. 
1.5. Practical implications of the lease proposal 
Accounting literature establishes that changes in accounting standards may have 
real economic impact in different ways. Concretely, the economic consequences of 
changes in lease accounting have been well documented by researchers. These studies 
are considered to be ex ante research because the standards have been never 
implemented and the evidence is based on assumptions.  
1.5.1. Direct effects of the lease proposal on financial statements and ratios 
There is a specific body of accounting literature on leases that focuses on measuring 
the impact that off-balance sheet lease capitalization (operating leases under IAS 17 and 
ASC topic 840) would have on financial statements. These studies are based on 
estimations, that is, the authors calculate the total amount of the assets and liabilities 
that would be recognized on the balance sheet and also the impact on the income 
statement, cash flow and key ratios, considering the information available in companies’ 
footnotes. Therefore, the method and the estimated data used to determine these 
amounts are critical to research.  
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Basically, we distinguish two methods of capitalization: the constructive 
capitalization method and the factor method. The constructive capitalization method 
developed by Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991, 1997) is the most widely used in academia 
and approaches the method for calculating the right-of-use proposed in the new 
standard. It requires estimating the initial amount of debt and assets at the present value 
of the minimum lease payments for every non-cancellable operating lease (long term). 
The minimum lease payment should be given in the notes under ASC topic 840 and IAS 
17. In contrast, other figures must be estimated (i.e., the discount rate, lifetime, etc.). The
different evolution of assets and debt is also considered. 
The factor method uses a factor that multiplies the annual current rental costs 
depending on the industry sector; sectors differ regarding the intensity of the operating 
leases (8 is the most quoted number). This method is intended to simulate the purchase 
of all assets and not simply to capture the present value of contractual obligations. This 
method is much simpler than the capitalization method, and it is often utilized by analysts 
or international credit rating agencies (i.e., Moody’s, 2006; Standard and Poor’s, 2008; 
Fitch, 2011) to quickly calculate the capitalization amount. Academic studies prefer the 
constructive capitalization method because it is considered to be more accurate, and 
they only employ the factor method to contrast results. Thus, in the next paragraphs, we 
focus primarily on papers based on the first method.  
Before the publication of SFAS 13 in 1976, in the decade of the sixties, Nelson 
(1963) conducted an analysis of eleven companies from North America in which 
operating leases were capitalized at the present value of future minimum payments. In 
this case, the author obtained the necessary data from voluntary corporate disclosure: 
lifetime, duration of the lease, interest rate and committed revenues. In addition, he 
considered a system of linear depreciation. The analysis of the variation of financial ratios 
led him to conclude that comparisons between companies could be inaccurate and 
misleading if leases were not capitalized. However, the sample was too small to 
extrapolate the findings; this paper set the basis for future works.  
Later, Ashton (1985) used the same method as Nelson to capitalize the lease assets 
of twenty-three British companies. For every measure, he ranked the companies with 
and without the capitalization of leases. By analysing various measures, he concluded 
that the position of the company as related to the others did not change significantly after 
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the capitalization of finance leases.  Although the sample was again too small to 
extrapolate the findings, the suggestion that including the capitalization of leases would 
lead to an unchanged relative standing of companies in the same industry was a 
contribution to the literature at that time.  
As we explained earlier in this chapter, the publication of SFAS 13 in 1976 and IAS 
17 in 1982 stipulated the partial lease capitalization model, where lease contracts were 
classified between finance and operating leases, and only the former type of contract 
was required to recognize assets and liabilities. Consequently, academic studies started 
to focus only on the simulated effects of operating lease capitalization because 
information for finance leases was included in the balance sheet.  
The studies of Nelson and Ashton were precedents of the seminal articles in this 
research line. Imhoff et al. (1991) developed the constructive capitalization method 
(known as the ILW method) by analysing seven companies with a high level of operating 
leases matched with another seven companies with a low level of operating leases. They 
conclude that the capitalization of operating leases may materially affect the comparison 
of companies across key financial ratios such as return on assets and debt to equity, 
especially for those companies that have a large portfolio of operating lease contracts, 
for example, airlines and the grocery industry.    
In the UK, Beattie et al. (1998) developed a similar study using the method of 
constructive capitalization over 232 UK listed companies. The authors examined nine 
different performance and balance sheet ratios. They improved upon the previous works 
by using a larger sample of companies from different industry sectors. As a contribution 
to the model, they included a specific estimation of the weighted average for the ratio of 
the remaining lifetime to the total lifetime of the contract for each industry sector and also 
an effective tax rate. They concluded that long-term debt was undervalued by 39%, while 
assets were undervalued by only 6%. The evidence showed that capitalization had a 
significant effect on the sales margin, return on assets and debt measures. These 
authors also found differences in the ranking of firms for the gearing ratio based on the 
recognition of the operating lease, in contrast to the finding of Ashton (1985). The 
changes were more significant in the more intensive service sector operating leases. 
Similar results have been obtained in subsequent studies developed in different 
countries over the world. Studies conducted in New Zealand, Canada, Germany, the UK 
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or Spain, among others, are addressed in the following paragraphs. For example, 
Bennett and Bradbury (2003) selected a sample of 38 companies quoted on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange in 1995. They found that operating lease capitalization also 
decreases profitability and liquidity added to the negative impact on leverage ratios 
demonstrated by previous papers. 
In the UK, Goodacre (2003) analysed 102 retail firms for the period 1994-1999. The 
evidence showed that the capitalization of operating leases would increase the operating 
profit of approximately 23% of firms because depreciation would be less than the 
operating lease rentals. The estimated impact on profit after tax is projected to 
experience approximately a 7% reduction.  They noted the negative impact over nine 
key performance ratios that include gearing, profitability, interest coverage and asset 
turnover. They conclude that this method of capitalization would not be well accepted by 
the retail industry because they would try to avoid the effects by changing long-term 
lease contracts to short-term lease contracts.  
Regarding the US economy, Mulford and Gram (2007) also concentrate on the retail 
industry by analysing 19 companies in 2006, and for Canada, Durocher (2008) applied 
the constructive capitalization method over 100 Canadian companies for the period 
2002-2003, arriving at the same conclusions as their predecessors.  
Fülbier, Pferdehirt and Silva (2008) created a simulation of 90 German listed 
companies in 2004. They used the constructive capitalization method, which adds a 
geometric regression model in which the lease descends at a constant rate. Unlike 
previous studies, they do not use a fixed discount rate but employ the discount rate used 
to calculate pensions and other provisions and, in their absence, other discount rates 
reported in memory. The results showed remarkable changes in a variety of financial 
ratios. However, according to these authors, the effects should not be overestimated 
because only minor effects can be observed for the profitability ratios and market 
multiples frequently used for evaluation. In addition, some industry sectors will be hardly 
affected at all compared to the retail industry sector, which would be one of the most 
affected.  
In Spain, Fito et al. (2013) conducted a study on a sample of 56 Spanish listed 
companies using the ILW method of capitalization for the period 2008 to 2010. The 
results showed that the impact on financial ratios is statistically significant. They find a 
Chapter 1. The new challenges of lease accounting 
46 
positive relationship between the size variation ratio and membership in the retail sector. 
Another affected sector is energy. Applying both the constructive capitalization method 
and the simplified factor method, they obtained similar conclusions because the impact 
of the method of constructive capitalization over the benefit and profitability ratio is very 
small. 
There is another study in Spain performed by Barral Rivada, Cordobés Madueño 
and Ramírez Sobrino (2014). They examined a sample of listed companies in the UK 
and a sample of 105 listed companies in Spain in 2005. The results clearly showed that 
operating lease capitalization lead to a decrease of 13% in the return on assets and to 
an increase of 58% in the leverage ratio.  
Some audit firms have conducted studies about the impact that recognizing the right 
of use proposed in the new lease standard would have on business. For instance, PwC 
(2010) conducted a study based on the financial information (fiscal year 2008) of more 
than 3,000 listed companies in 54 countries worldwide that assesses the impact of the 
capitalization of operating leases in the financial statements and financial ratios of the 
same, given the industry sector. 
All of the previous studies reviewed confirmed the expected impact that the 
capitalization of operating leases would have on reporting figures and financial ratios. 
However, it is important to know whether there are adverse effects in the market from 
these changes, a theme that will be discussed in the next section.  
1.5.2. Consequences of the changes in financial figures due to operating lease 
capitalization from the investor’s and the lender’s perspective 
Previous evidence has shown that the new lease approach will likely have a 
quantitative effect on financial statements and key financial ratios due to operating lease 
capitalization. However, the evidence is mixed regarding the relevance of the impact 
from these changes in reporting figures for credit ratings and investors’ perceptions. 
Therefore, from the capital market perspective, there are studies that report differences 
in the market perception of on-balance sheet debt compared to off-balance sheet lease 
debt and other papers that do not, as Barone, Birt and Moya (2014) confirmed in their 
overview of the literature.  
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There are authors that support the belief that the market has already integrated the 
effect of off-balance sheet leases. They argue that users of financial statements can 
easily calculate the expected impact using information disclosed in notes (Lindsey, 2006; 
Sakai, 2010; Sengupta and Wang, 2011; Altamuro et al., 2014). This argument only 
holds if certain axioms (Arimany, Fito, Moya and Orgaz, 2013) are assumed. First, it is 
assumed that the required information is disclosed in the notes and that this information 
is reliable. Second, it is assumed that any user is able to assess the potential impact of 
operating leases from the information disclosed in the notes. There are other researchers 
that have presented objections to these assumption (i.e., Arimany et al., 2013). They 
usually support the opposite position: the market perceives off-balance sheet leases in 
a different manner than on balance sheet leases (Andrade, Henry and Nanda, 2011; 
Dhaliwal, Lee and Neamtiu, 2011).  
It is true that professional analysts, such as all large credit rating firms (Moody's, 
Fitch and Standard and Poor's), adjust financial statements to incorporate the resources 
and obligations under operating leases, seeking to achieve improved comparability of 
results and to better assess the magnitude of debt for entities. For operating leases, 
some analysts, such as Moody's (2006), use factor techniques, multiplying the amount 
recognized as an expense for the lease period by a figure close to the number eight; this 
number can vary depending on the sector and the characteristics of the company. The 
factor method has been used in the literature as a contrast method. For example, the 
results of the study of Fito et al. (2013) show no significant difference between the 
constructive capitalization method and the factor method despite the simplicity of the 
former. 
This evidence reduces concern about possible negative consequences from the 
existing accounting methods for operating leases and raises concerns about the 
accounting proposal, which capitalizes all leases regardless of their economic 
characteristics. Krische et al. (2012) study the perception of analysts; although operating 
leases often act as the prototypical example for structuring transactions, responses from 
their survey of 24 analysts suggest that structuring leases and related voluntary 
settlements do not pose the same problems for them as do other earnings management 
activities (which decreases the perception of the credibility of management analysts). 
Additionally, defending the first position, Altamuro et al. (2014), based on their 
predecessors’ work (Lindsey, 2006; Sakai, 2010; Sengupta and Wang, 2011), confirm 
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that banks and rating agencies adjust for the display of off-balance sheet operating 
leases and, at least in the case of banks, try to reflect the underlying economics of the 
leases.  
Relating to the equity value, Boastman and Dong (2011) demonstrate, through a 
case study, that financial statements, adjusted for errors in accounting for operating 
leases, do not have an effect on the value of the company as estimated through three 
models of equity valuation. This finding is consistent with the assessment made by the 
IASB/FASB working group (2007, p.14): “the market’s assessment of firms’ equity risk 
did not change following the adoption of Statement 13” in 1976.  
Relating to the objection to the two assumptions, we review several papers that 
argue from different points of view. For the first assumption, Arimany et al. (2013), in line 
with the existing literature, analyse the degree of compliance in the UK and Spain to IAS 
17 issued by the IASB, in particular, as regards the notes on operating leases. In their 
study, the evidence shows that in the first year in the implementation of IFRS (2005), 
most Spanish companies did not disclose the required information about operating 
leases (82%). However, the number of companies complying with requirements 
increased over time and, in 2011, 66% of companies provided information in their notes 
on operating leases. These percentages are significantly higher for British companies. 
In the first year of analysis, 82% of UK companies provided this information, with a slight 
increase over the period of analysis. In 2011, only 16% of UK companies analysed did 
not disclose this information. In conclusion, there are different levels of non-compliance 
with the required disclosure depending on the country (Arimany et al., 2013).  
In relation to the assumption of reliability for the information provided in the notes, 
prior literature has demonstrated that in some cases, the quality and reliability of 
information recognized in the balance sheet or income statements is higher than the 
information only disclosed in notes. For example, Libby, Nelson and Hunton (2006) 
conducted a controlled study with 33 partners of Big Four audit firms. In this experiment, 
researchers manipulated the information provided in the balance sheet and that 
disclosed in notes about lease portfolios. The result provides evidence that auditors are 
more willing to allow errors in the information provided in the notes than in the amounts 
recognized in the balance sheets. The same evidence is reported later by Strand, Rose 
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and Suh (2011): auditors give more importance to recognized information than to 
disclose information. 
Regarding the third assumption, the IASB identifies users of financial statements as 
any current or potential lender or investor, which reflects professional and non-
professional users. The question we ask here is whether non-professional users are able 
to interpret the information disclosed in the same way as professional investors or 
lenders. There are some authors that believe non-professional users have a comparative 
disadvantage to professional users. Hales, Venkataraman and Wilks (2012) perform a 
controlled experiment using MBA students as a proxy for non-professional investors. The 
experiment successfully responds to ex ante study notions of accounting policies. This 
paper concludes that non-professional lenders are less willing to lend money to a 
company that capitalizes optional renewal periods than to a company that reflects this 
information in the notes. Although this particular case refers only to renewal options, this 
experiment can be extended to the decision whether to capitalize or not as we try to 
evaluate the impact for non-professional investors. What Hales et al. (2012) show in their 
experiment is that in the case of non-professional investors or lenders, the capacity to 
interpret off-balance sheet data is lower. 
In the opposite side, studies exist that focus on perception with and without 
capitalizing operating leases in terms of bond ratings; CDS prices (Andrade et al., 2011); 
and the perception of risk for a company (Dhaliwal et al., 2011), concluding that there 
are differences depending on whether the balance sheet did or did not include the debt 
of operating leases. Recently, an article was published that studied the effects of 
capitalizing operating leases on the immediacy of debt covenant violations performed by 
Lee, Paik and Yoon (2014), concluding that there are changes.  
As observed, the consensus does not exit, under the perceptions of the market. In 
this case, we agree with the statement of Nailor and Lennard in 2000, who argue that 
because analysts, lenders and investors need to incorporate the value of the assets and 
liabilities related to leases, it would be much more transparent and less costly if 
capitalization was conducted by the companies using a unique method. 
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1.6. The assessments of groups interested in the lease proposal 
The changes in lease accounting have been very controversial. On the one hand, it 
is assumed that the new accounting approach would help user decision making by 
increasing comparability, but on the other hand, there is a concern about cost and 
consequences for companies. There has been serious debate in both specialized and 
more general forums, such as the IASB/FASB environment, academic accounting 
reviews, and the economic press.  
There is a body of accounting literature that, in the earlier stages of the project, 
documented differences in the point of view between users of financial reporting and 
preparers. For example, Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2006) published an empirical 
paper in which they demonstrate through a survey (apropos of the document published 
in 1996, "Accounting for leases: a new approach") that users believe that the lease 
information obtained from existing standards is less than they should obtain. To the 
contrary, preparers were only partially in favour in some respects. 
Regarding the responses to the three documents published by the IASB and the 
FASB, there are several studies that documented reactions to the proposal by different 
collectives. In the works of Kort (2011), Mora and Molina (2014) and Barral Rivada 
(2014), which analyse the comment letters submitted by companies, auditors, national 
standards setters, academics and users addressing the lease project, it is observed there 
is great resistance to the change in the accounting approach, mainly from companies. 
Concerns focus on issues such as the unnecessary complexity associated with 
interpretations of the standard; excessive costs for implementing the standard that 
outweigh the benefits; lack of relevance of the information for most stakeholders; lack of 
benefits for small businesses; and lack of consistency with existing standards. They also 
possess other concerns regarding practical issues, such as the renegotiation of debt 
covenants.  
We observe that financial directors who are considered to be preparers of financial 
statements for both lessees and lessors are primarily against the changes to the 
accounting for leases. The main reasons are the economic consequences referred to 
earlier in this chapter. There is a wish to preserve the status quo because they are used 
to it and have found the best manner of making efficient transactions under the present 
rules. If the standard changes, companies would need time to adapt to the new situation. 
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In the following table, we offer a random sample of general comments by companies to 
ED/2013/6.  
Table 1.2. A random sample of the general comment by companies in response to the 
ED/2013/6 
Company name General comments 
Koch Industries Inc. “Does not reflect economic reality” 
Beacon Rail leasing 
“Overly complex, operationally challenging, disconnected 
from reality” 
HSBC “No improvement, conceptually inconsistent, complex” 
Lafarge “No improvement, too complex, does not reflect reality” 
Union Pacific Railroad Co “Not cost effective” 
ConocoPhillips “Too burdensome” 
Exxon Mobil Corporation “No benefit, reduces comparability” 
General Electric Company 
“Agrees with FEI, drop the project, no improvement, too 
costly” 
Societe Generale “No conceptual basis, do not adopt” 
Wal-Mart Store Inc. 
“The cost to implement and the added complexities of the 
proposed standard significantly outweigh the benefits” 
Canadian National Railway Co “Overly burdensome, too costly” 
Volkswagen Group “Reduces comparability, cancel the entire project” 
PHH Arval 
“Too onerous on both lessees and lessors and would require 
additional costs that outweigh the benefits” 
Angel Trains “More complex, costly, confusing” 
Dow Chemical Company “Complex, costly” 
Remke Market 
“Again, overly burdensome to SME's with dubious benefit to 
the users of those statements” 
WestJet airlines LTD 
“Level of complexity will lead to a lack of comparability and 
understandability amongst issuers” 
However, for the preparers, the concrete reasons for being against or in favour of 
the new approach differ depending on the industry sector.  One specific sector that will 
be affected is the oil and gas industry sector, but due to the existence of their special 
operative, they offer some doubts regarding the new proposal. For instance, will drilling 
contracts be considered leases? As PwC confirms, they would have to analyse each 
drilling contract to see if it fits the conditions of the lease definition and that will increase 
the cost, the uncertainty and the comparability. In contrast, we observe that the US real 
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estate industry sector does not demonstrate a radical position against the proposal. The 
reason is that their main concern was solved in the last draft: the ability to register 
expenses of type B leases in a straight line (equivalent to previous operating leases). To 
illustrate this fact, the Washington Real Estate Investment Trust comments on the letter 
submitted to the last exposure draft (2013, CL113, p.1): “Fortunately, the standards in 
the Revised ASU have adequately and sensibly addressed our concerns regarding 
lessor accounting”.   
We can observe the high presence of service industry sectors strongly opposing the 
lease standard. As presented by Goodacre (2003), the retail subsector is one of the most 
intensive in the use of operating leases and its voice is also represented in comment 
letters, as well as the voices of hotels and commercial airlines. In the industrial sectors 
objecting, we find large US and European conglomerates, specifically those associated 
with transportation by land, sea and air. The chemical industry is also included, as well 
as health care and agricultural industry sectors. All of these industries use machinery 
that could be leased. Consultants and business associations are considered to be 
indirect lobbyists for preparers (Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert and Van Der Tas, 2011); 
therefore, they maintain the same position as the industry sector they are associated 
with.  
Professionals at accounting and auditing firms and accounting profession 
associations are also a group that is actively involved in sending comment letters to the 
regulators (Haring, 1979; Puro, 1984; MacArthur, 1988; Hylton-Meier, Alam and 
Pearson, 1993; Larson, 2007). As regards the lease proposal, auditors have been very 
active in submitting comment letters on the three documents. Analysing the comment 
letters specific to Big Four accounting firms, we notice that they appear to agree with the 
general approach: the capitalization of operating leases. However, they find several 
points too complex such as the dual model for recognizing expenses in the lessees’ 
income statement. In lessor accounting, they agree with the return to the previous 
standards. They recommend better clarifying the two conditions to define a lease 
contract and also eliminating some terms that could be too subjective such as “important 
economic incentive”. It appears that standards setters have considered some of the audit 
firms’ recommendations in their re-deliberations.  
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The national standard-setters are a supportive group in general, as demonstrated 
by Mora and Molina (2014) after analysing their comment letters in response to the lease 
DP published in 2009 and by Giner and Arce (2014) in relation to other standards. This 
support could be explained by their need to collaborate with international standard-
setters to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their national constituents. 
The collective of academics is very small, but they provide an interesting point of 
view on some specific concepts or clauses, as we can observe in the comment letters 
submitted by Zeff (2013, CL14), who is an expert in normative accounting. Finally, 
professional and non-professional users present a mixed opinion. Some of them prefer 
to continue under the existing standards and some consider the new lease standards to 
be an improvement, although they also have some objections. The same occurs for 
authorities and individuals.  
1.7. Conclusion of the chapter 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the discussion in the international arena 
on accounting for leases. We present the new lease standard as compared to existing 
standards, developing the theoretical issues and practical implications of accounting for 
leases. We consider this to be a relevant subject for this thesis to test some lobbying 
theories because it is a highly controversial standard and a much debated issue into the 
normative accounting field.  
We exposed the substantial number of lease operations that comprise corporate 
financing strategies. Under the same tax and economic conditions, classical finance 
theory does not find any financial differences between leasing or buying an asset; 
however it does find that lease contracts present advantages over normal debt, such as 
lower maintenance costs or more flexible conditions in the contract. Furthermore, 
positive accounting theory also finds other financial and not financial variables that favour 
lease contracts.  
Under the existing standards, leases are classified so that assets and liabilities that 
derive from financial leases are recognized on the balance sheet and those generated 
by operating leases stay off of the balance sheet. The empirical data has demonstrated 
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that from the adoption date of SFAS 13 (now ASC 840) in 1976 and IAS 17, in 1982, the 
number of operating leases has experimented a notable increase compared to the 
enormous decrease in financial leases. These data suggest the preferences of 
companies that consider having assets and liabilities off-balance sheet to be a 
comparative advantage. 
Concerned with this phenomenon, the IASB and the FASB tried to converge into a 
common lease standard that avoids alternative accounting for different lease 
transactions and that permits comparability between countries. Therefore, a new 
approach was presented where all long-term non-cancellable lease contracts must be 
recognized on the balance sheet and the income statement. The proposed standard 
includes changes in policies for recognizing assets and liabilities in lessees’ and lessors’ 
accounting, comprising options in the lease term and contingent payments, modifications 
to the manner of registering expenses and income from the lease, and other issues such 
as lease-backs, presentations, disclosure, etc. However, the new proposal has raised a 
storm of criticism, and consequently, it has currently still not been published.  
The previous accounting literature has focused on lease accounting, developing 
empirical ex-ante research that could be very important to helping regulators understand 
the economic consequences of the lease proposal. In the third section of this chapter, 
we reviewed the empirical evidence that confirms the larger impact of the new proposal 
on the reporting figures of companies across all industries and jurisdictions by increasing 
their debt. These studies demonstrate that leverage ratios would be significantly 
increased by the capitalization of operating leases as would performance measures such 
as the profit margin and return on assets, although not as intensely as balance sheet 
measures. The most affected companies would be those in the service industry sector, 
such as retailers, hotels, airlines, and vehicle providers. The change could also affect 
debt covenant requirements.  
Prior literature maintains a mixed position on how the economic effects of the new 
proposal on reporting figures and ratios would be perceived by analysts, investors and 
lenders or by the market itself. Some authors suppose that there is no change in 
perceptions because professional analysts already adjust the figures to include the effect 
of operating leases. However, other researchers suppose that not all investors are 
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professional and have the tools and knowledge to calculate this impact. One of the main 
issues is that not all companies comply with disclosure requirements.  
The interested parties have offered a mix between conceptual and economic 
arguments to oppose or defend the new lease standard. Comment letters submitted in 
the process, institutional information, audit firm reports and the economic press 
document the strong debate around the proposed changes. Preparers of financial 
reporting and users of financial information have different objectives in defending or 
criticizing several clauses of the standard. On the one hand, the new accounting 
approach would help user decision-making by increasing the quality of information and 
comparability and, on the other hand, there are changes that are considered to be 
excessively costly and complex for preparers compared to the benefits to the business 
world. Moreover, there are other groups such as auditors or academics that may have a 
more neutral perspective.   
In this chapter, we have recognized the importance of lease accounting for business 
and financial strategy. This chapter offers a summary of the state of discussion about 
accounting for leases. It leads us to recognize that the regulators involved in this lease 
accounting standard-setting process do not have an easy solution. After understanding 
the situation, the next step is to understand if there are political forces pressuring 
standard-setters to favour the self-interest of some powerful groups and, if these forces 
exist, to understand the nature of the pressures that standard-setters are subject to.  
Therefore, for several reasons such as the complexity of the conceptual approach 
considering the critical points of the lease standard and the difficulties of the lease 
standard-setting process, which has postponed agreement on and the publication of the 
new standard, we consider the lease standard to be a very good issue of focus for 
understanding the behaviour of parties interested in the process. 
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Chapter 2 
Overview of lobbying literature in the accounting 
standard-setting process 
2.1. Introduction to the chapter 
Under the convergence process, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) are immersed in creating 
a new accounting framework to reduce differences between International and US 
standards. The discussion of standards around convergence attracts more attention from 
the international community than previous projects. The participation of interested parties 
in the accounting standard-setting due process could be perceived to be a signal of the 
regulators’ legitimacy and the outcomes’ quality (Durocher and Fortin, 2011). Moreover, 
the viability of accounting standards is conditioned to the legitimacy of standard-setters 
as well as to users’ confidence in the companies´ financial statements (Burlaud and 
Colasse, 2011).  
The IASB and the FASB are private organisations that need to be accepted by 
society to develop their objectives. Consequently, they need sufficient authority (political 
legitimacy), enough technical expertise (substantial legitimacy) and an independent and 
transparent due process (procedural legitimacy) (Burlaud and Colasse, 2011). External 
pressures over the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) to increase 
independence and professionalism and thereby achieve more international recognition 
took form in an internal restructuring in 2001, through which it transformed itself into the 
IASB, which is more similar to FASB. Richardson and Eberlein (2011) state: (i) input 
legitimacy is gained with constituents’ participation; (ii) throughput legitimacy is acquired 
during the process of transforming the collected inputs using a formalised decision 
process and; (iii) output legitimacy arrives when the standards are finally produced. 
Cortese and Irvine (2010) describe the decision-making process of standard-setters 
as a ‘black box’ to illustrate its complexity. According to Watts (2006), accounting 
regulators fix directions as part of a market-driven process, distinguishing political forces 
moving towards market equilibrium from those directed by special groups for self-
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interested reasons not oriented to the equilibrium. In this sense, the previous literature 
suggests that regulators’ interest payoff may be positively correlated to social welfare or 
efficient decision making (Polk, 2002), whereas individuals and groups are moved by 
their own interests (Sutton, 1984).  
Standard-setters are subject to external and internal pressures, as institutional 
theory confirms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These pressures could be visible or 
invisible to society. Orens et al. (2011), based on the previous work of Georgiou (2004), 
also distinguishes between formal versus informal and direct versus indirect methods of 
exercising pressure. One of the most accessible participation methods for interested 
parties is the submission of comment letters. Other direct methods are presentations at 
public events; meetings or calls with regulators or technical staff; and consulting work on 
particular projects. Indirect methods include pressure through others, such as comments 
in the media; associations representing the interests of the company; external auditors; 
and members of institutions or sponsoring research studies.   
Sutton (1984) defines lobbying as all actions taken by stakeholders to influence the 
regulatory process to defend their own interests. Most of the studies in this area have 
used comment letters as a proxy for lobbying activities, defining lobbyists as all parties 
who submit a comment letter in response to a discussion paper or an exposure draft 
launched by standard-setters (Hansen, 2011). It has been assumed that comment letters 
are the most visible action within lobbying activities, reflecting also the invisible side. 
However, the question is whether and to what extent comment letters could be a proxy 
for lobbying activities. In this chapter, we discuss this question while reviewing the prior 
literature.  
Therefore, comment letters are considered to be useful for lobbyists, regulators and 
researchers. They might be useful for interested parties as an instrument to persuade 
regulators. In addition, they should be useful for regulators in terms of the legitimacy and 
quality of standards. Finally, they allow researchers to better understand the critical 
issues of a new regulation and to study the behaviour of parties in the process. This 
information is valuable for the market and especially for preparers and users of financial 
information.  
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the lobbying literature in the 
accounting standard process through comment letters submissions. To do that, we 
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review prior literature including seminal and current published articles, and also some 
working papers and thesis, mainly focusing on lobbying papers that emphasis on 
comment letters submitted to the standard-setting process (specially to IASB and FASB). 
We classify prior literature according to the following criteria: participation in the due 
process (i.e., Larson, 2007; Koh, 2011; Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens and Van der Tas, 2012; 
Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens and Van der Tas; 2013; Holder, Karim, Lin and Woods, 2013); 
content analysis (i.e., Kwok and Sharp, 2005; Stenka and Taylor, 2010; Le Manh, 2011; 
Mora and Molina, 2014); and influence on accounting standard-setters (i.e., Yen, Hirst 
and Hopkins, 2007; Hansen, 2011; Giner and Arce, 2012; Bautista Mesa, Molina 
Sánchez and Ramírez Sobrino, 2014).  
In recent years, academics and regulators have demanded more works focused on 
the accounting standard-setting process. Most empirical research has focused on 
lobbying through preparers (companies and managers) and less attention has been 
given to audit firms and other groups of participants such as institutions, market 
regulators, etc. Our chapter aims to contribute to the previous literature in different ways. 
First, we examine the existing literature to understand how political forces could influence 
the standard-setting process through comment letters. Second, we analyse the 
usefulness of comment letters for participants and regulators. Third, we identify 
fundamental questions that remain unanswered and could be developed by future 
studies. 
The structure of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide an 
overview of the main theoretical aspects behind lobbying research. In the next sections, 
we divide the lobbying literature that focuses on comment letters into three primary 
research lines: the literature that explains the decision to submit comment letters 
(participation), the literature that analyses the content of these comment letters (content 
analysis) and the literature that investigates the reaction of regulators to comment letters 
(relation input-output). In the last section, we present conclusions and final thoughts. 
2.2. Theoretical background 
Regulators incorporate formal public consultation when develop the accounting 
standards to know the views and opinions of constituents’ before the accounting 
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standards is mandatory. From the participants’ side, they involve themselves in the due 
process because they are interested to influence the standard-setting process to take an 
advantage. They are considered lobbyists, in most cases. It is known that private 
interests seeking to influence government decisions, legislation or the award of contracts 
are part of the policy-making process in modern democracies. As institutional theory 
asserts both sides, regulators and lobbyist, represent ends of a feedback loop. 
The US Government defines lobbying activity as the effort to persuade legislators to 
propose, pass or change legislation to provide benefits to parties with special interests 
(U.S. senate cited by Hill, Kelly, Lockhart and Ness, 2013). Focusing on the accounting 
standards regulatory process, which differs from other regulation process, Zeff (2002) 
differentiates technical from political lobbying. Political lobbying includes all political 
pressures and strengths affecting standard-setters moved by special interest groups for 
self-interested reasons. For example, the self-interested claims by preparers and others 
‘may be detrimental to the interest of investors and other users’ (Zeff, 2002, p.43). This 
political influence over standard-setters with the goal of affecting outcomes may or may 
not be inconsistent with the regulators’ mission.  
Durocher, Fortin and Côté (2007) performed an interesting classification of the 
previous literature on ‘lobbying’. In particular, the participation of interested parties in the 
accounting standard-setting process is explained in the framework of three theories: the 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), based on the works of Watts and Zimmerman (1978), 
which links economic motivations to corporate characteristics; the Economic Theory of 
Democracy (ETDG), initiated by Downs (1957) and Sutton, which measures the 
probability of participation based on a cost-benefit analysis; and the Coalition and 
Influence Group (CIG). 
The PAT group focuses on the underlying motivations behind preparers’ positions on 
accounting standards and on how they behave as pressure groups. The PAT theory 
does not include users as subjects, but it is clear that users are also affected by the 
underlying economic incentives. The literature identifies some key variables that 
influence the decision to participate in the due process of accounting standards. For 
example, subjects of study are the variables related to firm characteristics such as size 
and degree of indebtedness and variables related to country characteristics such as the 
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percentage of policy control (Francis, 1987; Jorissen, Lybaert and Van de Poel, 2006; 
Ramanna, 2008). 
According to the ETDG, a rational company or individual allocates resources to 
lobbying only if the benefits compensate for the costs, similar to the process of allocating 
a vote in a political system. In these terms, Sutton (1984) asks what type of individual or 
organisation finds lobbying more profitable. This equation can also be affected by the 
degree of support for preferences among individuals or pressure groups, the probability 
of influencing the decision process of the regulatory authority and the resources of the 
lobbyist. Some recent studies such as Jorissen et al. (2012) or Giner and Arce (2012) 
build hypotheses using this framework. 
The CIG group examines possible alliances between groups to influence the 
process of forming accounting standards. It starts with the Metcalf Report (1976), which 
states that the FASB is greatly influenced by the large audit firms. Later, Puro (1984) and 
McKee, Williams and Frazier (1991) conclude that there are strong coalitions between 
large audit firms and their clients, whereas others such as Haring (1979) do not support 
this hypothesis. Jorissen et al. (2006) separate the third theory as a theoretical 
framework related to non-pluralistic practice controlled by a few powerful clusters.  
In the next section, we review the main empirical evidence in this area and we 
provide some insight for future studies. Some of the most recent studies are summarized 
in the appendix 2.1.  
2.3. Literature about participation 
2.3.1. The decision to submit a comment letter 
We define the decision to submit or not to submit a comment letter as a cost-benefit 
function, as Sutton (1984) proposes according to rational choice theory. This cost-benefit 
function is generally represented by signalling models based on assumptions that also 
rely on agency theory (Jensen and Meekling, 1976). Accordingly, all individual action is 
driven by self-interest; therefore, individuals would act in an opportunistic manner to 
increase their wealth, without notions of loyalty and morality. The expected benefit could 
be the probability of influencing the final standard, also named the outcome, and the cost 
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is equivalent to the investment of resources that an interested party makes to submit a 
comment letter.  
Sutton (1984) divided the participants in the standards development process 
between preparers of financial reporting and users to explain differences in decisions by 
collectives of interest. Based on this partition, the IASB (2011, paragraph 17) has 
classified constituents into the following groups: preparer group, accounting profession 
group, regulators group, users, academics and consultants.  
The literature demonstrates that preparers have been the most numerous group in 
terms of participation without distinction among standard-setters (i.e., Tandy and 
Wilburn, 1992; Jorissen et al., 2006 and 2012). According to Sutton (1984), corporate 
preparers of financial reporting, contrary to investors and other users, are more willing to 
participate because they are richer, less diversified and their economic interests are 
more homogeneous. These characteristics reduce the cost of submitting a comment 
letter and increase the possibilities of success. Giner and Arce (2012) argue that even in 
a case where users are wealthier than preparers, they would be less interested in any 
standard because of their diversified portfolios.  
Several works show that preparers participate significantly more when proposals 
have a major impact on the financial statements of a firm (i.e., Jorissen et al., 2012); 
participation also depends on the type of accounting issue under consideration (Sutton, 
1984). The motivation to participate increases substantially when the accounting 
standard affects the recognition or measurement of relevant issues. It is accepted that 
accounting standards can impact financial statements; for example, changes in lease 
accounting would increase assets and liabilities due to operating lease capitalisation. 
Therefore, it could be interesting here to continue exploring the variables that explain the 
decision to submit a comment letter based on robust theories such as the agency 
framework and the positive accounting framework.  
Koh (2011), who examines the option expensing proposal launched in 2004, 
concludes that smaller firms that belong to an industry with peers who have lobbied and 
that have higher board independence are more likely to self-select to lobby. Recently, 
Kosi and Reither (2014) analyse the exposure draft of the Insurance Contracts standard, 
focusing principally on financial and insurance firms. Their results show that the lobbying 
decision is positively related to firms’ financial constraints, firm size, profitability and past 
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lobbying experience. Moreover, firms with more dispersed ownership are more likely to 
lobby intensively. This finding is in line with block holders’ potential to obtain private 
information and thereby disentangle the effect of accounting changes on firm 
performance. One interesting contribution is that the empirical evidence shows that firms 
who lobbied in the past might experience economies of scale. 
The group formed by auditors has been less studied, in contrast to preparers. 
According to the agency theory perspective, auditors are expected to lobby in response 
to the interests of their clients (Watts and Zimmerman, 1982; Puro, 1984), to risk and to 
the transfer of wealth (Hylton-Meier et al., 1993). Watts and Zimmerman (1982) argue 
that in a competitive equilibrium, auditors’ wealth ultimately depends on their customers. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explains the ways in which the interests of 
clients and auditors may overlap. The role of the auditor is represented as that of an 
agent, and corporate shareholders are its primary customers, so that auditors are 
expected to participate by representing the benefit of their clients and thus, in the 
process, also benefit themselves (Puro, 1984). Regarding only the Big Four audit firms, 
which have a different profile than other auditors, the tightening auditing oligopoly 
manifests in a decrease in competitive pressure to satisfy client preferences and causes 
concern about rule reliability and litigation costs (Allen, Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 
2013). 
The other groups, users, academics or national standard-setters, have been less 
studied by the literature. However, Durocher et al. (2007) argue that the theoretical 
framework from preparers could be extended to them. For example, the only paper that 
focuses on the participation of national standard-setters is Giner and Arce (2014). The 
results show that the participation of national standard-setters increased at the end of 
the process, which is consistent with institutional theory. They conclude that national 
standard-setters who are interested in a convergence process with the IASB are more 
likely to participate to gain legitimacy. In relation with other collectives, such as 
academics, there is so little participation. Then, researchers may pay attention to the 
unexplored collectives to provide new insights.  
There are basically two methodologies used to determine lobbyist participation. 
First, the identification of significant differences between lobbying groups versus no 
lobbying groups could be detected using univariate methodology such as the Wilcoxon-
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Mann-Whitney test or the Kruskal-Wallis test (i.e., Giner and Arce, 2012; Kosi and 
Reither, 2014). Second, the decision to submit a comment letter and its determinants 
could be modelled by a discrete choice model. The most common models are probit (i.e., 
Ang, Sidhu and Gallery, 2000; Jorissen et al., 2012) and logit (i.e., Francis, 1987; Koh, 
2011), which offer a binary dependent variable for lobbyists and not lobbyists to identify 
the probability of submitting a comment letter and the variables that determine the 
behaviour of submitting a comment letter. Other authors have also conducted 
multinomial regression when the dependent variable takes three or more values as the 
probability to submit one, two or more comment letters (Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos 
and Santos, 2014). This methodology allows researchers a more precise categorisation 
of the variable of interest than the binary models, which address only two categories.   
 In general, the empirical studies suggest differences between firms that choose to 
submit a comment letter and firms that do not (Koh, 2011; Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos 
and Santos, 2014). In this sense there is an extent study that summarizes the main 
studies about firm lobbying choice around FASB (Gipper, Lombardi and Skinner, 2013). 
The challenge for researchers could be to find solutions to make theory more robust in 
explaining the reasons for lobbying, perhaps by complementing them with sociological 
and psychological theories. Another practical problem is that studies often focus on 
companies because they submit more comment letters than other groups. Focusing on 
other collectives, such as auditors, or extending the sample would be good ways to solve 
this limitation. In the next section, we review the participation of constituents in an 
international setting to address the global profile of the IASB. 
2.3.2. Participation according to geographical location 
The IASB is a global standard-setter; therefore, it needs to have international 
legitimacy (Johnson and Solomons, 1984; Larson, 2007; Jorissen et al., 2013). The 
objective of international accounting standards is to make financial information 
comparable worldwide. However, each country has particularities that may affect its 
accounting approach (Nobes, 2006). 
There is a part of the literature that principally studies the impact of country variables 
in the decision to submit a comment letter. The first reflexion was made by Sutton (1984), 
who stated that different costs of noncompliance in different countries affect the lobbying 
level. Also literature on earnings management (Hope, 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 
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2003) and quality of earnings (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000) provides evidence that the 
cost of noncompliance differs between countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1998). Moreover, it is highly demonstrated that accounting practices are 
influenced by country variables such as capital market development, nation’s legal 
system, enforcement systems, investor protection, etc. (Leuz et al., 2003).  
As mentioned before, the theoretical foundations are primarily based on two 
premises. First, an organisation that submits international standards needs to be 
legitimated by the international community. Comment letters may contribute to 
increasing procedural legitimacy. Second, different country characteristics might include 
biases and different access due to the different cost of lobbying (Jorissen et al., 2013).  
The literature on comment letters has developed some models that explain the 
participation intensity by countries, firms or specific industries. As the impact of 
accounting standards adoption does not affect the entire jurisdiction in the same manner, 
the motivation to participate in the accounting standards setting process remains a 
special interest. Focusing on the country level, the empirical studies include specific 
country variables that explain different levels of participation intensity by country 
(Jorissen et al., 2006 and 2013; Larson and Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014). 
Empirical studies usually use the lobbying intensity of a particular country as a dependent 
variable measure based on the number of writers or the number of comment letters of a 
country (i.e., Larson and Herz, 2013 use both). The variable could be represented in 
absolute terms (Knospe and Dobler, 2014) or scaled by other variables such as 
companies listed in the domestic market (Jorissen et al., 2006) or GDP (Jorissen et al., 
2013). 
With respect to the determinants of lobbying intensity, the variables are usually 
classified into two groups: firm-level variables and firm-country variables. Related to the 
former, the most common variables are contractual arrangements, compensation 
arrangements, regulatory and industry motivations, size, ownership structures, and 
governance mechanisms. Related to the latter, the most common variables are the 
country’s level of economic development, proxy variables for financial, law and 
government systems, and also variables such as language barriers, reliance on the 
IFRS, country cultural dimensions, etc.  
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Economic variables have been considered in several previous works (e.g., Jorissen 
et al., 2013; Larson and Herz, 2013). Variables such as capital market development and 
gross domestic product per capita have been chosen as explanatory variables, detecting 
differences in participation in the sense that more developed countries are more likely to 
participate than less developed countries (Jorissen, Lybaert, Orens and Van der Tas, 
2014). 
Orens et al. (2011) suggest that the national regulatory background of preparers 
could affect their decision to participate versus not participate. Continental Europe has 
been regulated traditionally by a code law tradition wherein government institutions take 
the regulation initiative, contrary to Anglo-Saxon countries, where common law tradition 
emerged and where standards are set by the private sector. The authors assume that 
respondents from civil law tradition countries face a higher participation cost because 
they are less familiar with the process. Jorissen et al. (2006) include other variables such 
as the rule of law, enforcement, tax compliance, earnings management, etc. 
Larson and Herz (2013) introduce other types of variables such as language 
barriers, measured by English language proficiency. This variable is positively 
associated with participation because lack of proficiency could increase the cost of 
participation. In addition, they introduce the variable IFRS differences, suggesting that 
interested parties from countries with larger historical differences in accounting from 
IFRS are more likely to submit comment letters. Contrary, Holder et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that writers from countries where the use of IFRS is required or permitted 
are more likely to submit comment letters expressing an unfavourable opinion.  
The cultural variables identified by Hofstede in 1980 (2001) such as individualism, 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance or masculinity can be linked to Gray’s (1988) 
accounting values, for example, professionalism versus statutory control, uniformity 
versus flexibility, conservatism versus optimism and transparency versus secrecy. Gray 
(1988) describes these linkages in his study, explaining the cultural aspects of a country 
that support each accounting value. Braun and Rodriguez (2008) have created a score 
of accounting values aggregating Hofstede’s cultural dimension. Both have been used 
by the literature as a determinant of participation intensity. Jorissen et al. (2013) and 
Larson and Herz (2013) demonstrate the influence of some of these variables on the 
decision to participate at the country level.  
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The contribution of these studies to the literature can be summarised in the next 
points. These studies use large samples that include several standards and comment 
periods and a broad set of variables to examine firm characteristics and country variables 
that influence lobbying. Therefore, the conclusions are more likely to be generalizable to 
the population. We believe that this line of research provides relevant and useful 
evidence that standard-setters can use to analyse constituents´ behaviour (especially in 
the case of firms and auditors) and to predict their reaction to future changes in 
accounting standards. To gain international acceptance, the IASB needs the 
participation of emerging countries as well as Western countries. The challenge for 
researchers is to determine why the participation of emerging countries is so low 
compared to others.  
2.4. Literature about the content of comment letters: positions and 
arguments 
Content analysis is a method of codifying and categorising texts. Generally, it is used 
when a large amount of qualitative information needs to be analysed. Content analysis 
serves to make inferences from texts related to the sender, the audience or the message 
itself (Weber, 1990). There are two general approaches to this methodology: form-
oriented analysis, which implies the counting of words, concepts or themes; and 
meaning-oriented analysis, which focuses on inferring the underlying sense of the text.  
In the area of lobbying, researchers have more often used meaning-oriented 
analysis. The content of comment letters may provide valuable information to regulators, 
for example, to test whether there is consent in some matters or too much opposition. 
Prior studies that use this methodology have focused on one issue (Yen et al., 2007; 
Holder et al., 2013). The main advantage of examining a single-issue standard is the 
ease in measuring the variables of interest, such as the lobbying position (Georgiou, 
2005), the sense of the comments (Giner and Arce, 2012), and the accuracy when 
examining the contextual and specific variables.  
Some authors such as Puro (1984), Rahman, Wee and Tower (1994), Kenny and 
Larson (1995), Georgiou and Roberts (2004) and more recent authors such as Le Manh 
(2011), Katselas, Birt and Kang (2011), Giner and Arce (2012) and Holder et al. (2013) 
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classify the global position of respondents between agreement, opposition and, 
sometimes, neutrality. They try to highlight relationships between the respondents’ 
characteristics and their position (i.e., Koh, 2011). Nevertheless, a model based on the 
position variable has many shortcomings (Francis, 1987; Buckmaster, Saniga and 
Tadesse, 1994) because its measure depends on subjective criteria.  
To increase the robustness of the investigation, researchers started to analyse 
different types of arguments in letters. Yen et al. (2007) analyse the content of comment 
letters written in response to the Comprehensive Income Exposure Draft (FASB, 1996), 
and they distinguish several types of arguments: definitional arguments, scope 
arguments, due process arguments, outcome-oriented arguments and others. Similarly, 
Mora and Molina (2014) use content analysis for comment letters on the IASB’s DP of 
leases (2009) and introduce the analysis of different type of arguments such as 
conceptual, economic effects, cost versus benefit, subjectivity, anti-abuse or business 
model.     
Some researchers also examine the use of different arguments by groups of 
respondents. Giner and Arce (2012) develop a content analysis of comment letters on 
the documents preceding IFRS 2. They focus on identifying arguments and positions in 
terms of recognition, valuation criteria and reference date. In conclusion, they provide 
evidence that the constituents’ most common strategy is to provide arguments only in 
the case of disagreement. The economic consequences arguments are used by only 
preparers and consultants, although they also sometimes use conceptual arguments too; 
these latter are preferred by regulators. Mora and Molina (2014) add that preparers have 
learned that the best strategy is to use conceptual arguments because they have 
observed that this type of argument is the most valued by regulators.  
Until this point, we have referred to studies based on a literal content analysis that 
extracts opinions and arguments. There are other studies that focus on linguistic 
characteristics of the text that transcend the literal meaning of sentences. There are a 
few articles that contain this type of analysis on comment letters. Stenka (2013) selects 
the previous text of the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: The Reporting 
Entity and the comment letters submitted on the proposal. The author identifies and 
categorises rhetorical devices under four main headings: (a) lexical choice, (b) sound 
patterning, (c) figurative language and (d) schematic language. The previous sociological 
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work of Bourdieu (cited by Stenka, 2013) supports the hypothesis that rhetorical 
language is a persuasive tool.  
Because special software has been developed to analyse text, it could be valuable 
to use these techniques to deeply investigate the style, tone, content and position of 
comment letters. Analysing text from management reports or financial disclosures, 
researchers have examined other factors such as readability (Loughran and Mcdonald, 
2014) or tone (Patelli and Pedrini, 2013). This field of research is extensive and might be 
applied to accounting standards setting process and in particular in the context of 
comment letters.  
2.5. Insights for standard-setters: the usefulness of comment letters 
After reviewing participation, drivers and the position of interested parties, we would 
like to go a step forward and review those studies whose objective is to analyse the 
impact of comment letters on regulators. We try to answer the following questions: Do 
comment letters submitted to discussion papers and exposure drafts influence the final 
standards? What is the key to lobbying success? 
Therefore, the main variable may be defined as lobbying success, that is, whether 
the lobbyists reach their objectives. To answer these questions, a definition of lobbying 
success is necessary. Authors such as Rahman et al. (1994), Van Lent (1997), Mcleay, 
Ordelheide and Young (2000) and Giner and Arce (2012) adopted a pluralistic 
framework, in which lobbyists, whose proposals are accepted, are considered to be more 
powerful and successful than lobbyists whose suggestions are rejected by standard-
setters. Then, lobbying success is defined as the ability to persuade standard-setters to 
make final decisions in some direction.  
To find the determinants of lobbying success, the expectations of regulators and 
lobbyists should be considered. Supposing that regulators were in some way social 
welfare-oriented (Polk, 2002), they would make decisions that maximise public benefit. 
To comply with this aim of increasing shared welfare, one of the primary objectives of 
the IFRS Foundation is to produce high-quality accounting standards that are understood 
and accepted by the international community.  
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If lobbyists want to influence regulators because of self-interest, and standard-
setters are involved in increasing the quality of accounting standards to maximise social 
welfare, lobbying success is located at the point where both interests converge. In this 
sense, Hansen (2011) argues that lobbying success is positively correlated with the 
ability of respondents to transfer valuable information to regulators. Therefore, the 
capacity to anticipate the information needs of standard-setters could be a fruitful 
thermometer of lobbying success.   
In general, the evidence is mixed. Yen et al. (2007), who examine the FASB, find a 
connection between the specific arguments used and the recommendations made in the 
comment letters and the most significant changes between the exposure draft and the 
final standard. They suggest that the FASB attempted to understand the positions of 
participants, and the content of the letters may have influenced the final standard. Other 
studies support that constituent coalitions could capture the standard-setting process in 
order to secure favourable regulation (Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis, 2010). 
Moreover, some studies report evidence of influence from preparers (Rahman et al., 
1994; Kwok and Sharp, 2005). Other reports show the impact of auditors in contrast to 
business preferences (Haring, 1979; McLeay et al., 2000) and support the effect of 
preparers conditioned to the help of auditors or academics. Seamann (1999) defends 
the power of users. There are other strands of studies that do not find any significant 
influence (Buckmaster et al., 1994; Van Lent, 1997). 
We have not found many studies that examine lobbying success focusing on the 
IASB. However, there are some authors that directly or tangentially study this goal and 
reach interesting conclusions. For example, Le Manh (2011), who analyses comment 
letters submitted to the IASB that discuss the comprehensive income project (one DP 
and two ED), does not offer clear evidence for the power of participants on the IASB’s 
final decision. Hansen (2011), analyses comment letters submitted to five exposure 
drafts (from ED2 to ED6) and concludes that lobbying success is positively related to 
lobbyists providing quality information to the IASB. However, this success also depends 
on the lobbyists’ credibility and the impact that they have on the viability of the IASB.  
In the same line, Giner and Arce (2012) analyse comment letters submitted to all 
consultation periods of the share-based payments project. The results show that none 
of the interested groups or parties has a dominant effect. This conclusion is contrary to 
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the findings of Kwok and Sharp (2005) because their research, built on a period when 
the IASC was the international standard-setter, shows that preparers were the most 
influential group. Additionally, Giner and Arce (2012) demonstrate that only conceptual 
arguments might be capable of influencing the IASB. Therefore, they believe that 
conceptual arguments are more useful to regulators than those based on economic 
consequences.  
The techniques used to examine the impact of comment letters on standard-setters 
are founded in the methodologies of participation studies and content analysis. To 
examine the relation between input and output, we need a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. First, the qualitative method allows researchers to identify the final 
position of the standard-setter in every statement of the new standards. Second, a 
comparison between the positions of standard-setters with the previous positions of 
constituents in comment letters is required; this comparison could be conducted using a 
binomial test (Giner and Arce, 2012). Later, in a quantitative analysis, the determinants 
of success could be tested individually in a univariate analysis or all together in a 
multivariate test, for instance, to determine the positive association between groups of 
arguments, considering the predictor variable and the outcome. 
There are also some innovative methods to measure success such as the 
methodology applied by Bautista et al. (2014). These authors create an influence index, 
which is a contribution to this field. The index describes the degree of overlap with the 
subsequent decisions of the IASB and reveals significant differences between individuals 
due to the influence of political factors. This finding is in line with the definition of political 
lobbying by Zeff (2002) and is due to the influence of factors related to the highest 
technical quality of the responses. This index, together with the participation index cited 
above, constructs the lobbying index and allows a prediction of which comment letters 
will be the most influential.  
Models that predict the content and form that are more likely to influence standard-
setters are a very interesting contribution to the lobbying literature because they include 
evidence of prior empirical studies and provide practical recommendations to standard-
setters and constituents. We considered that this research field will provide valuable and 
interesting avenues for advance in the lobbying arena.  
 
Chapter 2. Overview of lobbying literature in the standard-setting process 
74 
2.6. Conclusion of the chapter 
Based on rational choice theory and positive accounting theory, the previous 
literature supports the fact that the majority of interested parties submitting comment 
letters within the due process for accounting standard-setting are moved by their self-
interest and not by an altruistic interest. The decision to lobby is determined by a cost-
benefit function. This equation has its roots in classical microeconomic theory, in which 
individuals tend to maximise their utility, and also in behavioural theories, in which other 
factors influence the perception of cost and benefits. Comment letters allow lobbyists to 
express their position based on conceptual and economic arguments. Individuals and 
groups can pressure standard-setters in a public manner, exposing the weaknesses of 
and gaps in the standards.   
The motivation of regulators is oriented towards increasing the quality of accounting 
information to reflect in the best possible manner the dynamics of the real economy. 
Therefore, the purpose of achieving high quality standards and, at the same time, the 
aim of gaining legitimacy make the submission of comment letters a useful instrument 
for standard-setters. Moreover, a symbiotic effect might be produced because both 
parties profit from this relationship. The self-interested motivation of lobbyists might not 
always be contrary to the general benefit. First, the natural selection of interested parties 
into a public process mitigates the bias of being uninformed; thus, valuable insights and 
data are provided by lobbyists, thereby improving the information of regulators. Second, 
the fact that comment letters are sent to standard-setters increases the input legitimacy 
of these organisations and their outputs. 
Comment letters have been used as a proxy for lobbying activities in the accounting 
standard-setting process, among other lobbying instruments. First, they are observable 
due to their public character, and second, they are linked to other lobbying methods. 
Researchers have focused on identifying the interested subjects or groups that submit 
comment letters, understanding the reasons for participation, understanding positions 
and arguments and examining the effects that comment letters have on regulators. This 
research makes a contribution to future papers that focus on comment letters. At this 
moment, a revision of the literature and primary research lines is needed to understand 
the possibilities. These studies infer patterns within the lobbying phenomenon in terms 
of using comment letters, such as who the lobbyists are, and why, when and how do 
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they lobby? However, we observe some gaps in papers that could become new issues 
for future research.  
The majority of articles focused on explaining company behaviour because there is 
a lack of user responses in term of written submissions. Therefore, regarding information 
about who is a lobbyist and who is not or the reasons to be involved in the lobbying 
process, we consider groups such as auditors, academics or non-professional investors 
to be valuable samples for future work. From the perspective of standard-setters, they 
need to incentivise the participation of less-represented groups and less-represented 
countries, such as in the case of the IASB. Further challenges to consider are the 
extension of content analysis through new software, the combination of comment letters 
with other lobbying methods, and the demonstration of causality between comment 
letters and final standards considering how theories of regulation characterize 
accounting standard-setting, among others. All of these proposals are oriented towards 
the primary objective: predicting the behaviour of constituents and standard-setters to 
improve the standard-setting process and obtain better international accounting 
standards. 
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Appendix 2.1. Summary tables of recent articles about lobbying in the main standard-setting process 
Table 2.1.A. Studies about determinants of the decision to lobby: mainly focused on firm level factors 
Author/Year Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Koh, (2011) Positive 
accounting 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy. 
Institutional 
theory. 
What drives firms' decisions on 
whether or not to lobby and, if 
so, whether to oppose or 
support FASB's 2004 proposal.  
2004 
FASB's 
stock 
option 
expensing 
proposal 
368 CLs 
Two-level 
nested logit 
model. 
Firms' closeness to debt constraints is the main incentive to oppose option 
expensing in 2004, in contrast to 1993. Firms that are smaller, that are in 
an industry with peers who have lobbied, that have board interlocks with 
firms that have lobbied, and that have higher board independence are 
more likely to self-select to lobby. 
Jorissen et al. 
(2012) 
Positive 
accounting 
and agency 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy. 
Regulation 
theories. 
This paper sets out to enquire 
about the nature of constituents’ 
participation in the IASB’s due 
process in terms of 
representation and drivers to 
participate. 
2002-
2006 
(33 IASB 
issues) 
3.234 CLs 
Multivariate 
analysis 
through several 
sets of linear 
regression 
models. 
Preparers participate the most, followed by the accounting profession and 
standard-setters. Preparers, accountants, standard-setters write more 
comment letters to issues with a major impact on company accounting 
numbers. Stock exchanges, their supervisory authorities, and users write 
more to disclosure issues. Lobbying preparers are larger and more 
profitable than non-lobbying preparers 
Santos and 
Santos 
(2014) 
The 
economic 
theory of 
regulation 
Positive 
accounting 
theory 
To find the determining factors in 
lobbying strategies in 
accounting regulation of the oil 
industry.  
2004 
IASB DP 
IFRS 6 
Extractive 
activities 
(DP-EA) 
25 writers 
firms CLs) 
& 127 non 
lobbying 
firms. 
3 models: 1) 
binomial 
logistic 
regression; 2) 
multinomial 
logistic 
regression; 3) 
the Poisson 
regression 
model. 
The results support the hypothesis according to which size and the 
existence of a performance-based management compensation plan (less 
convincingly) represent determining factors for lobbying by oil firms. The 
propensity to reject a proposal in the DPEA is greater than the propensity 
to accept a proposal. So, lobbying is conducted to reject any change to the 
status quo in accounting regulation for the oil industry.  
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Author/Year Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Kosi and 
Reither 
(2014) 
Positive 
accounting 
theory 
Information 
asymmetry 
theory 
To find the determinants of 
financial firms’ lobbying 
decisions and also the 
determinants of their long-term 
lobbying intensity. 
IASB ED 
IFRS 4 
Insurance 
Contracts 
250 CLs 
Multivariate 
analysis 
through probit 
regression 
model. 
Preparers participate more than users. Additionally, this study documents 
a clear link between potential consequences of anticipated accounting 
changes in the ED and financial firms’ lobbying behaviour, consistent with 
findings for non-financial firms. Insurance companies are more likely to 
lobby than other sector firms. For the sample of IFRS firms, the lobbying 
decision is also positively related to firms’ financial constraints. They find 
that lobbying is positively related to firm size, profitability and past lobbying 
experience. Finally, the results show that insurers are more likely to lobby 
intensively over the period 2007–2010. Furthermore, IFRS firms with more 
dispersed ownership are more likely to lobby intensively. This is in line with 
blockholders’ potential to obtain private information and therefore 
disentangle the effect of accounting changes on firm performance. They 
find stronger empirical results for IFRS than USGAAP firms. 
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Table 2.1-B: Studies about determinants of the decision to lobby: mainly focused on country level factors 
Author/ 
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Jorissen 
et al. 
(2006) 
The 
economic 
theory of 
regulation. 
Positive 
accounting 
and agency 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy. 
To analyse participation and 
drivers of constituents in the 
IASB standard-setting process.  
2002-2005 
23 IASB 
issues) 
2.245 CLs 
Descriptive and 
univariate 
analysis. 
Preparers participate more than users and large companies participate more 
often than smaller corporations. Corporate comment letters come mainly 
from EU. Regarding geographical intensity of lobbying, the results indicate 
that in countries with high levels of enforcement, with high judicial efficiency, 
and with a positive attitude towards tax compliance, firms engage more often 
in lobbying. With regard to the cultural variables they obtained mixed results; 
only the existence of large power distance influences the lobbying behaviour 
in a negative way. Variables relating to domestic earnings management 
practices and the domestic information environment of the firm have no 
significant influence. 
Larson 
(2007) 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Positive 
accounting 
and agency 
theory 
To investigate constituent 
participation of one significant 
part of the IASB, the International 
Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee 
(IFRIC). 
2003-2006 
(18 IFRIC 
issues) 
714 CLs 
Descriptive 
analysis. 
Analysis on 
bivariate 
correlations. 
The participation of countries in IFRIC is significantly associated with the 
strength of its financial reporting system. The European Union submitted a 
majority of comment letters, with the UK being the largest provider. The US, 
Canada and developing countries contributed with few comment letters. 
Responses from countries requiring use of IFRS or ‘equivalents’ produced 
mixed results. Regarding the involvement of stakeholders, standard-setters 
and accounting profession generate more comment letters than firms or 
users.  
Jorissen 
et al. 
(2013) 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Positive 
accounting 
theory 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy 
To examine the evolution of 
constituents participation in 
terms of geographic diversity and 
whether biases (institutional 
regimes) or unequal access 
(differences in participation 
costs) are present in this 
process. 
1997-2007 
90 IASB 
document 
7.442 CLs 
Multivariate 
analysis 
through several 
sets of linear 
regression 
models. 
They observe an increase in participation over time. Also the findings show 
distortions in the geographic representation of constituents due to 
differences in the institutional regimes of countries and in participation costs. 
1) Jurisdictions characterized by lower investor protection, by lower quality
of enforcement, more code law oriented and with less transparency have 
lower participation rates. 2) Cost that are negatively associated with the 
participation intensity of a country such as the level of non-familiarity with: 
the English language; a system of private standard-setting; the accounting 
values in which IFRS are embedded (professional judgment, transparency 
and optimism). The IFRS adoption status in a country does not influence to 
a large extent differences in geographical participation intensity. 
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Author/ 
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Larson 
and Herz 
(2013) 
Legitimacy 
and 
institutional 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy 
To understand different 
geographic response levels 
depending on institutional 
factors, other factors, nature of 
the issue, evolution over time. 
2001-2008 
(57 IASB 
issues) 
5.875 CLs 
Multivariate 
analysis 
through several 
sets of linear 
regression 
models. 
Countries variables such as EU membership, G4+1 membership, IASB 
donors and higher equity market development are associated with higher 
levels of countries participation. However, EU membership is not a significant 
predictor of participation in the 2005–2008 period. Developing countries are 
responsible for 12% of CLs. Countries with more historic divergence in 
accounting standards from IFRS have greater participation. Language 
barriers may hinder participation from non-English speakers. Responses per 
each standard issued did not increase over time, being higher for discussion 
papers and substantive issues rather than for amendment issues, and 
procedural issues. In most countries one single stakeholder interest group 
provides at least one half of all responses.   
Knospe 
and 
Dobler 
(2014) 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy 
To determine the impact of 
country and due process 
document characteristics on the 
level of constituents’ 
participation, according to (1) the 
level of economic development, 
and (2) cultural characteristics of 
the countries of origin. 
2006–
2012 
56 IASB 
issues 
8.825 CLs 
Multivariate 
analysis 
through several 
sets of linear 
regression 
models. 
The descriptive and univariate results indicate differences in constituents’ 
participation between interest groups and continents. Preparers of financial 
statements and European constituents participate most. 
The level of constituents’ participation per country of origin is associated with 
a country’s market capitalization and its society’s level of individualism, while 
unrelated to other economic and cultural characteristics. The level of 
constituents’ participation per due process document is positively associated 
with the input opportunities offered by a due process document while un-
associated with the complexity of the project it is affiliated with. 
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Table 2.2. Studies about the content of comment letters: positions and arguments 
Author/ 
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Yen et al. 
(2007) 
Theories of 
regulation. 
Coalition and 
Influence 
theory. 
The main aim is to categorize 
systematically code and analyse 
the content of comment letters 
written in response to the CI ED, 
focusing on how firms attempt to 
persuade the FASB. They focus 
on types of arguments, 
associations of arguments with 
industry affiliation and 
consistence with final standard.  
1997 
FASB 
ED SFAS 
130 Com-
prehensive 
Income 
Reporting 
278 CLs 
Meaning 
oriented 
content 
analysis 
They find that writers used a wide variety of arguments: definitional, due 
process, and outcome-oriented arguments. Outcome-oriented arguments 
related to external financial statement users are the most common. The 
contents of the letters suggest a distinctly tailored aspect to the letter-writing 
process. Many respondents described company-specific circumstances 
(driven by industry affiliation) and speculated about how the proposal would 
affect investors’ perceptions of the operating results and level of risk for their 
company. Finally, they observe the changes made between the ED and the 
final standard addressed the most common objections of the writers, 
although a causal connection cannot be made given other concurrent 
lobbying activities.  
Katselas 
et al. 
(2011) 
Positive 
accounting 
theory. 
To investigate the influence of 
firm characteristics such as size, 
performance, and number of 
segments on firms’ lobbying 
position choices on ED 8. 
2006 
IASB 
IAS 14 
Segment 
Reporting 
ED 8 
Operating 
Segments 
182 CLs 
Meaning 
oriented 
content 
analysis 
Their finding are related to preparers. Of 34 preparers, sample is 27 listed 
corporations, mainly from UK. Larger firms are more likely to lobby. Results 
also reveal that larger firms were more likely to lobby in favour of ED 8, and 
firms with two or fewer segments were more likely to lobby against ED 8. It 
also provides evidence that relatively profitable firms operating in an 
environment of low competition are less inclined to support ED 8. 
Giner 
and Arce 
(2012) 
Institutional 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
Democracy. 
There are several objectives: I. 
To examine the groups that 
participate in the process; II. To 
analyse the content of their 
submissions; III. To examine 
power relationships by focusing 
on the standard-setters’ 
responses to the lobbyists’ 
suggestions. 
2002-2004 
G4+1 and 
the IASB 
(2 DP and 
ED for 
IFRS 2 
Share- 
based 
payments) 
Content 
analysis 
Univariate tests 
Chi-Square 
The empirical analysis show the following results: financial statements’ 
preparers sent more CLs than others; firms sent twice as many letters in 
early stage of the regulatory process. In contrast, the other groups sent more 
CLs to the latest document. Companies and consultants frequently used 
economic-effects arguments, but as the commenting period progressed, 
they replaced them with conceptual viewpoints. The profession and 
regulators showed a position towards the proposals similar to users. The 
analysis of influence shows that none of the interested parties had a 
dominant effect, what suggests the IASB’s due process is indeed pluralistic. 
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Author/ 
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Holder et 
al. (2013) 
Economic 
theory of 
Democracy. 
I To explore the level of 
participation. II level of support, 
nature and intensity of arguments 
used to support constituents' 
positions, and extent to which the 
various supporting arguments are 
cited by different types of 
respondents. 
IASB's ED 
IAS 37 
and the 
FASB's 
ED to 
SFAS 5. 
369 CLs 
Content 
analysis 
Ordered logit 
regression 
model 
Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) 
regression 
models 
Both proposal received unfavourable responses, but the IASB’s proposal 
received more pressures to eliminate the probability recognition criterion than 
the FASB’s proposal. Users support more the proposal than other 
stakeholders. Finally, they observe significantly more respondents to the IASB 
ED were from countries required or permitted to use IFRS (more likely to 
express an unfavourable response to the ED and to cite relevance to support 
their position), than from countries required to report under their national 
GAAP.  
Barral 
Rivada 
(2014) 
Positive 
accounting 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
Democracy. 
The aim is to study why preparers 
lobby, in what sense they do and 
how they argue. 
2009-2013 
IASB-
FASB 
leases 
proposal 
ED/2010/9 
Content 
analysis 
Multivariate 
regression 
models. 
CHAID method 
The results reveal that preparers participate in this project significantly more 
than others. Some characteristics influence this behaviour (Anglo-Saxon 
origin, the smaller size and trading on a smaller number of markets). They find 
that the opposite position justifies the participation because the majority 
position is contrary the proposal. The opponents use a higher battery of 
arguments: technical and economics. Technical arguments are less 
determinants of the position. 
Mora and 
Molina 
(2014 
and 
2015) 
Ideology 
theory of 
regulation. 
Positive 
Accounting 
Theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
Democracy. 
They develop hypothesis about 
the impact of additional variables 
in lease project as the level of 
agreement with the proposal, the 
type of argument and the 
participation in IASB activities. 
2009-2013 
IASB-
FASB 
leases 
proposal 
DP2009 
302 CLs 
Content 
Analysis  
Descriptive and 
CHAID method  
The results confirm that the willingness to participate and the position in favour 
or against the proposal are consistent with the Positive Accounting Theory and 
the Economic theory of Democracy. In general preparers are the most active 
group and are mainly against the proposals; auditors´ position is different to 
their clients, standard-setters’ position is closer to the auditors’ position than to 
preparers’. The strategy followed by all the constituents is the primary use of 
conceptual opinions to persuade. This is new and it could be explained by a 
learning process. Another novelty is the use of the business model argument. 
The number of arguments is significantly higher when the participant is against 
the proposal. 
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Table 2.3. Studies about the relationship between the inputs (comment letters) and the outputs (final standards) 
Author/
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Cortese 
et al. 
(2010) 
Regulatory 
capture 
theory 
To determine how the discourse 
was produced by powerful players 
(that is, by whom the discourse 
was created and what it 
contained), and how it was 
received, and interpreted by the 
IASC/IASB. 
2000 
IASB/ 
IASC 
IFRS 6 IP 
Extractive 
Industries 
52 CLs 
CDA-Critical 
Discourse 
Analysis 
An examination of the discourse practice, using PwC, Exxon Mobil, and the 
API, expose the interactive process of meaning-making that occurred during 
the standard-setting process. The due process provided a forum within which 
powerful and self-interested constituents and constituent coalitions could 
contribute to and capture the standard-setting process in order to secure 
favourable regulation. 
Le Manh 
(2011) 
Institutional 
theory 
To understand how the IASB 
makes decisions in regard to the 
formal inputs in the due process.  
2006-2010 
IASB 
Compre-
hensive 
income 
project 
493 CLs 
Meaning-
oriented 
content 
analysis 
Descriptive 
analysis 
The correlation between the IASB’s decisions and the opinion expressed by 
participants to the due process is not obvious and does not provide any 
evidence of a mimetic isomorphism. The findings suggest that the IASB’s 
comprehensive income project is mainly driven by convergence (with the 
FASB) issues, which lead to mimetic pressures from the FASB and coercive 
pressures from the SEC.  
Hansen 
(2011) 
Theories of 
regulation. 
Positive 
accounting 
and agency 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy. 
To develop a study regarding the 
associations between attributes of 
lobbyists and their lobbying 
success. 
2002–2004 
(5 IASB 
issues) 
630 CLs 
Meaning-
oriented- 
content 
analysis. 
Logit 
regression 
model. 
The evidence shows that lobbying success is positively associated with: 1) the 
ability of lobbyists to transfer information to the IASB, measured by higher 
quality of information in comment letters; 2) the impact that the lobbyists have 
on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the 
size of the capital market in their home country. The number of IASB Board 
Members from a lobbyist’s home country is not related to lobbying success. 
Chapter 2. Overview of lobbying literature in the standard-setting process 
83 
Author/
Year 
Theory Objective Sample Methodology Main results 
Bautista, 
et al.  
(2014) 
Agency 
theory. 
Institutional 
theory. 
Economic 
theory of 
democracy. 
To confirm the existence of 
collective lobbying about the IFRS 
for SMEs. Demonstrating the 
effectiveness of this influence by 
comparing the decisions finally 
made by the IASB and the 
position of each constituent. 
Confirming the use of different 
arguments by the stakeholders 
2004–2012 
(15 IASB 
issues) 
Meaning 
Content 
analysis. 
Index creation: 
index of 
influence (IL). 
Descriptive 
analysis 
Calculation of 
the Gini 
coefficient 
A) The collective influence on the IASB CLs: this work shows that the majority
opinions of constituents agreed with fundamental decisions taken by the IASB 
discussion paper after 2004. However the effectiveness of lobbying by CLs is 
traditionally made from a collective approach, with inconclusive results.   
B) The individual influence on the IASB: the influence index. The study
suggests the existence of differences in the technical competence of each of 
the senders, which may provide a different consultative value to each answer. 
The signs reveal this circumstance are: (i) the temporal discontinuity of the 
views of each individual and (ii) the possible plot inconsistency of argument 
into the same comment letter. Furthermore, the influence index, or degree of 
overlap with the subsequent decisions of the IASB, reveals significant 
differences between individuals due to both the influence of political factors 
and technical quality of the responses. 
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Chapter 3
Country-level determinants of the geographical 
intensity of lobbying 
3.1. Introduction to the chapter 
In recent years, the international accounting-harmonization process has intensified, 
as a result of globalization. Because of the combined efforts of the IASB and the FASB 
to develop international standards within the framework of the terminated convergence 
project between NIIF and the US Standards, researchers’ attention to the regulatory 
process has increased.  
Both of these standard-setters (i.e., the IASB and the FASB) are private 
organizations whose activities have an undeniably political character. Legitimacy theory 
supports the preposition that these organizations need community support to maintain 
their operations (Deegan, 2014). Both standard-setters have designed the entire 
standard-setting process to achieve the levels of independence, transparency and 
impartiality required for procedural legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Burlaud and Colasse, 
2011). For this reason, the documents and drafts launched for public discussions and 
the establishment of formal methods, as the submission of comment letters, have been 
set to encourage participation among constituents (Tandy and Wilburn, 1992; Larson, 
2007; Richardson and Eberlein, 2011). Although the standard-setting process has an 
international scope, country participation is not homogeneous worldwide, and there are 
several factors that explain participation intensity across various regimes and 
jurisdictions. Geographical participation and the constituents implicated in the standard-
setting process are matters of considerable interest and importance both to authorities 
(G20, 2009) and to researchers (Jorissen et al., 2013) 
Standard-setters have cultivated “the belief among constituents that their input 
exerts some degree of influence upon the ultimate content of standards” (Fogarty, 1994, 
p. 220). In this context, some individuals or groups interested in the final standards seize
opportunities to participate in the standard-setting process, seeking to persuade 
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regulators in an attempt to affect the accounting rules for self-interested reasons (Watts, 
2006), depending on their expected effectiveness (Sutton, 1984). This phenomenon is 
called political lobbying (Zeff, 2002). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and the 
positive accounting framework, the constituents’ opportunistic behaviour of constituents 
should be linked both to their underlying economic motivations and their characteristics. 
Both constituents’ motivation to participate and their potential influence on accounting 
standard-setters have captured special attention in the academic community. Moreover, 
considerable effort has been spent on understanding how different legal and 
informational environments, traditions and values among interested countries (i.e., La 
Porta et al., 1998; Ball et al., 2000; Hope, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Nobes, 2006; Zeghal 
and Mhedhbi, 2006; Bae, Tan and Welker, 2008: Cho, El Ghoul, Guedhami and Suh, 
2014) may explain participation intensity (i.e. MacArthur, 1999; Larson, 2007; Jorissen 
et al., 2013; Larson and Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014). 
The great concern related to biases in international participation and the academic 
questions about the country factors that may influence lobbying behaviour also motivate 
our research. The leases project, prepared jointly by the IASB and the FASB, which will 
replace the standards currently in force (IAS 17 and ASC 840), has been selected as the 
object of the study for several reasons. The highly controversial nature of the lease 
project compared to other projects renders it an extreme and interesting case study. The 
lease proposal has received more comment letters than almost any other project 
submitted by the IASB (Barral Rivada, 2014); those letters have arrived from more than 
45 different countries. Even unexpected countries, such as Pakistan and Colombia, have 
been involved in the process. It is expected that the lease proposal will have differing 
impacts depending on the country; at the same time, such differences determine 
variance in constituents’ lobbying decisions and strategies. Accordingly, it is worthwhile 
to develop a better cross-country study on a single, specific issue that will allow us to 
obtain conclusions that consider the specific characteristics of the lease project.  
The main reason for the controversy over the lease project is that from a conceptual 
and practical perspective, it introduces important accounting changes that would 
significantly affect all companies’ financial information. The new approach implies that 
assets and liabilities associated with all lease contracts (except short term) will be 
reflected on the balance sheet. This approach would have a substantial impact on 
companies’ financial figures and ratios across all countries (Fülbier et al., 2008; Fito et 
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al., 2013). Moreover, other accounting notions are also the object of criticism, because 
they could present practical and conceptual problems (i.e., with respect to the definition 
of a lease). Although the proposal attempts to overcome current problems with the 
standards, it simultaneously creates new inconsistencies and structuring opportunities. 
This fierce debate has been reflected in a long and complex lease standard-setting 
process. To date, one discussion paper and two exposure drafts have been published 
for the purposes of public discussion, receiving 1,745 comment letters in total. 
Moreover, the lease project is one of the international accounting standards whose 
aim is to be applied in every country that either permits them or establishes them as 
mandatory. Every normative change that is applied in different countries with diverse 
contexts can result in a multiplicity of practical consequences (Wysocki, 2011). The 
previous literature shows some differences in lease accounting practices or financing 
strategies among countries. PwC (2010) has performed a study based on the FY2008 
information of more than 3,000 listed companies in 54 countries worldwide, concluding 
that there are great differences in the impact of the proposed lease changes among 
various industries and countries. The diverse impact among countries may result from 
previous differences in legal systems, enforcement levels and compliance attitudes (e.g., 
Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Arimany et al., 2013), current accounting standards (i.e., 
either rules-based or principles-based) (e.g., Collins, Pasewark and Riley, 2012; 
Henderson and O’Brien, 2012), and industry composition (e.g., Barral Rivada et al., 
2014) among other things, all of which could influence the existing volume of off-balance-
sheet operating leases.  
To the best of our knowledge, few prior studies have focused on lease projects. 
Some exceptions are Molina and Mora (2015), who conduct a content analysis of 
comment letters pertaining to the IASB’s DP of leases (2009); they also analyse various 
types of arguments related to conceptual issues, economic effects, costs versus benefits, 
subjectivity, anti-abuse issues or business-model issues that were deployed either for or 
against the proposal. Those authors conclude that conceptual arguments are used both 
to legitimize lobbying behaviour and to persuade standard-setters. Barral Rivada (2014) 
develops a meaning-oriented analysis. He examines the draft published in 2010, 
investigating preparers’ characteristics related to the arguments and positions set forth 
in their comment letters concluding that financial and non-financial companies exhibit 
different lobbying behaviours.  
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This research aims to investigate how institutional, economic, and cultural 
characteristics, along with other country factors, influence the participation of interested 
parties in the lease standard-setting process. The empirical part of the study is developed 
by collecting comment letters submitted to the three documents published by the IASB 
and FASB that are to be discussed before the publication of the final standard: (1) the 
discussion paper of 2009; (2) the first exposure draft of 2010; and (3) the second 
exposure draft of 2013. We conduct a univariate analysis using several country factors 
to the intensity of each country’s participation. The findings suggest that institutional 
framework, economic context, cultural values and other control factors for each country 
influence the extent to which the interested parties located in a country are more likely 
to engage in lobbying efforts related to the lease project.  
The previous evidence has signalled comment letters as a proxy for lobbying 
activities (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Hansen, 2011; Koh, 2011; Holder et al., 2013). 
These instruments are public, available and permit researchers to better understand the 
critical aspects of a new regulation, enabling the study of the characteristics, behaviour 
and drivers of parties who submit a comment letter for a given new standard.  
The research contributes to previous cross-country lobbying studies. This study 
combines a set of country factors that allow us to extend prior research evidence in the 
lobbying field: 1) institutional factors that primarily have been tested in other areas of 
accounting and confirmed as determinants of accounting decisions; 2) economic factors, 
which are very important for  understanding the distribution of hegemonies and power 
worldwide, 3) cultural factors, which are responsible for differences in political and 
business behaviour among countries; and 4) other specific factors in accountancy theory, 
such as the status of IFRS adoption among jurisdictions and the perception of corruption. 
The consideration of all of these factors in the same research analysis could provide a 
global image on lobbying attitudes in the lease standard-setting process. In addition, this 
analysis could help future researchers to better understand the lobbying phenomenon.  
Additionally, the study attempts to contribute to a deeper understanding to the lease 
standard-setting process. To present a more complete picture of country participation in 
the lease accounting project, this study adds on to previous studies by examining the 
project’s 2013 exposure draft. The definitive lease accounting standard is expected to 
be published during the last quarter of 2015. This research also contributes to previous 
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lease project studies, providing an international approach to lobbying behaviour related 
to the lease standard.  
The structure of the chapter is presented as follows. In the 3.2 section, we explain 
the theoretical framework while constructing the hypothesis. In the 3.3 section, we 
present the description and measurement of the variables and methodology. In the 3.4 
section, we introduce the sample and descriptive analysis. In the 3.5 section, we conduct 
the statistical test and show the results. The 3.6 section reports the sensibility analysis 
that gives robustness to previous tests. In the final section, we discuss the results and 
conclude.  
 
3.2. Theoretical framework and country-level hypotheses  
Ongoing globalization has sparked researchers’ increasing interest in cross-country 
studies. A vast accounting literature has already suggested that accounting practices are 
influenced by variables such as capital market development, national legal systems, 
enforcement systems, investor protections, etc. (Leuz et al., 2003). Gordon, Greiner, 
Kohlbeck, Lin and Skaife (2013) advance the discussion of special challenges to cross-
country accounting studies posed by differences in, inter alia, political institutions (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hope, 2003), the legal environment 
(Salter and Doupnik, 1992) culture (Hofstede, 2001; Gray, 1988; Schwartz, 1994; House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta, 2004) and religion (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2003).  
The IASB is an international regulator. Its accounting standards are applied in 
various countries worldwide and are expected to be extended into the future, as 
confirmed by its convergence project with the FASB and similar projects with other 
national standard-setters. This context provides an interesting scope for empirical 
academic research to investigate the cost and benefits of the convergence project.  
The lease project is a matter of considerable interest to both academics and 
professionals because it introduces important accounting changes (from both a 
conceptual and a practical perspective) that would significantly affect the financial 
information of firms worldwide. We expect the lease proposal to have different impacts 
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in different countries; the basis of this expectation is the existence of prior studies 
showing that firms´ behaviour depends on the specific country where their activity is 
developed (PwC, 2010; Henderson and O’Brien, 2012; Barral Rivada et al., 2014). 
Existing empirical research also supports the proposition that lobbying attitude depends 
on legal tradition, the financial environment, etc., (i.e., Larson, 2007; Larson and Herz, 
2013; Jorissen et al., 2013). Based on this literature, we define four hypotheses related 
to the influence of country factors on the decision to submit a comment letter on the 
IASB/FASB’s lease proposal. More specifically, we divide the country factors in four 
groups: institutional factors, economics factors, cultural factors, and other social factors. 
3.2.1. Institutional factors 
There has been a considerable amount of research conducted on how institutional 
factors affect firms’ financial reporting. The institutional dimension comprehends not only 
the political and legal system but also the enforcement environment. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) consider that a country’s 
financial development is closely linked to institutional factors. La Porta et al. (1997), using 
a sample of 49 countries, show that countries with better legal protections also have 
more external finance—i.e., they have broader, higher valued capital markets-. La Porta 
et al. (1998) also reveal that differences in legal protections for investors explain 
differences in countries’ financial development.  
The framework developed by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) is a baseline both to 
understand and to develop how the legal and institutional environment influences 
corporate finance and governance worldwide. Subsequent studies reveal differences in 
financing and ownership patterns across countries driven by differences in legal rules 
regarding both investor protections and the quality of their enforcement (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008; Cho et al., 2013). The literature has also 
demonstrated a country’s higher levels of enforcement and compliance with standards 
may have an impact not only on levels of reporting quality (Leuz et al., 2003; Bradshaw 
and Miller, 2008) but also on levels of firms’ participation in the standard-setting process 
(Jorissen et al., 2013). 
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H1: Differences in institutional context among countries may explain the major or 
minor propensity of interested parties to lobby in the lease accounting standard-
setting process.  
In this context, it is necessary to measure both ex ante protections and ex post 
enforcement related to non-compliant behaviour. Based on the prior lobbying literature, 
we chose rule of law as ex post enforcement and shareholders’ rights as ex ante 
protection (Jorissen et al., 2013). Shareholder protection has been included in most prior 
cross-country accounting cross country studies and is very important to a country’s 
inversion volume and capital market size (La Porta et al., 1997). Moreover, the 
assessment of rule of law in the home country has been considered either an important 
condition for accounting quality or a disincentive for earnings management (Leuz et al., 
2003). 
Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) believe that in absence of strong property-rights 
protections and the efficient enforcement of laws, leasing may be useful for facilitating 
greater access to finance. Considering that the lease standard is moving towards the 
total capitalization of leases, higher enforcement levels in a country could influence 
participation intensity if the interested parties believe —and they do— that the accounting 
proposal would have negative economic consequences. We establish the next sub-
hypothesis, expecting a positive relation between the previous variables and the 
tendency to lobby:  
H1a: Constituents from countries with a high level of rule of law are more likely to 
lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared to constituents 
from countries with a low level rule of law.  
H1b: Constituents from countries with a high level of shareholder rights are more 
likely to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared to 
countries with a low level of shareholder rights.  
3.2.2. Economic factors 
Economic development has been considered in several previous works as a 
determinant of lobbying in the standard-setting process (e.g., Larson and Herz, 2013; 
Jorissen et al., 2014; Knospe and Dobler, 2014). Wealthier companies and individuals 
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have a larger capacity to spend resources on lobbying to obtain more favourable 
regulations (Sutton, 1984). As an extension of this assumption, it should be established 
that constituents from wealthier countries with larger traditions of capital markets and 
greater economic structures are supposed to be larger and richer, and they are supposed 
to be better able to afford the cost-benefit function of the decision to lobby. Therefore, 
more developed countries are expected to produce more lobbyists than less developed 
countries.  
In 2003, Bischoff conducts a study comparing OECD countries, finding that an 
OECD country’s level of economic development is a significant factor in its decision to 
join a lobbying group. In the field of accounting lobbying, Jorissen et al. (2014, p.103) 
use capital market development and gross domestic product per capita to identify 
economically motivated lobbying differences among countries, concluding that 
“constituents from countries with developed markets and high GDP per capita are still 
the overwhelming majority of the participants”. Therefore, we collect two economic 
factors related to a country’s market development, expecting a positive association 
between economic capacity and the tendency to lobby. We establish the following 
hypothesis and sub-hypotheses:  
H2: Constituents from countries with a high level of economic development are 
more likely to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared 
to countries with a low level of economic development.  
H2a: Constituents from countries with high income are more likely to lobby in the 
lease accounting standard-setting process compared to countries with low 
income.  
H2b: Constituents from countries with more developed capital markets are more 
likely to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared to 
countries with less developed capital markets.  
3.2.3. Cultural factors 
Prior studies suggest that culture plays an important role in accounting decisions 
(Chanchani and MacGregor, 1999; Braun and Rodriguez, 2008). In 1980, Hofstede 
defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
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members of one group or category of people from another’’ (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). This 
author identifies five dimensions to capture their effect on cultural variables (power 
distance, individuality, uncertainty discomfort, masculinity and long-term orientation). In 
the literature there are several papers that document the influence of these cultural 
values over accounting systems. For example, Ding, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2005) reveal 
that cultural values are associated with the divergence between international accounting 
standards and national accounting system. Doupnik (2008) indicates that the cultural 
dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and individualism are significantly related to 
earnings management, even after controlling for investor protection and other legal 
institutional factors.  
Based on the work of Hofstede, Gray (1988) has developed a framework for 
analysing the impact of culture on the development of accounting systems, proposing a 
linkage between cultural dimensions and accounting values or attitudes at the level of 
the accounting subculture (professionalism versus statutory control; uniformity versus 
flexibility; conservatism versus optimism and secrecy versus transparency) 
operationalized by authors such as Gray and Vint (1995) and Braun and Rodriguez 
(2008). For example, conservatism is associated with both uncertainty avoidance and 
also a higher level of power distance. In figure 3.1., the relationship between the two 
groups of values is exposed.  
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Figure 3.1. Cultural framework applicable to financial reporting rules
Source: Tsakumis (2007), adapted from Gray (1988) and Hofstede (2001). 
Hofstede (2001) hypothesizes that cultural values do not change easily, thus 
implying external changes as the harmonization of accounting standards (e.g., IFRS) 
does not entail the harmonization of cultural factors that ultimately influence accounting 
perceptions and decisions (D’Arcy, 2001; Cieslewicz, 2014). Therefore, it could be 
inferred that the perception of proposed changes in the lease standard will vary 
depending on a country’s cultural values. This statement has important implications for 
the standard-setters who are managing the international adoption of IFRS. 
In an early work about cultural factors in the IASC standard-setting process, 
MacArthur (1999) analyses comment letters submitted by accounting member bodies 
from 23 countries, suggesting that cultural and accounting subcultural factors influence 
the accounting preferences of corporate managers and other accounting professionals.  
Jorissen et al. (2013) reveal that the level of professionalism in a country is 
significantly and positively associated with the participation rates of that country’s 
preparers and non-preparers alike. Moreover, preparers from less conservative 
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countries, in which transparency is more accepted, participate more by submitting 
comment letters. With respect to non-preparers, the accounting values of conservatism 
and secrecy play a less important role in explaining differences in country participation 
levels. We establish the following hypotheses considering participation intensity in the 
lease accounting project:  
H3: Highest levels of professionalism, optimism and transparency in a country are 
associated with the level of participation of constituents in the process of 
discussing the standard lease. 
H3a: Constituents from countries with a preference level for professionalism are 
more likely to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared 
to constituents from countries with a preference for compliance with prescriptive 
legal requirements.  
H3b: Constituents from countries with a preference for conservatism are more 
likely to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared to 
constituents from countries with a more optimistic risk-taking approach.  
H3c: Constituents from countries with a preference for secrecy are more likely to 
lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting process compared to constituents 
from countries with a preference for a more transparent, open and publicly 
accountable approach.  
3.2.4. Other social factors 
Other social factors might have a bias related to participation in the discussion of 
accounting standards because those factors are responsible for variations in the cost of 
lobbying (Sutton, 1984). The factors considered here are reliance on the IFRS and the 
perception of corruption.  
The different degrees of reliance on the IFRS—referring to the levels of familiarity 
with the international standards depending on each country’s adoption status—could 
either eliminate or pose an entrance barrier to the lobbying decision by the constituents 
of countries worldwide. However, because of the acceleration of the harmonization 
process and the joint process conducted by the IASB with several national standard-
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setters to converge with some national standards, familiarity with the IFRS has been 
extended to countries in which they are not permitted, for example, the United States.  
The reliance on the IFRS has been considered in several lobbying studies that focus 
on the standard-setting process (Hansen, 2011; Jorissen et al., 2013; Holder et al., 2013; 
Larson and Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014).  
Holder et al. (2013) reveal that writers from countries where the use of IFRS is 
required or permitted (Deloitte, 2014) are more likely to submit comment letters 
expressing an unfavourable opinion. Such writers are more familiar with new standards 
and their potential economic effects; therefore, they are prompted to engage in more 
lobbying. Conversely, Larson and Herz (2013) introduce the concept of IFRS differences 
proposed previously by Ding, Hope, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2007), revealing that 
countries with larger historical differences from IFRS accounting have a greater number 
of comment letters submitters.  
Knospe and Dobler (2014) show that participation is unaffected by a country’s level 
of institutional reliance on IFRS, which could be explained not only by the globally 
expected character of IFRS and the intention of regulators to harmonize accounting 
standards but also by FASB’s involvement in the convergence project. In this case, we 
formulate the next hypothesis, expecting a neutral association between intensity of 
lobbying and familiarity with IFRS.  
H4a: Constituents’ familiarity with the dimensions and mandatory requirements of 
IFRS does not make them more likely to lobby to lobby in the lease standard-
setting process. 
The other social factor considered in this study is the perception of a country’s 
corruption. Firms from countries with higher levels of corruption are not motivated to 
invest in lobbying the standard-setters because other same country same-country firms 
could invest lower quantities to avoid the rules’ existing restrictions. Based on the 
previous work of Downs (1957), Sutton (1984) compares the lobbying phenomenon with 
the activity of voting because both share the characteristic of an investment good, subject 
to a cost-benefit equation with a degree of uncertainty. In more corrupt places, the 
existences of an alternative way to obtain the objective with less cost affects the 
collective decision to lobby. However, in the long term this collective behaviour— non-
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compliance with standards caused by corruption—does not guarantee the quality of 
reporting and the credibility of the markets, national economics and business.  
Previous evidence suggests that earnings management and high levels of corruption 
are negatively related to lobbying activities (Jorissen et al., 2006; Campos and 
Giovannoni, 2007; Harstad and Svensson, 2006). For instance, Jorissen et al. (2006) 
report that companies engage in more lobbying on the international accounting 
standards when earnings management is lower in the domestic market. They argue that 
constituents from countries that manipulate less tend to lobby in the standard-setting 
process to protect their self-interest. In contrast, constituents from countries that are 
accustomed to manipulating do not need to exert as much pressure via lobbying because 
they can more easily resort to earnings management behaviour.  
Campos and Giovannoni (2007) investigate lobbying, corruption and influence by 
examining the characteristics of a country’s firms and institutional environment. Their 
findings involve the relation between lobbying and corruption: 1) lobbying and corruption 
are substitutes; 2) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political 
influence than corruption, even in less developed countries. In the same line, Harstad 
and Svensson (2006; 2011) maintain that lobbying and corruption are substitutes and 
consequently, they are negatively associated with one another. Those authors report 
that when confronted by a regulatory constraint, firms may choose between bribing 
bureaucrats to avoid rules and lobbying the government to influence rules. The first 
option discourages firms from investing in lobbying and is associated positively with the 
lowest levels of development (i.e., the poverty trap). The second option implies a greater 
investment but is a more long-term-oriented action.  
The lease accounting proposal introduces both a new accounting approach and new 
restrictions caused by the lease definition, full capitalization caused by the right-of-use 
registration, a dual model to recognize expenses on the lessees’ income statements, etc. 
There are some constituents that are companies with a great deal of concern about 
economic consequences; however, we expect a different behaviour in response to 
potential changes, depending on the perceived level of a country’s corruption. We expect 
that constituents from countries with lower perceived levels of corruption attempt to lobby 
more than constituents from countries with higher perceived levels of corruption, with the 
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aim of persuading standard-setters to elaborate rules in the long term that respect their 
own interests:  
H4b: Constituents from countries with lower perceived levels of corruption are 
more likely to lobby in the lease standard-setting process compared to 
constituents from countries with higher perceived levels of corruption. 
3.3. Definition and measurement of variables 
The participation intensity variable has been chosen as the dependent variable to 
quantify the level of a country’s participation activity (see e.g., Jorissen et al., 2013; 
Larson and Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014; Jorissen et al., 2014). Specifically, 
Jorissen et al. (2013) propose to scale the number of letters by GDP to define a country’s 
contribution to standard-setting (IASCF cited by Jorissen et al., 2013). We define the 
variable as the number of comment letters written from a country during a period scaled 
by that country’s population for that year, measured in thousands. It is noted that we do 
not use GDP as a deflator because GDP is an important independent variable that 
explains differences in volume of comment letters received from countries (Larson and 
Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014; Jorissen et al., 2014). The ratio is defined as 
follows:   
Participation intensity =
Number of letters submitted by country
Population by country
 x 1,000,000 
In the paragraphs below, we explain the definition and measure of the independent 
variables. 
First, we define and measure the institutional variables included in the study. The 
rule of law is defined as the reflection of “the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” (Ramanna and Sletten, 2014, p. 1538). The rule of law 
variable is obtained from Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank 
(see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007 and 2009). The index provides an annual 
measure of the variable and is based on survey responses. It has mostly been used by 
previous works (see, e.g., Jorissen et al., 2006 and 2013). For the statistics test, this 
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variable is divided into two values: 1 for countries with overall legal quality and on law 
and 0 otherwise.  
The shareholder rights variable, more commonly named as anti-director rights index, 
was originally developed for 49 countries in La Porta et al.’s seminal article (1998). This 
variable represents the degree of protection for minority shareholders’. Recently, it has 
been recently revised by Djankov et al. (2008) for 72 countries. The composition of anti-
director rights equivalent to the addition of six indeces that assess the possibility of voting 
by mail, blocking shares before a shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed 
minorities, pre-emptive rights, and the percentage of share capital required to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting (Cho et al., 2013). For the purpose of our study, the 
shareholder rights variable has been coded as 1 for countries with higher shareholder 
protection and 0 otherwise. 
Second, we explain the economics variables included in the study. Most previous 
studies use gross national income (GNI) per capita and market development to measure 
the level of country development (see e.g. Ahluwalia, 1976; Busse and Hefeker, 2007), 
specifically applied to lobbying studies (Jorissen et al., 2014). Gross national income 
(GNI) is defined as GDP plus net receipts from abroad of wages and salaries (earned by 
residents working outside the country) and property income (interest, dividends and 
correspondent retained earnings of foreign enterprises that are either fully or partially 
owned by residents). This variable is obtained from the World Bank (2013), which 
categorizes several groups according to income level: high-income economies include 
those countries with a GNI per capita of $12,746 or more. Low- and middle-income 
economies incorporate the countries that the Word Bank has defined as those with a 
GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of less than $12,746 in 
2013. We use the dummy variable, which takes two values: high income coded as 1 and 
middle and low income coded as 0.  
Additionally, we classify countries based on their capital market development index, 
which is based on Morgan Stanley Capital International’s (MSCI) website (2015). This 
organization classifies countries into three groups depending on their capital market 
development, which is based on economic development, liquidity requirements, and 
market-accessibility criteria. The first cluster, coded as 2, is composed of countries with 
developed capital markets; the second cluster, coded as 1, is composed of countries 
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with emerging capital markets; and the third cluster, coded as 0, integrates countries with 
frontier capital markets (see, e.g., Jorissen et al., 2014).  
Third, with respect to cultural variables we based our analysis on prior studies such 
as those of Hofstede (2001), Gray (1988), Braun and Rodriguez (2008) and Jorissen et 
al. (2013). Gray (1988) identifies four accounting values derived from the prior 
accounting literature: 1) professionalism versus statutory control; 2) uniformity versus 
flexibility; 3) conservatism versus opportunism; and 4) secrecy versus transparency. 
Braun and Rodriguez (2008) operationalize Gray’s accounting values by creating a score 
for each of these values and for every country to which Hofstede (2001) has assigned 
one of the fourth cultural dimension indices (power distance, individuality, masculinity 
and uncertainty avoidance). The scores are constructed as a direct function of the 
numerical values presented in Hofstede and the relationships predicted by Gray (1988).  
For the purpose of this study, the variables are presented in a dichotomous way. 
The first accounting value, professionalism, must be presented with preference for 
individual professional judgement coded as 1 and opposition to more guidance imposed 
by legal requirements coded as 0. The second accounting value, conservatism, implies 
a preference for more cautious accounting practices among companies coded as 1 and 
a more risk-taking approach coded as 0. The third accounting value, secrecy, involves 
an information-restriction approach, coded as 1, as opposed to a more open and publicly 
accountable approach, coded as 0. According to Jorissen et al. (2013), uniformity versus 
flexibility is excluded because it is highly correlated with professionalism.  
The variable named reliance on the IFRS measures permissiveness in applying 
IFRS accounting rules (see e.g., Larson and Herz, 2013; Knospe and Dobler, 2014). To 
define reliance on the IFRS, we created a dummy variable that takes three values 
depending on a country’s position with respect to the adoption of IFRS: not permitting 
adoption of the IFRS for listed companies (coded 2); permitting adoption of the IFRS for 
listed companies (coded as 1); and requiring adoption of the IFRS for listed companies 
(coded as 0). The source is the Deloitte (2014) website, which reports each jurisdiction’s 
status.  
Finally, we introduce the variable perception of corruption, which measures 
perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert assessments and opinion 
surveys. The index is calculated every year by the Transparency International 
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organization (Transparency International, 2015). Corruption is defined as the misuse of 
public power for private benefit. This measure of the level of corruption has been used 
in several cross-country studies of corruption and accounting (i.e., Kimbro, 2002; 
Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge and Stephens, 2010) and lobbying (Svensson, 2005).  
Table 3.1 summarizes the main variables used in this study. 
Table 3.1. Description of the country-level variables 
Variable Definition 
A. Dependent variable 
Participation intensity Number of comment letters for each country scaled by the 
population. 
B. Independent variables 
B.1. Institutional variables 
Rule of law 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with overall legal 
quality and on law and 0 otherwise (following Kaufmann et 
al., 2007).  
Shareholders rights Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with higher anti-
director protection and 0 otherwise.  
B.2. Economic variables 
Per capita gross national income 
(Per capita GNI) 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with high GNI 
and 0 for countries with medium and low GNI. GNI is 
defined as GDP plus net receipts from abroad of wages, 
salaries and property income. 
Country’s capital market 
development 
Dummy variable coded as 2 for countries with developed 
capital markets; 1 for countries with emerging capital 
market and 0 for countries with frontier capital markets.  
B.3. Cultural variables 
Professionalism 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with a 
preference for the exercise of individual professional 
judgment and the maintenance of professional self-
regulation and 0 for countries with a preference for 
compliance with prescriptive legal requirements. 
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Conservatism 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with a 
preference for a cautious approach to measurement to 
cope with the uncertainty of future events and 0 for 
countries with a more optimistic risk taking approach.   
Secrecy 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries with a 
preference for confidentiality and the restriction of 
disclosure of information and 0 for countries with a 
preference for a more transparent, open and publicly 
accountable approach.  
B.4 Other factors 
Reliance on IFRS 
Dummy variable coded as 2 when the country does not 
permit adoption of the IFRS for listed companies, 1 when 
the country permits adoption of the IFRS for listed 
companies and 0 when the country considers mandatory 
adoption of the IFRS for listed companies.  
Perception of corruption 
Dummy variable coded as 1 for countries where perceived 
corruption is lower and 0 for countries where perceived 
corruption is higher.  
3.4. Sample and descriptive statistic 
For our analysis of constituents’ geographic distribution, we focus on the comment 
letters sent by participants during the three consultation periods: 302 comment letters 
corresponding to the Discussion Paper published in 2009 (IASB, 2009); 788 comment 
letters corresponding to the ED/2010/9 (IASB, 2010); and 655 comment letters 
corresponding to the ED/2013/6 (IASB, 2013). We collected a total of 1,745 comment 
letters from the IASB website. The comment letters have been classified first by country 
of origin and then by geographical area. Some comment letters are excluded from the 
final sample: 1) comment letters categorized as not belonging to a single country, which 
are considered apart from the analysis sample because they cannot be allocated to a 
specific country variable (for instance, the Big Four auditing firms are considered 
international and thus classified in the group of supra-national respondents); 2) comment 
letters that are classified as indeterminate because the respondents do not specify their 
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country. As a result, the final sample includes 1,630 comment letters: 279, 733 and 618 
for the DP2009, ED2010 and ED2013, respectively. 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the study’s main variable: lobbying 
intensity by geographical area measured by the number of comment letters submitted 
for each country. Table 3.2, Panel A indicates the number of comment letters submitted 
by geographical origin considering six geographical areas in the sample: Europe, North 
America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Latin America and Africa. Table 3.2, Panel B 
exhibits the average number of comment letters submitted concerning the six 
geographical areas mentioned. Table 3.2, Panel C presents the descriptive analysis of 
the dependent variable of the study, which is the number of comment letters submitted 
for each country divided by population.  
Our descriptive outcomes indicate differences in constituents’ participation among 
interested countries. Table 3.2, Panel A, shows that in absolute terms, the majority of 
the remaining letters are from North America (51% considering the three projects, last 
column, Table 3.2), mainly the United States; next is Europe (28% considering the three 
projects, last column, Table 3.2). Latin America and Africa are located on the other side 
of the balance, submitting a marginal number of comment letters. The large number of 
comment letters from the United States is likely attributable to convergence projects that 
are ongoing between the IASB and FASB (Hansen, 2011). Large American firms, which 
may need to use the IFRS in the future, are very interested in monitoring the process. 
There are also arguments that countries with a rules-based accounting regulatory 
approach tend to use more operating leases to remove debt or finances from the balance 
sheet. Table 3.2, Panel B, shows the average number of comment letters by 
geographical area. In this case, too, North America has the highest average number of 
comment letters. 
On average, constituents from Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
participate the most, in terms of population, as is observed in Table 3.2, Panel C. For 
Europe, the mean of this variable decreases because there are many countries; the 
United Kingdom presents the highest mean for that continent. In the context of lobbying 
research and specifically the lease project, Mora and Molina (2014) analyse the 
responses to the 2009 Discussion Paper on the lease project, showing that “common-
law” countries are more involved in lobbying activities than “civil-law” countries, following 
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the definitions and country classifications of La Porta (1998). Moreover, a country’s legal 
system is also correlated to the classification of Anglo-Saxon countries versus non-
Anglo-Saxon countries. For instance, Wehrfrield and Haller (2014) show differences 
between German and British accountants in the practical application of the IFRS. Anglo-
American countries have a longer tradition of participation in the private accounting 
standard-setting context versus the public standard-setting process (Jorissen et al., 
2006; Larson, 2007; Mora and Molina, 2014). Jorissen et al. (2014) identify eight 
countries as frequent lobbyists, which are so designated when interested parties from a 
country have responded to at least half of the proposals issued by the standard-setter: 
Australia, France, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Appendix II reports a detailed descriptive analysis of the 
lease project in which the United Kingdom and the United States have maintained a high 
percentage of participation in the three documents, followed by Australia, Canada, 
Germany and France, consistent with Jorissen et al.’s (2014) findings.  
It is interesting that country participation varies depending on the responses to a 
specific project. Reviewing previous works based on an analysis of various projects’ 
comment letters considered as a unique sample, Jorissen et al. (2013), Larson and Herz 
(2013) and Knospe and Dobler (2014) find that the average participation from Europe 
(leader by UK) is higher than the average participation from North America considering 
standard-setting of the IASB and IASC (and some convergence projects). In this case, 
the opposite is true: North America is the most interested country. Next, we consider it 
important to disaggregate the evidence by project to help standard-setters and 
accounting professions understand the participation of interested parties.   
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Table 3.2. Distribution of geographical origin 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistic by geographical origin considering the total number of comment 
letters submitted, the average number of comment letters submitted and the average number of comment 
letters submitted scaled by population. We have classified countries into their geographical area in terms of 
continents: Europe, North America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, Latin America and Africa.  
Panel A. Total number of comment letter by geographical origin
N % N % N % N %
Europe 125 41% 203 26% 157 24% 485 28%
North America 110 36% 422 54% 365 56% 897 51%
Asia 19 6% 55 7% 55 8% 129 7%
Australia/ New Zealand 18 6% 41 5% 23 4% 82 5%
Latin America 4 1% 7 1% 12 2% 23 1%
Africa 3 1% 5 1% 6 1% 14 1%
Subtotal (sample) 279 92% 733 93% 618 94% 1,630 93%
Supra-national 22 7% 37 5% 34 5% 93 5%
Indeterminate 1 0% 18 2% 3 0% 22 1%
Total 302 100% 788 100% 655 100% 1,745 100%
Panel B. Average number of comment letter by geographical origin
MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD
Europe 6.94 13.38 11.28 19.54 8.72 15.29 8.98 16.07
North America 27.50 44.97 105.50 185.78 91.25 164.36 74.75 136.33
Asia 1.36 1.28 3.93 5.18 3.93 4.10 3.07 3.98
Australia/ New Zealand 9.00 8.49 20.50 14.85 11.50 13.44 13.67 11.13
Latin America 0.80 0.84 1.40 2.07 2.40 3.78 1.53 2.45
Africa 1.00 1.73 1.67 2.89 2.00 1.73 1.56 1.94
Panel C. Average number of comment letter - scaled by population - by geographical origin
MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD
Europe 0.31 0.31 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40
North America 0.20 0.24 4.51 7.24 0.47 0.55 1.72 4.32
Asia 0.08 0.15 0.27 0.63 0.24 0.40 0.20 0.44
Australia/ New Zealand 0.69 0.00 1.85 0.63 0.68 0.32 1.08 0.68
Latin America 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Africa 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04
Geographical origin
DP 2009 ED/2010/9 ED/2013/6 Pool
Geographical origin
DP 2009 ED/2010/9 ED/2013/6 Pool
ED/2013/6 Total 
Geographical origin
DP 2009 ED/2010/9
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3.5. Results 
This section presents our results in relation to the participation intensity variable by 
countries measured by the number of comment letters for each country scaled by the 
population. We use several univariate tests to detect statistically significant differences 
among countries. Specifically, we use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U test and the 
non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis test. The Mann-Whitney-U test is used when the 
reference variable takes two values and the Kruskal–Wallis test is used when the 
reference variable takes more than two values. For the quantitative data analysis, we 
use SPSS 22 software. The analysis has been repeated separately for the sample of 
comment letters corresponding to each document (the Discussion Paper of 2009, the 
Exposure Draft of 2010 and the Exposure Draft of 2013). We also examine the comment 
letters submitted considering all of the consultation periods together (named the pool 
sample).  
3.5.1. Institutional factors 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the influence of rule of law on a country’s 
participation intensity. Table 3.3, Panel A, shows that countries with higher rule of law 
submit more comment letters (mean = 0.33) than countries with lower rule of law (mean 
= 0.02) in the first period; i.e., the discussion paper of 2009. The same behaviour is 
observed in the subsequent consultant period—i.e., the first exposure draft of 2010 
(Panel B) and the second exposure draft of 2013 (Panel C)—and considering the 
complete consultant period (named pool, Panel D). The evidence suggests that on 
average, countries with a higher rule-of-law score submit more comment letters than do 
countries with a lower rule-of-law score. In all of the panels, the Mann-Whitney-U test 
reveals statistically significant differences among countries caused by the rule-of-law 
variable (p < 0.01). The evidence is consistent with the prediction of H1a because ex post 
enforcement (measured by the rule-of-law variable) influences participation intensity.  
Although the study of Jorissen et al. (2006) is not directly comparable with ours, their 
evidence—the comment letters written between 2002 and the summer of 2005 in 
response to discussion documents and exposure drafts issued by the IASB during that 
period, for example, IFRS 2, the share-based payment standard—shows that 
enforcement variables affect lobbying behaviour.  
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Table 3.4 presents the results of our second proxy for institutional factors, the level 
of shareholder rights. Panel A reveals that on average, countries with a higher level of 
shareholders submit more comment letters in response to a due process document 
related to DP 2009 (mean = 0.29) compared to countries with a lower level of 
shareholders (mean = 0.09). Mann-Whitney tests consistently indicate significant 
differences between country groups (p < 0.05). The evidence remains similar when the 
due process document related to ED2010/9 and ED2013/6 projects (Panel B and Panel 
C) and all of the consultation periods (Panel D) are examined (p < 0.05). This evidence
is consistent with the prediction of H1b, which means that a country’s level of shareholder 
rights influences the responses to a process in all leasing-consultant periods. 
Taken together, the two variables representing enforcement level can be considered 
determinants of countries’ lobbying intensity on the lease project. These findings confirm 
and extend the literature on financial reporting quality and the impact of enforcement 
(see, e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Bradshaw and Miller, 2008). Because the IASB’s published 
standards are not directly applicable in the jurisdictions and need to be instituted by 
countries for proper implementation, the system’s enforcement degree is a key factor in 
the perception of new standards. In an institutional system with high levels of 
enforcement, constituents feel more pressure to make decisions according to the rules 
and have confidence in the formal process. Therefore, the incentives to lobby in a 
standard-setting process are greater, especially if the accounting standard is viewed as 
a potential threat with negative economic consequences. Conversely, constituents from 
countries with a weak institutional system may be less motivated to participate in the 
formal standard-setting process.  
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Table 3.3. Results of participation intensity by institutional factors: rule of law 
Table 3.4. Results of participation intensity by institutional factors: shareholder rights 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 20 .016 .032 13.300 56.000 -4.572 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 26 .333 .290 31.346
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 20 .038 .084 13.325 56.500 -4.532 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 26 1.304 2.941 31.327
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 20 .025 .027 13.175 53.500 -4.588 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 26 .523 .400 31.442
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 60 .026 .054 39.083 515.000 -7.883 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 78 .720 1.751 92.897
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 7 .085 .156 19.727 45.000 -2.189 .029 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 28 .292 .299 17.208
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 7 .101 .176 19.182 38.000 -2.478 .013 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 28 .648 .685 17.458
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 7 .110 .216 21.455 40.000 -2.392 .017 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 28 .455 .420 16.417
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 21 .099 .175 28.952 377.000 -4.048 .000 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 84 .465 .510 59.012
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3.5.2. Economic factors 
In this section, we examine the potential influence of economic factors, such as a 
country’s wealth as or the presence of a developed capital market, on lease-accounting 
lobbying behaviour. In Table 3.5, we analyse the influence of a country’s income based 
on GNI per capita on country-participation intensity. Table 3.5 shows that on average, 
high-income countries submit more comment letters—considering not only the 
consultant periods for the lease project DP 2009 (Panel A), ED2010/9 (Panel B) and 
ED2013/6 (Panel C) but also the pool (Panel D)—than middle- and low-income countries. 
The Mann-Whitney-U test reveals statistically significant differences among countries 
due to the proxy for economics factors—income variable (p < 0.01)—in all panels. The 
evidence is consistent with the prediction of H2a.  
The results are in line with previous works. For example, Jorissen et al. (2014) report 
that the most comment letters originate from countries with high macroeconomic 
indicators. They recommend that the standard-setter focus on the needs of those 
countries and establish a new mechanism to involve them in the process. They wonder 
whether the lower participation of emerging economies is associated with the IASB’s 
objectives.  
Table 3.5. Results of participation intensity by economic factors: income 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 14 .009 .018 12.64 72.000 -3.670 .000 H2a
High Income 32 .277 .288 28.25
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 14 .045 .098 14.00 91.000 -3.191 .001 H2a
High Income 32 1.064 2.690 27.66
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 14 .021 .026 12.21 66.000 -3.782 .000 H2a
High Income 32 .431 .408 28.44
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 42 .025 .060 38.17 700.000 -6.124 .000 H2a
High Income 96 .591 1.600 83.21
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Table 3.6 shows the results of our second proxy for economic conditions: the level 
of the capital market. That variable categorizes countries into three groups: countries 
with frontier capital markets, countries with emerging capital markets and countries with 
developed capital markets. This classification has been created by the MSCI (2015) 
organization and has been used in standard-setting lobbying research (Jorissen et al., 
2014). In the sensitivity analysis, we repeat the tests using two groups of countries: 
frontier and emerging capital markets and developed capital markets.  
Table 3.6 reports per-country statistics on the average comment letter submitted in 
response to DP 2009 (Panel A), ED2010/9 (Panel B), ED2013/6 (Panel C) and the three 
consultant projects together (Panel D). Panel A shows that countries with developed 
capital markets participate most—in terms of comment letters submitted (mean = 0.39)—
followed by countries with emerging capital markets (0.02) and countries with frontier 
capital markets (mean = 0.00). The Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal statistically significant 
differences among all of the groups (p < 0.01) considering each of the three consultation 
periods in turn (Panels A, B and C) and all of the consultant projects together (Panel D). 
The evidence suggests that there are differences in rankings among countries with 
different levels of capital market development. That is, the results show that the more 
developed a country’s capital markets, the higher the inclination to lobby in the lease 
international standard-setting process. Thus, the results support the hypothesis that a 
country’s participation intensity is influenced by its level of capital market development 
(H2b). 
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Table 3.6. Results of participation intensity by economic factors: level of development of the 
country’s capital market 
3.5.3. Cultural factors 
Table 3.7—Panels A, B and C—shows the influence of cultural variables on 
countries’ lobbying intensity. Table 3.7 reveals that on average, countries with a high 
preference for professional judgement submit more comment letters to the lease project 
in every period than do countries with more preference for statutory control. Table 3.7, 
Panel D, also reflects greater lobbying intensity in countries with a higher preference for 
using professional judgement than in countries with an inclination for statutory control 
using the complete sample (the three consultation periods). The Mann-Whitney-U tests 
consistently show statistically significant differences among countries caused by the 
professionalism variable (p < 0.01). Thus, the results support the hypothesis that country-
participation intensity is influenced by the country’s level of preference for 
professionalism versus statutory control (H3a). Professional judgement is preferred in 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Level of market development N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Countries with frontier markets 7 .001 .002 7.714 32.352 .000 H2b
Countries with emerging markets 16 .022 .036 14.500
Countries with developed markets 22 .392 .278 34.045
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Level of market development N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Countries with frontier markets 7 .061 .138 12.143 30.782 .000 H2b
Countries with emerging markets 16 .022 .036 12.563
Countries with developed markets 22 .843 .656 34.045
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Level of market development N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Countries with frontier markets 7 .021 .025 11.000 24.541 .000 H2b
Countries with emerging markets 16 .059 .112 14.750
Countries with developed markets 22 .590 .391 32.818
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Level of country market 
development
N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Countries with frontier markets 21 .03 .08 30.33 87.968 .000 H2b
Countries with emerging markets 48 .03 .07 40.56
Countries with developed markets 66 .61 .50 99.94
Notes: we exclude Bermuda because it is not included in the source
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countries with high levels of individuality (e.g., United Kingdom) and is positively 
associated with higher levels of participation in the accounting standard-setting process, 
as argued by Jorissen et al. (2013) and Knospe and Dobler (2014).  
Table 3.7. Results of participation intensity by cultural factors: professionalism 
Table 3.8, Panel A, reveals differences in the mid-ranges of countries with a high 
preference for conservatism and countries with a preference for optimism for the first 
consultation period, which includes the first group to submit fewer comment letters by 
population. Table 3.8, Panels B, C and D, shows similar results. The Mann-Whitney-U 
tests consistently indicate statistically significant differences among countries caused by 
the conservatism variable (p < 0.01). Consequently, the evidence supports the 
hypothesis that country-participation intensity is determined by the country’s degree of 
preference for conservatism versus optimism (H3b). This result is consistent with previous 
evidence (Jorissen et al., 2013). Conservatism is closely associated with uncertainty 
avoidance (as a proxy for risk-aversion) and ranking lower in individualism and 
masculinity. Conservatism has strong ties with traditional accounting practices and 
therefore, constituents from conservative countries are not interested in participating in 
an external standard-setting process such as that proposed by IASB for harmonization. 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 21 .084 .146 14.476 73.000 -3.440 .001 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 19 .379 .308 27.158
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 21 .228 .527 14.190 67.000 -3.598 .000 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 19 .761 .631 27.474
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 21 .156 .326 15.333 91.000 -2.943 .003 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 19 .539 .391 26.211
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 63 .156 .366 42.683 673.000 -5.915 .000 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 57 .560 .482 80.193
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 Table 3.8. Results of participation intensity by cultural factors: conservatism 
Table 3.9—Panels A, B and C—indicates that countries with a high preference for 
secrecy submit fewer comment letters to the lease project in every period than do 
countries that prefer transparency. Table 3.9, Panel D, which represents the pool, 
reflects greater lobbying intensity in countries with a preference for confidentiality than in 
countries with a preference for public disclosure. The Mann-Whitney-U tests consistently 
show statistically significant differences among countries due to the secrecy-versus-
transparency variable (p < 0.05). Consequently, the data confirm the hypothesis that 
country-participation intensity is influenced by the degree of a country’s preference for 
secrecy versus transparency (H3c).  
These results are consistent with previous literature about geographical lobbying 
participation (see, e.g., Jorissen et al., 2013). In addition, with respect to lease 
accounting, Arimany et al. (2013) compare compliance with lease disclosure in the 
footnotes of two different countries, the United Kingdom and Spain, confirming that the 
United Kingdom provided more detailed information than Spain. These two countries are 
situated in different extremes of secrecy versus transparency in Braun and Rodrigues’s 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 19 .352 .325 25.816 98.50 -2.746 .006 H3b
Preference for conservatism 21 .109 .160 15.690
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 19 .806 .741 27.000 76.00 -3.354 .001 H3b
Preference for conservatism 21 .188 .305 14.619
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 19 .527 .459 24.947 115.00 -2.292 .022 H3b
Preference for conservatism 21 .166 .251 16.476
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 57 .562 .560 76.614 877.00 -4.840 .000 H3b
Preference for conservatism 63 .154 .244 45.921
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index: United Kingdom is more in favour of transparency. Our study also shows that 
United Kingdom is more involved than Spain in the standard-setting process.  
Table 3.9. Results of participation intensity by cultural factors: secrecy 
In sum, accounting sub-culture variables play an important role in the decision to 
submit a comment letter (MacArthur, 1999; Jorissen et al., 2013), specifically for the 
lease-accounting project, as Tables 7, 8 and 9 reveal. Cultural values are both strongly 
rooted and difficult to change. Previous literature shows that cultural values influence 
both accounting practices and perceptions of the IASB/FASB standards. Individuals and 
firms that operate in the context of cultural values also behave differently with respect to 
political activity such as lobbying in the standard-setting process. Individuals and firms 
are conditioned to cultural values when they operate in the market and engage in 
different behaviour that also affects political activity such as lobbying in the standard-
setting process.  
3.5.4. Other social factors 
Finally, we classify countries according to other social factors: reliance on the IFRS 
and perception of corruption.  
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 20 .362 .310 26.500 80.00 -3.259 .001 H3c
Preference for secrecy 20 .087 .150 14.500
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 20 .729 .631 27.000 70.00 -3.526 .000 H3c
Preference for secrecy 20 .234 .540 14.000
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 20 .518 .393 25.950 91.00 -2.953 .003 H3c
Preference for secrecy 20 .158 .334 15.050
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 60 .536 .481 78.817 701.00 -5.784 .000 H3c
Preference for secrecy 60 .160 .375 42.183
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Regarding reliance on IFRS, we can consider three groups: countries with 
mandatory adoption of the IFRS, countries with optional adoption of the IFRS and 
countries that forbid adoption of the IFRS. 
Table 3.10 indicates there are no differences in participation intensity according to 
reliance on the IFRS during the three consultation periods (p > 0.05) or considering all 
of the periods together (p > 0.05). This evidence is consistent with prior lobbying research 
(Knospe and Dobler, 2014). In general, countries in which the IFRS are not permitted 
are less likely to submit comment letters. However, there is an exception: the United 
States. In absolute terms, the United States is the country that has sent the most 
comment letters, even though it has different accounting standards. This resistance 
could be caused by the convergence project between the IASB and the FASB, the United 
States’ own standard-setter. Thus, the results do not support the hypothesis that country-
participation intensity is influenced by the level of reliance on the IFRS (H4a). Future 
research needs to examine this hypothesis, because countries with mandatory IFRS 
adoption are highly represented in our sample compared to countries with optional 
adoption of the IFRS or that forbid adoption of the IFRS. 
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Table 3.10. Results of participation intensity by other factors: reliance on the IFRS 
Table 3.11—Panels A, B and C—reveals that countries with lower perceived 
corruption submit more comment letters to the lease project in every period than do 
countries with higher perceived corruption. In addition, Table 3.11, Panel D, which 
represents the pool, shows greater lobbying intensity in countries with lower perceived 
corruption than in countries with higher perceived corruption. The Mann-Whitney-U tests 
consistently show statistically significant differences among countries due to the 
perception of corruption (p < 0.01). Consequently, the data confirm the hypothesis that 
country-participation intensity is influenced by the country’s degree of perceived 
corruption (H4b).  
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 6 .091 .131 19.000 .776 .678 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 4 .266 .511 21.500
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 35 .207 .260 23.857
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 6 .381 .572 20.667 1.284 .526 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 4 4.282 7.421 29.750
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 35 .436 .616 22.629
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 6 .370 .557 21.000 .588 .745 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 4 .276 .478 19.250
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 35 .308 .362 23.771
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev. Mid-range
Chi-
cuadrado
Sig. asintot. Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 18 .281 .460 59.889 .902 .637 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 12 1.608 4.365 69.250
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 105 .317 .445 69.248
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Table 3.11. Results of participation intensity by other factors: perception of corruption 
3.6. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we report the results of the several sensitivity tests. First, we use an 
alternative dependent variable to assure the evidence of the above tests. Second, we 
avoid potential bias by removing the countries that do not submit comment letters. Third, 
we eliminate the United States because of the high number of comment letter that it 
submits compared to the other countries. Finally, we use alternative definitions of 
independent variables to review previous findings. In this section, we show the empirical 
results considering the three periods together (pool sample) instead of each consultant 
period -DP 2009, ED2010/9 and ED2013/6- to save space. 
The sensitivity analysis using an alternative dependent variable is conducted 
because previous empirical studies have used a variety of proxies to measure 
participation intensity. For example, Jorissen et al. (2013) use as a proxy for participation 
intensity the number of letters submitted by country deflated by GDP. Jorissen et al. 
Panel A. First consultation period (DP 2009)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 21 .011 .019 11.976 20.500 -5.317 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 24 .365 .281 32.646
Panel B. Second consultation period (ED/2010/9)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 21 .042 .084 13.881 60.500 -4.381 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 24 .768 .675 30.979
Panel C. Third consultation period (ED/2013/6)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 19 .030 .032 13.105 59.000 -4.238 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 25 .538 .401 29.640
Panel D. Pool (All consultation periods)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 61 .028 .054 37.951 424.000 -8.094 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 73 .557 .502 92.192
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(2012) and Knospe and Dobler (2014) consider the number of comment letters per group 
in absolute terms to obtain their conclusions. Consequently, we run the above tests using 
an alternative dependent variable: the number of letters submitted by country measured 
by absolute terms.  
Table 3.12 shows the results of participation intensity driven by institutional factors, 
economic factors, cultural factors and other factors. Table 3.12 reveals that there are 
statistically significant differences in participation intensity by rule of law (p < 0.01, Panel 
A), shareholder rights (p < 0.01, Panel B), country income (p < 0.01, Panel C), capital 
market development (p < 0.01, Panel D), professionalism (p < 0.01, Panel E), 
conservatism (p < 0.01, Panel F), secrecy (p < 0.01, Panel G) and perceived corruption 
(p < 0.01, Panel I). In contrast, we do not find statistically significant differences in 
participation intensity by reliance on the IFRS (p > 0.05, Panel H). The results are 
consistent with the evidence in Section 5.  
In the next sensitivity analysis, we avoid bias by removing the countries that do not 
submit comment letters (the minimum of the sample). The removed countries in the first 
consultant period (DP 2009) include the following: Argentina, Bermuda, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi 
Arabia and Zambia. In the second consultant period (ED/2010/9) the countries that have 
been eliminated from the sample include the following: Argentina, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Greece, Indonesia, Kenya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Zambia. In 
the more recent consultant period (ED/2013/6) the excluded countries include the 
following: Austria, Bermuda, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Romania and United 
Arab Emirates. Table 3.13 shows that there are statistically significant differences in 
participation intensity by rule of law (p < 0.01, Panel A), shareholder rights (p < 0.01, 
Panel B), country income (p < 0.01, Panel C), capital market development (p < 0.01, 
Panel D), professionalism (p < 0.01, Panel E), conservatism (p < 0.01, Panel F), secrecy 
(p < 0.01, Panel G) and perceived corruption (p < 0.01, Panel I). In contrast, we do not 
find statistically significant differences by reliance on the IFRS (p > 0.05, Panel H). These 
results confirm the evidence shown in Section 3.5. 
Additionally, we eliminate the country that submitted the most comment letters (the 
maximum of the sample), the United States, to ensure the evidence demonstrated by 
the above tests. Table 3.14 confirms the results shown in Section 3.5. Mann-Whitney 
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tests consistently show statistically significant differences in the intensity of lobbing 
according to a country’s characteristics, which are summarized by institutional variables, 
economic variables and cultural variables. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not 
reveal statistically significant differences in the intensity of lobbing by reliance on the 
IFRS variable. 
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Table 3.12. Sensitivity analysis: results of the geographical intensity of lobbying in absolute 
terms by all factors considered
Institutional variables
Panel A. Geographical intensity of lobbying by rule of law (all consultation periods)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 60 1.500 2.095 46.083 935.000 -6.109 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 78 19.744 58.298 87.513
Panel B. Geographical intensity of lobbying by shareholder rigths (all consultation periods)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 21 2.762 3.375 33.857 480.000 -3.236 .001 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 84 18.560 56.308 57.786
Economic variables
Panel C. Geographical intensity  of lobbying by income (all consultation periods)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 42 1.667 2.302 47.750 1102.500 -4.279 .000 H2a
High Income 96 16.250 52.996 79.016
Panel D. Geographical intensity of lobbying by capital market development (all consultation periods)
Level of country market development N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Frontier & emerging markets 72 1.319 1.985 42.896 460.500 -8.265 .000 H2b
Developed markets 66 23.258 62.805 98.523
Cultural variables
Panel E. Geographical intensity of lobbying by profesionalism (All consultation periods)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 63 3.746 5.190 49.143 1080.000 -3.789 .000 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 57 24.298 67.649 73.053
Panel F. Geographical intensity of lobbying by conservatism (All consultation periods)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 57 25.088 67.441 77.868 805.500 -5.243 .000 H3b
Preference for conservatism 63 3.032 4.631 44.786
Panel G. Geographical intensity of lobbying by secrecy (All consultation periods)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 60 23.617 65.984 73.917 995.000 -4.258 .000 H3c
Preference for secrecy 60 3.400 4.962 47.083
Other factors
Panel H. Geographical intensity of lobbying by reliance on IFRS (All consultation periods)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
Chi-cuadrado Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 18 47.110 116.147 66.280 .797 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 12 5.920 5.401 77.460
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 105 6.760 13.036 67.210
Panel I. Geographical intensity of lobbying by perception of corruption (All consultation periods)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 61 1.639 2.176 45.418 879.500 -6.085 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 73 20.932 60.100 85.952
Sig. asintot.
.671
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Table 3.13. Sensitivity analysis: results of the geographical intensity of lobbying removing non 
submitter countries 
Institutional variables
Panel A. Geographical intensity of lobbying by rule of law (all consultation periods)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 38 .04 .06 21.45 74.00 -8.053 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 69 .81 1.84 71.93
Panel B. Geographical intensity of lobbying by shareholder rigths (all consultation periods)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 14 .148 .198 29.429 307.000 -2.687 .007 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 80 .488 .512 50.663
Economic variables
Panel C. Geographical intensity  of lobbying by income (all consultation periods)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 27 .039 .071 19.481 148.000 -6.684 .000 H2a
High Income 80 .709 1.730 65.650
Panel D. Geographical intensity of lobbying by capital market development (all consultation periods)
Level of country market development N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Frontier & emerging markets 42 .419 2.363 25.762 179.000 -7.566 .000 H2b
Developed markets 65 .618 .496 72.246
Cultural variables
Panel E. Geographical intensity of lobbying by profesionalism (All consultation periods)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 47 .209 .412 32.468 398.000 -5.774 .000 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 52 .614 .471 65.846
Panel F. Geographical intensity of lobbying by conservatism (All consultation periods)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 54 .593 .559 59.259 715.000 -3.514 .000 H3b
Preference for conservatism 45 .216 .266 38.889
Panel G. Geographical intensity of lobbying by secrecy (All consultation periods)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 55 .585 .474 63.982 441.000 -5.415 0.000 H3c
Preference for secrecy 44 .218 .425 32.523
Other factors
Panel H. Geographical intensity of lobbying by reliance on IFRS (All consultation periods)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
Chi-cuadrado Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 14 .361 .495 43.714 1.814 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 10 1.930 4.754 51.100
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 82 .406 .466 55.463
Panel I. Geographical intensity of lobbying by perception of corruption (All consultation periods)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 39 .043 .063 21.897 74.000 -8.044 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 66 .616 .492 71.379
Sig. asintot.
.404
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Table 3.14. Sensitivity analysis: results of the geographical intensity of lobbying removing the 
United States
Institutional variables
Panel A. Geographical intensity of lobbying by rule of law (all consultation periods)
Rule of law N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Countries with a lower rule of law score 60 .026 .054 39.067 514.000 -7.734 .000 H1a
Countries with a higher rule of law score 75 .714 1.784 91.147
Panel B. Geographical intensity of lobbying by shareholder rigths (all consultation periods)
Shareholder rights N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Lower shareholder rights 21 .099 .175 28.810 374.000 -3.946 .000 H1b
Higher shareholder rights 81 .450 .508 57.383
Economic variables
Panel C. Geographical intensity  of lobbying by income (all consultation periods)
Income N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Middle and low Income 42 .025 .060 38.143 699.000 -5.996 .000 H2a
High Income 93 .581 1.623 81.484
Panel D. Geographical intensity of lobbying by capital market development (all consultation periods)
Level of country market development N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Frontier & emerging markets 72 .244 1.807 39.708 231.000 -9.039 .000 H2b
Developed markets 63 .596 .498 100.333
Cultural variables
Panel E. Geographical intensity of lobbying by profesionalism (All consultation periods)
Profesionalism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for statutory control 63 .156 .366 42.476 660.000 -5.708 .000 H3a
Preference for profesionalism 54 .543 .480 78.278
Panel F. Geographical intensity of lobbying by conservatism (All consultation periods)
Conservatism N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for optimism 54 .545 .563 74.519 863.000 -4.595 .000 H3b
Preference for conservatism 63 .154 .244 45.698
Panel G. Geographical intensity of lobbying by secrecy (All consultation periods)
Secrecy N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Preference for transparency 57 .519 .479 76.930 688.000 -5.589 .000 H3c
Preference for secrecy 60 .160 .375 41.967
Other factors
Panel H. Geographical intensity of lobbying by reliance on IFRS (All consultation periods)
Reliance on IFRS N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
Chi-cuadrado Hyphotesis
Non permitted adoption of IFRS 15 .163 .364 49.000 3.581 H4a
Permitted adoption of IFRS 12 1.608 4.365 68.580
Mandatory adoption of IFRS 105 .317 .445 68.760
Panel I. Geographical intensity of lobbying by perception of corruption (All consultation periods)
Corruption perception N Mean Std Dev.
Mid-
range
U de Mann-
Whitney
Z
Sig. 
asintot.
Hyphotesis
Higher corruption perception 61 .028 .054 37.934 423.000 -7.943 .000 H4b
Lower corruption perception 70 .543 .501 90.457
Sig. asintot.
.167
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Finally, as an additional test (not reported in our tables for reasons of brevity), we 
repeat the univariate analysis using different definitions for independent variables. There 
are several ways to measure a country’s ex ante and ex post enforcement. For example, 
the literature supports the proposition that enforcement is negatively associated with 
earnings management and therefore, earnings management is used as a variable that 
is determinant of lobbying activities. In countries in which there is a higher rate of 
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003), companies might have less incentive to send 
comment letters, because in the new law they can find new ways of structuring their 
contracts. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between earnings management 
and levels of participation in the lease accounting standard-setting process. We also 
repeat the univariate analysis using various proxies for other independent variables, for 
instance, considering per-capita GDP to measure income. We also test the cultural 
variables in their initial index form and we use some Hofstede (2001) variables such as 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance. The results remain similar.  
3.7. Conclusion of the chapter 
The standard-setting process for the lease-accounting project has attracted 
international attention: comment letters have been received from 46 countries. The fierce 
debate caused by the proposed changes and their expected economic consequences, 
along with the global scope of the project, are responsible for the high participation of 
interested parties.  
In this chapter, we analyse whether the participation-intensity variable by country is 
influenced depending on a country’s characteristics. To do so, we rely on the comment 
letters submitted to the lease proposal in the three consultation periods: the DP 2009, 
the ED/2010/9 and the ED/2013/6. The results show that the participation intensity is 
influenced by a country’s institutional context, economic environment and cultural values. 
Institutional factors such as ex ante protection of creditors and shareholders and ex 
post protection (or punishment) of creditors and shareholders may explain the level of 
compliance with the accounting standards. Countries in which regulation avoidance is 
less common are those countries in which the lobbying phenomenon is more common. 
Individuals and companies are aware of the effects of the accounting rules on their 
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decisions. With respect to lease activity, enforcement also affects the flexibility of 
financing by increasing debt of looking for different solution as operating lease.   
Economic factors represent a country’s wealth and the dimensions of its financial 
systems. The wealthier an economic system, the larger the amount of business activity 
and the greater the need to finance equipment and property, with the lease being an 
important instrument. Moreover, the richest countries—e.g., the United States or United 
Kingdom—have been in that position for years, and so their companies and their 
individuals are operating in a more experienced system that has internalized some 
mechanisms, such as those for giving feedback on accounting rules that can affect those 
companies and individuals.  
Cultural values associated with a region’s historical tradition configure citizens’ way 
of thinking and consequently, their behaviour. Most prior studies suggest that each 
country’s business models are affected by cultural characteristics. Therefore, it is not the 
same to apply the new lease proposal in one country (for example, the United States) as 
in another (for example, Brazil) because the two countries might have different financing 
behaviour and different off-balance-sheet accounting practices. In this line, Japan is 
influenced by collectivism, conservatism and Confucian culture, and previous literature 
has demonstrated that the effect of lobbying incentives is mitigated compared to Western 
countries in which professionals tend to maximize opportunities through competition 
(Sugahara, Tsunogaya and Chand, 2014).  
With respect to reliance on the IFRS, the univariate test has confirmed that there are 
no significant differences between countries with different IFRS adoption statuses. 
However, further research requires this variable because countries with mandatory IFRS 
adoption are highly represented in our sample compared to countries that either make 
adoption optional or forbid it entirely.  
Finally, lower levels of corruption perception are positively associated with 
geographical lobbying intensity, as we predicted, assuming that corruption and lobbying 
are substitutes. Constituents from countries perceived to be more corrupted (such as 
Latin American countries) have less individual and collective motivation to invest in 
lobbying than do constituents from countries with lower levels of perceived corruption 
(such as Australia), because avoiding regulation restrictions such as those presented by 
the new lease proposal are easier in countries with high levels of perceived corruption. 
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However, non-compliance with standards can influence accounting quality and market 
development and can generate a poverty trap.  
The evidence provided by this research has implications for standard-setters, 
accounting professionals and researchers, indicating that participation by interested 
parties is strongly conditioned by a country’s characteristics. The research contributes to 
the extant cross-country accounting literature that has examined the accounting 
treatment of leases and international lobbying behaviour.  
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Appendix 3.1. Additional detailed sample distribution 
Table 3.15. Sample distribution by country 
Note: N is the number of comment letters. 
N % N % N % N %
Austria 1 0% 1 0% 0 0% 2 0%
Belgium 4 1% 5 1% 2 0% 11 1%
Czech Republic 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Denmark 2 1% 3 0% 2 0% 7 0%
Finland 3 1% 3 0% 5 1% 11 1%
France 12 4% 24 3% 18 3% 54 3%
Germany 14 5% 22 3% 22 3% 58 3%
Greece 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Ireland 2 1% 3 0% 5 1% 10 1%
Italy 3 1% 6 1% 2 0% 11 1%
Netherlands 7 2% 8 1% 10 2% 25 1%
Norway 1 0% 6 1% 3 0% 10 1%
Poland 0 0% 1 0% 1 0% 2 0%
Romania 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0%
Spain 5 2% 16 2% 6 1% 27 2%
Sweden 5 2% 7 1% 6 1% 18 1%
Switzerland 8 3% 13 2% 8 1% 29 2%
United Kingdom 58 19% 84 11% 65 10% 207 12%
Europe 125 41% 203 26% 157 24% 485 28%
Canada 16 5% 37 5% 28 4% 81 5%
United States 94 31% 383 49% 337 51% 814 47%
Bermuda 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0%
Jamaica 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0%
North America 110 36% 422 54% 365 56% 897 51%
China 2 1% 6 1% 9 1% 17 1%
Hong Kong 4 1% 16 2% 8 1% 28 2%
India 1 0% 3 0% 5 1% 9 1%
Indonesia 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Israel 1 0% 2 0% 3 0% 6 0%
Japan 4 1% 14 2% 14 2% 32 2%
Korea, Rep. 2 1% 6 1% 4 1% 12 1%
Malaysia 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 3 0%
Pakistan 1 0% 1 0% 0 0% 2 0%
Qatar 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Russian Fed. 1 0% 1 0% 2 0% 4 0%
Saudi Arabia 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Singapore 1 0% 5 1% 6 1% 12 1%
United Arab Emirates 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0%
Asia 19 6% 55 7% 55 8% 129 7%
Australia 15 5% 31 4% 21 3% 67 4%
New Zealand 3 1% 10 1% 2 0% 15 1%
Australia and NZ 18 6% 41 5% 23 4% 82 5%
Argentina 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Brazil 2 1% 5 1% 9 1% 16 1%
Chile 1 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0%
Colombia 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 1 0%
Mexico 1 0% 1 0% 2 0% 4 0%
Latin America 4 1% 7 1% 12 2% 23 1%
Kenya 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
South Africa 3 1% 5 1% 4 1% 12 1%
Zambia 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 1 0%
Africa 3 1% 5 1% 6 1% 14 1%
279 92% 733 93% 618 94% 1630 93%
Total
Geographical origin
Subtotal (sample)
DP 2009 ED/2010/9 ED/2013/6
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
129 
Chapter 4 
Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity 
in the lease standard-setting process  
4.1. Introduction to the chapter 
4.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
4.3. Model specification and definition of variables 
4.4. Sample and descriptive statistic 
4.5. Results 
4.6. Conclusion of the chapter 
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
130 
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
131 
Chapter 4 
Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the 
lease standard-setting process 
4.1. Introduction to the chapter 
The setting of accounting standards is commonly viewed as a political or economic 
process rather than a technical one (Zeff, 2002). Therefore, the IASB and the FASB, as 
private sector bodies, have established a formal process for issuing accounting 
standards to gain legitimacy. Transparency and participation are the key elements to 
achieve this objective. Actions of stakeholders to influence the regulatory process and to 
defend their own interests are called lobbying activities (Sutton, 1984).  
Orens et al. (2011), based on the previous works of Georgiou (2004, 2010), 
distinguish between different methods of exercising pressure: formal versus informal and 
direct versus indirect. Regarding the former, the most accessible avenues for 
participation for interested parties are the submission of comment letters. Comment 
letters have been considered a proxy for lobbying as a reflection of invisible lobbying 
actions (Hansen, 2011; Holder, Karim, Lin and Woods, 2013). Consequently, for the 
purposes of our study, we identify as a lobbyist every writer of a comment letter submitted 
to the lease discussion paper or to the exposure draft documents.  
The lease accounting proposal was chosen as the subject of this study for several 
reasons. First, this project has a global character because it was conceived as part of 
the convergence project of the IASB and the FASB, which makes it special because 
there are few projects that have the same condition. Second, it is a highly controversial 
accounting standard with distinct differences of opinion among the political forces and 
participants. This heated debate is reflected in the international media and in the 
substantial number of comment letters received by the standard-setters. Third, the lease 
project introduces important accounting modifications from a conceptual and practical 
perspective. In addition to the adoption of a “right of use” model, there were some other 
critical accounting matters that hindered the achievement of consensus. Finally, the new 
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approach could have significant economic consequences because it affects companies’ 
financial information.  
The lease accounting standard is a high-priority project for both standard-setters, 
the IASB and the FASB. It was introduced to the common agenda of both Boards in 2006 
after the SEC (2005) required a change in lease accounting after finding $US1.25 trillion 
operating leases outside of balance sheets. The project is currently under way, although 
divergence has occurred regarding some aspects. The commitment of both boards to 
the lease project confers it a global character, more than previous IASB projects. Only a 
few standards have the same converged condition, such IFRS 15 – Revenue from 
Contracts with Customers - issued in 2014 – which is fully converged with ASU 2014-09. 
During the lease standard-setting process, one discussion paper (March 2009) and 
two drafts (August 2010 and May 2013) were published for the purposes of public 
discussion, and they received 302, 788 and 655 comment letters, respectively. The 
number of responses, most of which opposed the proposal, surpassed the average 
number of responses for other projects’ comment letters (Barral Rivada, 2014), thus 
indicating a strong polemic. Additionally, the date of the final standard was delayed 
several times, so that the process of establishing lease accounting standards is 
especially long compared with other projects, such as the Business Combinations 
standard (IFRS 3). The ongoing debate about the pros and cons of the new lease 
accounting standard has become an important issue that has attracted the attention of 
accounting academia, professionals and the media (see, e.g., The Economist, 2013, The 
New York Times, 2013). On the one hand, the new lease approach is supposed to help 
users’ decision-making, but on the other hand, companies have concerns about costs 
and consequences. 
The treatment of lease accounting has evolved from a complete lack of registration 
of assets and liabilities to the current partial capitalization model. With this new proposal, 
the standard-setters intend to go one step further: to move towards a full capitalization 
model. All leases that are not freely cancellable by both parties would be reflected in the 
balance sheet, with the exception of short-term leases. Both standard-setters show 
strong support for the “right-of-use” model rather than the current ownership model 
(Biondi et al., 2011). Currently, however, there are other key issues such as the definition 
of a lease, the recognition of expenses on the lease income statement, renewal periods, 
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and contingent payments that have changed lease accounting and that are being 
questioned.  
The new lease approach would affect the financial statements of companies across 
all sectors; however, the financial figures of industries that are traditionally more intensive 
in operating leases would face considerably higher impacts (e.g., Fülbier et al., 2008; 
Fito et al., 2013). Authors such as Beattie et al., (1998), Goodacre (2003) and Duke, 
Hsieh and Suj (2009) and companies such as PwC (2010) have examined the possible 
increases in assets and liabilities due to the capitalization of operating leases, and their 
results show that some financial ratios would be substantially affected. However, other 
authors reveal that the amount of off-balance-sheet assets and liabilities proceeding from 
operating leases have been adjusted by analysts and are included in stock prices and 
interest rates (see, for example, Boastman and Dong, 2011; Krische et al., 2012; 
Altamuro et al., 2014), thus reducing concerns about the recognition of assets and 
liabilities from lease contracts that would be more transparent if companies calculated 
the adjustments directly (Nailor and Lennard, 2000).  
The aim of this chapter is to find explanatory factors that predict the behaviour of 
corporate groups with respect to the lease standard-setting process by distinguishing 
between three degrees of intensity in lobbying activities, depending on participation in 
the different discussion periods. For this reason, having considered all of the submitters 
of lease comment letters that have participated in the process from different groups 
(academics, regulators, companies, associations, etc.), we study the comment letters 
submitted by 306 non-financial listed companies in response to the lease discussion 
paper (2009) and the two exposure drafts (2010 and 2013) elaborated jointly by the IASB 
and the FASB. The quality of the financial statements provided by the listed companies 
and the fact that they are publicly available are valuable for this research. Additionally, 
the design to the study requires us to use firm factors that are difficult to obtain from other 
groups such as academics or regulators. 
Our findings suggest that the intensity of lobbying, which is understood as the 
degree of presence of interested companies measured through comment letters 
submitted during the lease accounting standard-setting process, is positively associated 
with the length of comment letters, firm size, firm profitability, firm age, and industries 
traditionally more intensively involved in leases and is negatively associated with 
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managerial ownership. The results are consistent with the positive accounting theory 
regarding firms’ motivations to lobby (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) and also with the 
rational choice theory proposed by Sutton (1984). Moreover, the outcomes are 
consistent with the accounting literature that predicted the economic effects of the lease 
proposal. 
The chapter contributes to the growing literature on lobbying behaviour in the 
accounting standard-setting process and the lease accounting project in particular. First, 
previous papers analysing the lease accounting standard-setting process have focused 
on the modifications from a conceptual and practical perspective by examining the 
impacts of the proposal, the characteristics of the participating constituents, the content 
of the comment letters and compliance with the proposal. This chapter adds a new 
perspective by examining the factors that determine the decision to submit comment 
letters in the lease accounting standard-setting process. Drawing on the framework that 
explains the drivers for lobbying in accounting standards, this chapter explores the 
intensity of lobbying using a combination of quantitative and qualitative determinants 
such as size, firm age, managerial ownership and length of comment letters. Thus, the 
results contribute to extending the previous evidence on lobbying behaviour, as we use 
not only traditional variables that empirical papers have shown to be associated with 
lobbying but also new determinants or less conventional determinants that could explain 
firms’ decisions to submit comment letters on this specific project.  
Moreover, this study also reveals that previous findings that have identified factors 
that influence a company’s decision to lease and the characteristics that explain 
preferences for off-balance-sheet financing may be connected with companies’ lobbying 
attitude in this case. Additionally, to our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the 
factors associated with firms’ decisions to lobby in the lease accounting standard-setting 
process using the comment letters received in three consultation periods – DP 2009, 
ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6. Thus, the results provide a complete picture of firms’ 
participation behaviour in the lease accounting standard-setting process. This study 
therefore represents a new step in predicting the behaviour of preparers regarding 
changes in standards as controversial as the lease project.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the theoretical 
framework while also presenting the hypothesis. In section 4.3, we describe the 
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methodology and the variables. Section 4.4 reveals the sample selection and the 
descriptive analysis. In section 4.5, the results are shown and discussed. Finally, section 
4.6 presents the conclusions. 
4.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986), who provide the theoretical basis for the 
positive accounting theory, express some seminal statements about the lobbying 
phenomenon. From an economic perspective, a new accounting standard could impact 
the economic and financial situation of companies. Therefore, there are three factors that 
can explain managers´ motivation to incur in certain accounting practices: a) the political 
cost hypothesis, b) contractual arrangements related to debt or c) information production 
costs and bookkeeping costs linked to manager compensation. The first factor assumes 
that the government will place more sophisticated regulations on more visible firms (e.g., 
larger firms, more profitable firms); therefore, companies tend to use different accounting 
methods to avoid attracting political attention. The second factor states that managers 
will make accounting choices to show better performance and liquidity positions to 
comply with the terms of debt contracts between firms and lenders. The third factor 
assumes that managers tend to maximize their wealth via compensation agreements 
tied to accounting numbers. Therefore, this theory could explain the association between 
the impact of a new accounting standard, the financial situation of the company and the 
lobbying phenomenon. 
The positive accounting theory is a robust accounting framework to explain company 
behaviour and particularly lobbying behaviour. Prior empirical research has used a 
variety of factors and variables to explain firms’ motivations to lobby. While the prior 
literature generally finds that a high probability of submission of comment letters is 
associated with larger companies (Larson, 1997; Ang et al., 2000; Georgiou, 2005; 
Katselas et al., 2011; Jorissen et al.,  2012), debt covenants or high leverage (Ndubizu, 
Choi and Jain, 1993; Georgiou, 2005; Koh, 2011; Fito et al., 2013) and corporate 
governance characteristics (Kelly, 1985; Koh, 2011), less evidence exists with regard to 
other corporate characteristics such as media coverage or corporate social 
responsibility. Based on this previous research, this chapter examines a combination of 
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firm characteristics that may explain the likelihood of submitting a comment letter in the 
lease standard-setting process. 
According to the rational choice theory and the economic theory of democracy, a 
rational company or individual allocates resources to lobbying only if the benefits 
compensate for the costs, similar to the process of allocating a vote in a political system. 
Thus, Sutton (1984) asks what type of individual or organization finds lobbying to be 
more profitable. This calculation can also be affected by the degree of support for the 
entity’s preferences among individuals or pressure groups, the probability of influencing 
the decision process of the regulatory authority and the resources of the lobbyist. Some 
recent studies, such as those by Jorissen et al. (2012) and Giner and Arce (2012), build 
hypotheses using this framework. 
Based on previous theories, we assume that companies involved in the lease 
standard-setting process through the submission of comment letters have made an 
investment to transfer information to standard-setters to ultimately influence the outcome 
and receive benefits. They are signalling themselves as lobbyists through a transactional 
information strategy according to the corporate political activities theory. Independent 
from the corporate position described in the comment letter, which may be interpreted 
subjectively, the investment is greater if the company is committed during all phases of 
the project in addition to the result of the final standard. The positive accounting theory 
and the economic theory of democracy provide arguments to explain that the decision to 
engage in lobbying in the early stage of the accounting standard-setting process (i.e., in 
the standard-setting process between the first discussion document and the definitive 
publication of the accounting standard) depends on the firm´s effectiveness in influencing 
issues during the provisional stage of the process and on the economic impact of the 
proposal. 
Based on the previous evidence that shows that the lease project is one of the joint 
standards established by the IASB and the FASB that has caused the most debate, 
primarily among companies potentially affected by the proposed changes, and also 
based on the lobbying principal theories such as positive accounting theory and the 
economic theory of democracy, which suggest that corporate characteristics influence 
the decision to lobby, we develop seven hypotheses to test in this chapter. 
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Hypothesis 1: Comment letters’ length 
We examine the length of comment letters because it may be a vehicle to exert 
pressure over regulators in the accounting standard-setting process. The evidence may 
be remarkable not only for this project but also for future projects. The literature has used 
different proxies to investigate the relationship between the content of comment letters 
and the lobbying behaviour. For example the quantity of information measured by the 
length of a comment letter is used in several early studies (Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 
1994; Brown, 1982; Ang et al., 2000, Hansen, 2011, Giner and Arce, 2012).  
Hansen (2011) argues that lobbying success is positively correlated with the ability 
of respondents to transfer valuable information to regulators. He uses a factor to 
measure the quality of the reasoning (of the arguments) that includes the length of the 
letter (in number of pages), the percentage of answered questions, references to 
conceptual frameworks and to other IFRS and, finally, references to national standard-
setters. He finds a positive association between the quality of the information included in 
a comment letter, each lobbyist’s desired position and the outcome. According to the 
rational choice theory, a lobbyist would only exert the effort to submit a comment letter if 
he or she expects to influence the outcome; therefore, the expectations of a comment 
letter’s influence based on its characteristics are relevant. In addition, Giner and Arce 
(2012) use several accounting projects to reveal that the length of comment letters, as 
measured by the number of pages and words, is important as a lobby strategy.  
Focusing on the lease project, Mora and Molina (2014) examine the strength of the 
constituent positions in favour or against, measured by the number of arguments 
presented in the comment letter as a proxy for each of the issues addressed by the 
interested parties. The results show that preparers use more arguments than other 
participants due to their high level of interest in this project, which is consistent with their 
opposition to the proposal. In sum, the quality of the reasoning has been measured by 
different proxies such as the length of comment letters, the percentage of questions 
answered and the arguments that have been used by each constituent.  
Based on this literature, we examine the length of the comment letters regarding the 
three consultation phases, as the length may be related to the lobbying intensity. We 
expect a positive association between the quality of the reasoning and the lobbying 
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decision because the quality of the reasoning positively influences the standard-setters. 
Consequently, we establish the next hypothesis.  
H1: The length of the comment letters is positively associated with the intensity of 
lobbying activity in the lease accounting standard-setting process.  
Hypothesis 2: Firm size 
Several authors have examined the attribute of firm size as a determinant of a 
lobbying decision from different perspectives. First, Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 
1986) use size as a proxy to measure political visibility or political costs, as large 
companies are more politically visible. They make the assumption that companies with 
a larger size may receive adverse political attention; consequently, large companies tend 
to use accounting methods to reduce their profit (and to avoid such visibility) more than 
small companies do. In addition, Kelly (1985) and Francis (1987) examine lobbyist 
behaviour regarding the accounting standards published by the FASB using the 
framework proposed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1986). 
Second, Sutton (1984) argues that lobbyists make rational choices according to the 
cost-benefit function. Therefore, a large company has more incentives to lobby than a 
small company does because a large company has more resources to invest in lobbying 
activities and more capacity to influence a regulator and to benefit from the outcome. 
Koh (2011, p.5) interprets Sutton’s approach by explaining that a “larger firm size is 
generally seen as a proxy for the higher likelihood that a firm’s proportion of benefits 
obtained from lobbying is usually large enough to offset the lobbying costs”.  
In line with these theories, prior empirical studies on lobbying show a positive 
relationship between size and the tendency to participate in the process of standard-
setting (e.g., Larson, 1997; Ang et al., 2000; Georgiou, 2005; Katselas et al., 2011; 
Jorissen et al., 2012). Recent articles based on the size hypothesis and a combination 
of the two theories conclude that the lobbying decision is positively related to firm size 
(Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos and Santos, 2014). Additionally, in the particular context 
of the lease accounting project, we can consider that a firm is affected by the political 
costs hypothesis (Goodacre, 2003; Gosman and Hanson, 2000; Lanfranconi and 
Wiedman, 2000; Fito et al., 2013). In addition, changes in lease accounting could 
proportionately affect large firms more, and large companies have more capacity to 
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absorb lobbying costs. Therefore, we introduce firm size in our study, and we expect a 
positive relationship between size and the tendency to engage in lobbying behaviour. 
H2: Larger firms are more likely to lobby more intensively than small companies 
regarding the lease accounting standard-setting process. 
Hypothesis 3: Leverage 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) use the positive accounting theory to argue that 
companies are more likely to be involved in a decision to lobby when the regulatory 
changes could have an impact on their reporting figures. Continuing with this argument, 
Georgiou (2004) argues that firms prefer not to participate in the process when the 
proposed standard does not have a substantial impact on their accounts. The new lease 
proposal intends to move towards a full capitalization model whereby lessee companies 
would increase the amount of assets and liabilities recognized due to operating lease 
capitalization, and as a consequence, financial ratios such as leverage would be affected 
(Beattie et al., 1998; Bennett and Bradbury, 2003; Durocher, 2008; Fito et al., 2013). 
The literature on lease determinants considers that firms with higher leverage levels 
and financial constraints prefer to use leases instead of other types of debt (Sharpe and 
Nguyen, 1995; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009). In addition, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
predict that managers would make elections that would avoid violating the terms of debt 
covenants. Additionally, if operating leases are capitalized, it could affect debt covenant 
violations in the short term (Lee et al., 2014). Therefore, we establish the hypothesis that 
companies with high leverage ratios are more likely to lobby in the long term than other 
companies, and we expect a positive relation between debt ratios and the tendency to 
lobby.  
H3: Companies with high leverage ratios are more likely to lobby more intensively 
than other companies are regarding the lease accounting standard-setting 
process. 
Hypothesis 4: Profitability 
As mentioned previously, most of the prior research on the subject of lobbying on 
accounting regulations has used the positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
140 
1978) to build hypotheses. Several authors have included firm profitability as an 
important part of their lobbying models (Sadrich and Annavarjulia, 2003 and 2005; 
Jorissen et al., 2012; Fito et al., 2013; Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos and Santos, 2014; 
Mora and Molina, 2014; Barral Rivada, 2014). The literature shows that more profitable 
firms are supposed to be more likely to lobby because they have more resources to 
invest in it (see, e.g., Fito et al., 2013; Kosi and Reither, 2014). Additionally, income 
volatility or changes in profitability can explain the probability of submitting a comment 
letter (Kosi and Reither, 2014; Barral Rivada, 2014). Reviewing the empirical evidence, 
some studies do not find a relationship between lobbying and the profitability variable 
(Jorissen et al., 2012; Fito et al., 2013), while some studies find a positive relationship 
between lobbying and income volatility or profitability (Sadrich and Annavarjulia, 2003 
and 2005; Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos and Santos, 2014). 
From the perspective of financial strategy, in large companies, profitability is found 
to be positively correlated with lease contracts (Morais, 2013). Regarding the proposed 
changes in lease standards, it has been documented that profitability ratios are expected 
to be reduced to some extent in some sectors (Goodacre, 2003; Mulford and Gram, 
2007; Durocher, 2008). Therefore, based on previous lobbying research that shows a 
positive relationship between lobbying and income variability during the period or 
average return on assets during the period (Sadrich and Annavarjulia, 2003 and 2005; 
Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos and Santos, 2014; Barral Rivada, 2014), we introduce 
firm profitability into the study. 
H4: Profitable companies are more likely to lobby more intensively than non-
profitable companies regarding the lease accounting standard-setting process. 
Hypothesis 5: Firm age 
Within the corporate political activities theory, we find several antecedents that argue 
for an association between firm age and lobbying. Campos and Giovannoni (2007) 
explain that firm age increases the likelihood of a firm being a lobbyist. Hillman, Keim 
and Schuler (2004) argue that age has been used as a proxy for constructs such as 
“visibility of the firm” (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000), “reputation” (Boddewyn and Brewer, 
1994) and “experience” or “credibility” (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). All of these proxies could 
be related to political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1986). Additionally, the 
age of the firm as a synonym of “experience”, meaning, for example, “previous 
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experience in lobbying activities”, may also influence the cost-benefit equation proposed 
by Sutton (1984). Morck, Sepanski and Yeung (2001) and Kosi and Reither (2014) affirm 
that firms lobbying in the past might experience economies of scale. They make 
considerable investments the first time they lobby, but in subsequent periods, they 
experience low marginal costs for further lobbying. Moreover, success in past lobbying 
could also be a motivation for continuing lobbying behaviour (Beresford, 2001; Kosi and 
Reither, 2014).  
The age of the firm is considered to be a potentially important driver of firms’ political 
activities (Weymouth, 2012). The author states that older firms have the advantage of 
repeated interactions during previous years with politicians and regulators, and 
therefore, the costs of monitoring may decrease with the age of the firm. Therefore, we 
expect that the maturity of a firm may be positively associated with the intensity of 
lobbying.  
H5: Older firms are more likely to lobby more intensively than younger firms 
regarding the lease accounting standard-setting process. 
Hypothesis 6: Industry 
According to Watts and Zimmerman’s theory (1978), companies that belong to 
industries that are more affected by a regulatory change (firms that use operating leases 
more intensively) tend to lobby more than companies in other industries do. The sectors 
that use operating leases more intensively are those in service industries (Beattie et al., 
1998; Peterson and Brolin, 2014) such as air transport services, retailing (Finucane, 
1988; Gosman and Hanson, 2000), restaurants, hotels, shipping, truck and railway 
transport, and companies involved in the energy and utilities sectors (Adams and 
Hardwick, 1998).  
A large number of previous studies examine the impact of the new standard on these 
particular industry sectors. Goodacre (2003) shows that commercial companies use 
operating leases intensively. Fito et al. (2013) simulate the impact of capitalization on 
the balance of commitments for operating leases on a sample of 52 Spanish listed 
companies and note that the impact from 2008-2010 is significant in some ratios, and 
key sectors are impacted regarding energy and retail distribution of both goods and 
services. PwC (2013) argues that the oil industry will be particularly affected because of 
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the definition of a lease due to the capital-intensive nature of the industry and the fact 
that highly specialized equipment is not always owned. Therefore, we expect a positive 
relationship between industries that are traditionally more intensively involved in leases 
and lobbying in the long term.  
H6: Companies from industries that are traditionally more intensively involved in 
lease contracts are more likely to lobby more intensively than companies from 
other industries are regarding the lease accounting standard-setting process. 
Hypothesis 7: Managerial ownership 
Agency theory concerns the relationship between the principal (ownership) and the 
agent (manager) when the agent is engaged in managing a company and the principal 
and agent have different goals or interests. The positive accounting literature has 
focused on examining situations where both parties have different interests and the way 
that governance mechanisms limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour when asymmetric 
information exists.  
Corporate governance and the ownership structure have been extensively 
examined in the economics and accounting literature (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Kelly, 1985; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Koh, 2011). The literature shows 
that public firms have high agency costs compared with private firms due to the greater 
ownership separation and dispersion. Ownership concentration has showed mixed 
results. In general, the literature shows that when CEO ownership increases, the 
interests of managers and other shareholders are more aligned, thus reducing the 
agency problem (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, it is also possible to find 
the opposite effect (entrenchment) because owner-managers can use their equity 
positions to divert resources away from the firm, which results in a higher level of agency 
costs (e.g., Morck et al., 1988). 
According to the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Walkling and Long, 1984), in companies where CEOs and other executives have a larger 
share of ownership, they try to reduce the firm’s exposure to risk through a positive 
tendency to use lease contracts to reduce, for example, the obsolescence risk of property 
(i.e., Flath, 1980; Smith and Wakeman, 1985; Mehran, Taggart and Yermack, 1999; 
Duke, Franz, Hunt. and Toy, 2002). However, the changes in lease accounting do not 
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need to affect the risk considerations of insider managers because these considerations 
reflect characteristics of the contracts themselves and not with the recognition of assets 
or debt.  
Little research to date has linked ownership structure with lobbying behaviour. For 
example, Kelly (1985) examines the importance of share ownership of management and 
concludes that firm that lobby have lower management ownership compared with firms 
that do not lobby. In addition, Koh (2011) uses this variable as a control variable to 
analyse the decision to lobby. Regarding the lease literature with respect to the positive 
accounting theory, we expect a negative association between managerial ownership and 
the lobbying decision in the lease project. Borghesi and Chang (2015) suggest that firms 
with a higher level of insider ownership invest less in the firms and lobby more because 
lobbying does not increase firm value in the long term.  
In our sample, CEO ownership is low compared with previous samples because the 
percentage of managers that own more than 5% shares is on average 8%. Based on the 
previous literature, we expect that the insider variable influences lobbying intensity. 
However, due to the high dispersion of ownership, we do not predict the sign of the 
relationship between lobbying in the lease accounting standard-setting process and the 
concentration of managerial ownership.  
H7: The managerial ownership concentration of companies influences their 
lobbying intensity to the lease proposal.  
4.3. Model specification and definition of variables 
The hypotheses related to the key factors that explain participation and intensity of 
lobbying are tested in three ways: (i) Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis (ii) we 
compare the three groups on intensity of lobbying in the lease standard-setting process 
through a univariate test (Kruskal-Wallis test) to observe whether there are significant 
differences between the groups; (iii) we use a multivariate discrete choice model to 
explain the decision to submit a comment letter to the lease project and its determinants, 
where we measure three possibilities: the probability of a company submitting comment 
letters on only one lease document (less intensity of lobbying), the probability of a 
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company submitting comment letters on two of the three documents published by the 
regulators (medium intensity of lobbying) and the probability of a company submitting 
comment letters on all three documents that were discussed (high intensity of lobbying). 
For the quantitative data analysis, we use the following software: SPSS (22) and Stata 
(12).   
The most common models used to study the decision to engage in a lobbying 
behaviour are probit models (see, e.g., Ang et al., 2000; Jorissen et al., 2012) and logit 
models (e.g., Francis, 1987; Koh, 2011), which offer a binary dependent variable for 
lobbyists and not lobbyists to identify the probability of submitting a comment letter and 
the variables that determine the behaviour of submitting a comment letter. Other authors 
have also conducted multinomial regressions where the dependent variable takes three 
or more values as the probability of lobbying by different levels of intensity or not lobbying 
(Kosi and Reither, 2014; Santos and Santos, 2014). This methodology allows 
researchers a more precise categorization of the variable of interest than binary models, 
which address only two categories. Therefore, we run a multinomial regression to test 
ours hypotheses. The model takes the following expression:  
INTENSITY_LOBBY (ORDERED PROBIT) = β + β1AV_LENGTH + β2AV_SIZE 
+ β3AV_LEV + β4AV_PROF + β5AGE + β6INDUSTRY + β7INSIDERS + ε. 
The dependent variable is the Intensity of lobbying, that is, companies that submitted 
comment letters in all three phases of the lease accounting standard-setting process are 
considered lobbyists in the long term; such companies have to spend more resources 
because they expect to receive more benefits from their actions. Thus, the variable takes 
the value of 2 for firms that have submitted three documents during the consultation 
periods, the value of 1 for firms that have submitted two documents during the 
consultation periods and the value of 0 for firms that have submitted one document 
during the consultation periods.  
As explanatory variables, we use one qualitative comment letter characteristic and 
six corporate firm characteristics. First, we use a variable called length, which is 
measured by the number of pages of the comment letter, which we consider to be a 
proxy for the quality of the reasoning and the cost of lobbying. Second, we use Bureau 
van Dijk’s OSIRIS database to obtain corporate data from firms’ financial statements. 
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For the size variable, we use the logarithm of total assets (similar to Santos and 
Santos, 2014, in the Extractive Activities discussion paper). We take the average of the 
logarithm of total asset for firm i in year t for the period from the 2009 to 2013. 
For the leverage variable, we use the long-term debt ratio, which is defined as the 
amount of long-term debt scaled by the book value of total assets (Cho et al., 2014). This 
use of this measure is based on previous literature that shows that total leverage is 
mainly determined by the amount of long-term debt (see, e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; 
Johnson, 2003). We take the average of total long-term debt divided by total assets for 
firm i in year t for the period that from 2009 to 2013.  
We consider the variable profitability in our model as categorical variable that takes 
the value of 1 if firm i reports positive net income divided by assets in year t and 0 
otherwise, considering the years from 2009 to 2013. Kosi and Reither (2014) use the 
average of return on assets during the period. Santos and Santos (2014) use the average 
of net profit during the period. 
The age of the firm is measured as the years since the time of incorporation to the 
last day of 2013 (Shin and Stulz, 2000; Akhtar and Oliver, 2009).  
Moreover, we include in our model the industry effect. This variable is measured as 
a categorical variable based on subsectors that traditionally use operating leases more 
intensively and the others. We classify the companies by the four-digit SIC Code 
obtained from the OSIRIS database and taking into account the classification of sectors 
made by Gosman and Hanson (2000), Lim, de Mann and Mihov (2005), and Kostolansky 
and Stanko (2011). Thus, the intensive lease industries are airlines, other transport, 
some manufacturing industries, supermarkets, family clothing stores, restaurants, hotels, 
energy and communications.  
Finally, we consider the variable insiders in our model as a categorical variable that 
takes the value of 1 if any of the managers of the firms (CEOs or other executives) own 
more that 5% of the shares of the company and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4.1. Description of the firm-level variables 
Variable (predicted 
sign) 
Definition 
Source 
INTENSITY_LOBBY 
Indicator variable that takes the value of 2 if the firm 
submitted comment letters in all three periods of the 
lease standard-setting process, 1 if the firm submitted 
comment letters in two periods of the lease standard-
setting process and 0 if the firm submitted comment 
letters in one period of the lease standard-setting 
process.  
Comment 
letters’ 
sample 
AV_LENGTH (+) 
Average number of pages in comment letters submitted 
(2009-2013). 
Comment 
letters’ 
sample 
AV_SIZE (+) 
Natural logarithm of the average total assets (2009-
2013). 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
AV_LEV (+) 
Mean of ratio of long-term debt to total assets (2009–
2013). 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
AV_PROF (+) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
reports positive net income / assets in the year, 0 
otherwise (2009-2013). 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
AGE (+) 
Number of years from the date of incorporation to 
31/12/2013. 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
INDUSTRY (+) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for industries 
that traditionally use operating leases more intensively 
(US SIC principal code), 0 otherwise (2009-2013). 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
INSIDERS (?) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a manager 
that owns more than 5% of shares, 0 otherwise (2009-
2013). 
OSIRIS 
database 
(2014) 
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4.4. Sample and descriptive statistics 
4.4.1. Data collection  
We focus on the analysis of the comment letters sent by participants during the three 
consultation periods: the Discussion Paper published in 2009 (IASB, 2009), the 
ED/2010/9 (IASB, 2010) and the ED/2013/6 (IASB, 2013). We collected 1,745 comment 
letters from the IASB website to test the hypotheses. There are some comment letters 
that are signed by several respondents. Therefore, we treat them as different writers. 
Hence, the regulators have received 1,745 comment letters during the three consultation 
periods submitted by 1,186 respondents in total.  
Table 4.2. Sample selection 
Note: The group of non-preparers includes academics, regulators, accounting profession, 
consultants and users. The group of preparers refers to companies that elaborate financial 
statements and their trade associations.  
First, we consider the total number of respondents in any of the three consultation 
periods opened after the introduction of the Discussion Paper in 2009 and the two 
subsequent Exposure Drafts in 2010 and 2013. The prior literature distinguishes the 
group of financial statement preparers as the most active group in the submission of 
comment letters in the accounting regulatory process. The same pattern is observed in 
this lobbying group regarding the process of replacement of the lease standard (663 
companies submitted letters signed by preparers of financial statements, or 55.9% of the 
sample, followed by their trade associations, with 176 respondents, or 14.8% of the 
sample); therefore it is interesting to focus on this group. The evidence is consistent with 
Sutton’s theory (1984) about the lobbying phenomenon that supposes that preparers 
might be more involved in the standard-setting process than non-preparers, as preparers 
are more resourceful, less diversified and will be more affected by the new standard. 
Other studies, such as those of Tandy and Wilburn (1992) and Jorissen et al. (2006), 
Total comment letters' submitters to lease proposal 1,186
- Non-preparers respondents -347
- Trade associations -176
Total corporate comment letters' submitters to lease proposal 663
- Financial companies -198
Total non-financial corporate comment letters' submitters to lease proposal 465
- Non-listed industrial companies -159
Total non-financial corporate listed comment letters' submitters to lease proposal 306
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find that the majority of the comment letters are from preparers. A few published studies 
also focus on the distribution of respondents in the lease accounting project (Kort, 2011; 
Mora and Molina, 2014; Barral Rivada, 2014) and provide similar evidence, although 
they do not incorporate the last ED.  
To acquire a better understanding of preparers’ behaviour, we follow the arguments 
from the prior literature. Orens et al. (2011) find differences in lobbying behaviour 
between industrial firms and financial firms and also between listed and non-listed firms. 
For instance, the mandatory application of IFRS only for listed companies in the 
European Union since 2005 is one reason that may explain the different reactions to a 
regulatory change between listed and non-listed firms in this geographic zone. Regarding 
differences between financial and industrial firms, Orens et al. (2011) indicate that such 
firms have distinct preferences in lobbying methods. A peculiarity of the financial industry 
is that its companies can in some cases be considered preparers of financial statements 
and in other situations users of financial information as capital investors or creditors. 
Based on these considerations, we focus on listed industrial companies. 
Table 4.2 shows that there are 663 corporate preparers involved in the lease 
standard-setting process. To obtain further data on these respondents, we use the 
OSIRIS database to obtain their names and international security identification numbers. 
The corporate preparer group is divided into 465 non-financial companies and 198 
financial companies. Regarding the non-financial companies, we separate the 306 listed 
firms and 159 private firms during the years considered (2009-2013). Of the 159 private 
firms, 16 of them were listed once and were delisted before or during the years under 
consideration. The 306 non-financial listed firms are the sample used for our study.  
4.4.2. Sample composition by consultation project, country origin and industry 
Table 4.3, titled sample composition by consultation project, shows the sample 
composition by participation intensity. There are 177 non-financial listed firms (58%) that 
submitted a comment letter in response to DP 2009, ED/2010/9 or ED/2013/6, 93 non-
financial listed firms (30%) that submitted comment letters in two of the consultation 
periods (30%) and 36 non-financial listed firms (12%) that submitted comment letters in 
all three periods of the lease standard-setting process.  
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Table 4.3. Sample composition by consultation project 
 
Note: N is the number of comment letters  
 
Table 4.4 reveals the country origin composition for the sample used in this study. 
Most of the writers come from the United States (47%). The large number of respondents 
from this country is likely attributable to the fact that this is a convergence project 
conducted jointly by the IASB and the FASB, which have different scopes. The rules 
submitted by the FASB are directly applicable to public and private companies located 
in the United States or listed in United States’ capital markets, and the standards 
submitted by the IASB depend on the approbation of the local authorities where they are 
permitted or mandatory; for example, in Europe, they are mandatory only for listed 
companies. The next largest geographic group is the group of respondents that come 
from the United Kingdom (10%).  
 
  
N % N % N % N %
Non-financial listed companies 177 0.58 93 0.30 36 0.12 306 1.00
Lobbyists in 
one of the 
three 
documents
Lobbyists 
in two of 
the three 
documents
Lobbyists in 
all of the 
three 
documents
Total 
lobbyists
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Table 4.4. Sample composition by country 
Note: Table 4.4 reports the composition of the sample by country and distinguishes between lobbyists who 
submitted a comment letter in response to DP 2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6, those who submitted two 
comment letters in response to the lease standard-setting process and those who submitted three comment 
letters in response to the lease standard-setting process. 
Table 4.5 shows the composition of the sample by industry considering the 2-digit 
SIC code. The largest industry group is the manufacturing group (31%), where we find 
large industrial conglomerate companies such as Siemens and General Electric, which 
specialize in heavy equipment, followed by the trade industry (19%), services industry 
Country
N % N % N % N %
Argentina 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
Australia 6 0.03 2 0.02 3 0.08 11 0.04
Belgium 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
Bermuda 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
Brazil 0 0.00 1 0.01 0 0.00 1 0.00
Canada 14 0.08 6 0.06 2 0.06 22 0.07
China 3 0.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 0.01
Denmark 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
Finland 2 0.01 1 0.01 0 0.00 3 0.01
France 2 0.01 6 0.06 2 0.06 10 0.03
Germany 7 0.04 5 0.05 2 0.06 14 0.05
Hong Kong 6 0.03 0 0.00 2 0.06 8 0.03
India 0 0.00 1 0.01 0 0.00 1 0.00
Ireland 2 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 0.01
Italy 2 0.01 1 0.01 0 0.00 3 0.01
Japan 11 0.06 12 0.13 0 0.00 23 0.08
Korea, Rep. 3 0.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 0.01
Netherlands 1 0.01 1 0.01 1 0.03 3 0.01
New Zealand 1 0.01 1 0.01 0 0.00 2 0.01
Norway 0 0.00 1 0.01 0 0.00 1 0.00
Singapore 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
South Africa 2 0.01 1 0.01 0 0.00 3 0.01
Spain 1 0.01 1 0.01 2 0.06 4 0.01
Switzerland 5 0.03 2 0.02 3 0.08 10 0.03
United Kingdom 19 0.11 9 0.10 3 0.08 31 0.10
United States 85 0.48 42 0.45 16 0.44 143 0.47
Total 177 1.00 93 1.00 36 1.00 306 1.00
Total 
lobbyists
Lobbyists in 
one of the 
three 
documents
Lobbyists in 
two of the 
three 
documents
Lobbyists in 
all of the three 
documents
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(14%), transport industry (10%), utilities (8%), the petroleum industry (8%) and 
telecommunications (7%). Agriculture, natural resources and construction are the 
industries that are less represented in the sample.  
Table 4.5. Sample composition by industry 
Note: Table 4.5 reports the composition of the sample by industry and distinguishes between lobbyists who 
submitted a comment letter in response to DP 2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6, those who submitted two 
comment letters in response to the lease standard-setting process and those who submitted three comment 
letters in response to the lease standard-setting process. 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Descriptive statistics, bivariate correlation analysis and univariate tests 
Table 4.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The table 
reveals that the average length of the comment letters (AV_LENGTH,) is 6.74 and at the 
90th percentile is 13.50. The average firm size (AV_SIZE), measured by the size 
logarithm, is 16.38. The average of leverage (AV_LEV), measured as long-term debt to 
total assets, is 0.37. The average of firm age (AGE) is 48.94, which means that firms 
Industry
N % N % N % N %
Utilities 13 0.07 6 0.06 4 0.11 23 0.08
Agriculture 1 0.01 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00
Natural resources 4 0.02 1 0.01 0 0.00 5 0.02
Petroleum industry 10 0.06 11 0.12 4 0.11 25 0.08
Construction 3 0.02 0 0.00 1 0.03 4 0.01
Manufacturing 45 0.25 36 0.39 13 0.36 94 0.31
Services industry 28 0.16 14 0.15 2 0.06 44 0.14
Telecommunications 9 0.05 7 0.08 6 0.17 22 0.07
Trade industry 41 0.23 12 0.13 4 0.11 57 0.19
Transport Industry 23 0.13 6 0.06 2 0.06 31 0.10
Listed non-financial firms 177 93 36 306
Lobbyists 
in one of 
the three 
documents
Lobbyists 
in two of 
the three 
documents
Lobbyists 
in all of the 
three 
documents
Total 
lobbyists
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have experience in the market. The average of industry is 0.55. The average of insiders 
is 0.08, which means that most managers own less than 5% of the firms’ shares. 
Table 4.6. Descriptive analysis of independent variables 
Note: Table 4.6 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the model: 
AV_LENGTH, AV_SIZE, AV_LEV, AV_PROF, AGE, INDUSTRY, INSIDERS. 
Table 4.7 shows the pair-wise correlations among the dependent variable and the 
corporate variables, including the signs of the correlation coefficients. Pearson 
correlations (below the diagonal) are consistent in signs with the Spearman correlations 
(above the diagonal). As predicted, the dependent variable INTENSITY_LOBBY is 
positively correlated with AV_LENGTH, AV_SIZE, AV_LEV, AV_PROF, AGE and 
INDUSTRY and negatively correlated with INSIDER. The evidence suggests that intense 
lobbying is mainly adopted by larger firms, profitable firms, more mature firms and firms 
operating in industries that traditionally use operating leases more intensively. In 
addition, the intensity of lobbying is positively correlated with the length of comment 
letters. Although many of these pairwise correlations are statistically significant, all of the 
correlations are considerably low, which indicates that there is no collinearity problem. 
MEAN SD PERC 10 PERC 25 PERC 50 PERC 75 PERC 90
AV_LENGTH 6.744 4.949 2.000 3.000 5.500 9.000 13.500
AV_SIZE 16.381 1.734 14.147 15.103 16.503 17.629 18.634
AV_LEV 0.369 0.187 0.118 0.230 0.358 0.494 0.629
AV_PROF 0.781 0.414 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AGE 48.939 38.784 10.555 16.971 34.208 74.302 112.363
INDUSTRY 0.552 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
INSIDERS 0.082 0.274 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Period 2009-2013Independent 
variables
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Table 4.7. Pearson and Spearman correlations 
Note: This table presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal for the complete 
sample (all of the consultation projects). *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, 
and 99 percent confidence levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.8 presents univariate results through the non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis 
test. The first three columns show the descriptive data for each variable for the three 
values of the dependent variable: lobbyists that submitted comment letters on one of the 
three documents, lobbyists that submitted comment letters on two of the three 
documents, and lobbyists that submitted comment letters on all three documents. The 
last column shows the p-value of the Kruskal–Wallis test.  
Table 4.8 reveals significant differences in the length variable2, which is measured 
by the number of pages submitted in each comment letter (AV_LENGHT). The group 
that lobbied in the long term presents the largest average length (9.630), followed by the 
group that submitted comment letters on two of the lease documents (7.055) and then 
the group that only submitted comment letters on one of the documents (5.993). The 
Kruskal-Wallis test shows statistically significant differences in the length variable among 
the different intensities of lobbying (p < 0.001). This evidence supports H1, which predicts 
that the length of comment letters is associated with by intensity of lobbying.  
2 To extend the study, we also include the analysis of comment letter’s length (pages) and 
percentage of answered questions considering all comment letters submitted to the three 
documents (DP2009; ED2010; ED2013). See table 4.12 in the appendix 1.1. 
AGE INSIDER
INT_LOBBY .220 ** .325 ** .071 .146 * .179 ** .183 ** -.154 **
AV_LENGTH .225 ** .190 ** .097 -.010 -.006 .009 -.078
AV_SIZE .322 ** .176 ** .195 ** .133 * .274 ** .233 ** -.153 **
AV_LEV .079 .069 .197 ** -.184 ** -.112 .041 -.175 **
AV_PROF .126 * -.029 .126 * -.187 ** -.004 .016 .014
AGE .186 ** .050 .293 ** -.074 -.019 .120 * .041
INDUSTRY .216 ** .019 .226 ** .044 .016 .099 -.043
INSIDER -.145 * -.056 -.167 ** -.170 ** .014 .035 -.043
P
e
a
rs
o
n
Spearman
INT_LOBBY AV_LENGTH AV_SIZE AV_LEV AV_PROF INDUSTRY
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Table 4.8 also reveals interesting differences in the size variable (AV_SIZE). The 
average for firm size (measured by the logarithm of assets) is 15.948 for the less 
intensive lobbyists, 16.754 for the medium-intensive lobbyists and 17.548 for the highest 
pressure group. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows statistically significant differences (p < 
0.001) in the size variable. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of H2 and also 
with the accounting literature (see, e.g., Jorissen et al., 2012; Santos and Santos, 2014). 
The mean of AV_LEV increases when the lobbying intensity is higher: 0.360 for the less 
intensive lobbyists, 0.372 for the medium-intensive lobbyists and 0.409 for the most 
intensive group. However, the Kruskal-Wallis test does not show statistically significant 
differences in the AV_LEV variable (p > 0.05). Thus, the evidence does not confirm the 
prediction of H3. There are also differences in the intensity of lobbying by the profitability 
variable. The profitability average is 0.723 for the less intensive lobbyists, 0.882 for the 
medium-intensive lobbyists and 0.806 for the most intensive lobbyists. In addition, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test shows statistically significant differences (p < 0.05). Thus, the 
evidence supports H4. 
Table 4.8 shows that the relationship between the variable intensity of lobbying and 
the maturity of the company is as follows: the average company maturity is 43.484 years 
for companies that submitted one comment letter, 53.243 years for companies that 
submitted two comment letters and 64.641 years for companies that submitted three 
comment letters. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows statistically significant differences in 
AGE (p < 0.01), thus confirming H5. 
Moreover, we include the variable INDUSTRY to consider industries that are 
involved in leases more intensively and industries involved in leases less intensively. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test shows statistically significant differences in the industry variable (p < 
0.001), thus confirming H6. 
Finally, Table 4.8 shows that there are statically significant differences (p < 0.05) 
between the intensity of lobbying and the insider ownership variable (INSIDERS), which 
supports the last hypothesis, H7. 
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
 
155 
Table 4.8. Univariate results 
 
Note: Table 4.8 reports descriptive statistics of the sample for lobbyists who submitted a comment letter in 
response to DP 2009, ED/2010/9 or ED/2013/6, those who submitted two comment letters in response to 
the lease standard-setting process and those who submitted comment letters in all three periods of the lease 
standard-setting process. The table also reports the statistical significance (p-value) of the difference 
between the three groups using the Kruskal-Wallis test (last column). All of the variables are defined in Table 
4.1. 
 
4.5.2. Multivariate results 
Table 4.9 reports the ordered probit regression estimation of the model stated in 
Equation 1. Model 1 does not include dummy variables, and Model 2 includes country 
dummies. The (pseudo) R squared of the models ranges from 0.11 (Model 1) to 0.14 
(Model 2).  
  
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD p-value
Independent variables
AV_LENGTH 5.993 5.000 4.547 7.055 6.000 5.209 9.630 9.000 5.140 0.000
AV_SIZE 15.948 15.978 1.623 16.754 16.899 1.685 17.548 17.439 1.668 0.000
AV_LEV 0.360 0.347 0.191 0.372 0.354 0.184 0.409 0.403 0.169 0.308
AV_PROF 0.723 1.000 0.449 0.882 1.000 0.325 0.806 1.000 0.401 0.011
AGE 43.484 29.326 35.913 53.243 38.027 40.314 64.641 59.040 43.553 0.007
INDUSTRY 0.497 0.000 0.501 0.516 1.000 0.502 0.917 1.000 0.280 0.000
INSIDERS 0.119 0.000 0.324 0.032 0.000 0.178 0.028 0.000 0.167 0.022
Lobbyists in one of the 
three documents
Lobbyists in two of the 
three documents
Lobbyists in all of the 
three documents
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Table 4.9. Results of ordered probit 
Note: The dependent variable is lobbying intensity, which takes the value of 2 for lobbyists who submitted 
comment letters in all three phases of the lease standard-setting process (DP 2009, ED/2010/9 and 
ED/2013/6), the value of 1 for those who submitted two comment letters in the lease standard-setting 
process and the value of 0 for those who submitted comment letters only in one of the three phases of the 
lease standard-setting process. All of the variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.9 shows that the coefficient on AV_LENGTH is significant and positive, 
which means that the quality of reasoning is associated with the intensity of lobbying, 
thus supporting our first hypothesis H1. The coefficient on AV_SIZE is significant and 
positive. This result corroborates H2, that is, larger companies are more likely to lobby 
more intensively.  
However, the coefficient on AV_LEV is not statistically significant. This result is not 
isolated because prior lobbying studies also provide mixed evidence related to this 
variable (e.g., Ang et al., 2000; Katselas et al., 2011; Kosi and Reither, 2014). For 
example, in the leases case, some authors question the relationship between debt 
created from a lease contract and other types of debts, especially with regard to whether 
they are substitutes for each other or are complementary (see, e.g., Ang and Peterson, 
1984; Lewis and Schallheim, 1992; Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000; Eisfeldt and 
Rampini, 2009). The same could be the reason for the mixed evidence related to the 
AV_LEV variable. 
Pred sign coef p-value coef p-value
AV_LENGTH (+) 0.044 0.002 0.039 0.022
AV_SIZE (+) 0.137 0.003 0.142 0.005
AV_LEV (+) 0.313 0.433 0.189 0.664
AV_PROF (+) 0.425 0.022 0.367 0.055
AGE (+) 0.004 0.042 0.003 0.119
INDUSTRY (+) 0.388 0.008 0.448 0.004
INSIDERS (?) -0.654 0.037 -0.685 0.042
No. of observations
Pseudo-R2
Country dummies
L2 chi2
Prob > chi2
61.12 79.91
0.000 0.000
306
Included (26)
0.1403
No included
0.1073
306
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The coefficient on AV_PROFIT is significant and positive, which suggests that more 
profitable firms are more likely to lobby more intensively. Additionally, the coefficient on 
INDUSTRY is positive and statistically significant. Thus, firms operating in industries that 
traditionally use operating leases more intensively are more likely to submit comment 
letters. Finally, the coefficient on INSIDERS is significant and negative, which means 
that INSIDERS are less likely to submit comment letters. As mentioned previously, this 
variable requires further research. 
In summary, the ordered logit regression supports our hypotheses that larger firms, 
profitable firms, more mature firms and firms operating in industries that traditionally use 
operating leases more intensively are more likely to submit comment letters. The results 
also show that the quality of the reasoning is positively associated with the probability of 
engaging in long-term lobbying.  
4.5.3. Sensitivity test 
In this section, we develop several sensitivity tests based on the sample 
characteristics and the variables. First, we repeat the regression while excluding the 
countries that are heavily represented and also the countries that have low 
representation in the sample. Second, we model the probability of submitting a comment 
letter using a probit regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator. In 
section 5.2, we use a probit model where the dependent variable takes three values 
according to the number of comment letters submitted during the period. Finally, we 
repeat the univariate and multivariate analyses using alternative measures for the 
independent variables. 
First, we conduct the same analysis while controlling for country representation. In 
this case, we repeat the regression excluding countries that are 1) heavily represented 
in the sample of observations (the United States and United Kingdom); 2) poorly 
represented, that is, countries that have three or fewer companies in the sample of 
observations (Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, China, Denmark, Finland, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, and 
South Africa).  
Table 4.10 indicates that the coefficients on AV_LENGTH, AV_SIZE, AV_PROFIT, 
AGE and INDUSTRY are positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on 
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INSIDERS is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on AV_LEV is not 
statistically significant. These results support the evidence from Section 5.2. 
Table 4.10. Results of ordered probit controlling for countries 
*Excluding the Unites States and United Kingdom. ** Excluding Argentina, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, China,
Denmark, Finland, India, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, 
South Africa 
Second, we model the probability of submitting a comment letter using a probit 
regression where the dependent variable is a binary indicator. In section 5.2, we use a 
probit model where the dependent variable takes one of three values based on the 
number of comment letters submitted during the period. In this model, the intensity of 
lobbying is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 for firms that submitted more than 
one comment letter (we consider that those firms are engaged in long-term lobbying, as 
they participated during the entire consultation period) and 0 for firms that only submitted 
one comment letter. Table 4.11 shows that the coefficients on AV_LENGTH, AV_SIZE, 
AV_PROFIT, AGE and INDUSTRY are positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficient on INSIDERS is negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on 
AV_LEV is not statistically significant. These results support the evidence from Section 
5.2. 
Pred sign coef p-value coef p-value
AV_LENGTH (+) 0.061 0.002 0.043 0.004
AV_SIZE (+) 0.198 0.008 0.132 0.006
AV_LEV (+) 0.207 0.769 0.182 0.657
AV_PROF (+) 0.545 0.050 0.369 0.054
AGE (+) 0.004 0.119 0.003 0.075
INDUSTRY (+) 0.396 0.097 0.366 0.017
INSIDERS (?) -1.260 0.014 -0.590 0.073
No. of observations
Pseudo-R2
L2 chi2
Prob > chi2
46.78
0.000
Without 
countries that 
have more 
representation*
Without 
countries that 
have less 
representation**
49.50
0.000
132 276
0.1854 0.0947
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Table 4.11. Results of probit using an alternative dependent variable 
Note: The dependent variable is lobbying intensity, which takes the value of 1 for lobbyists who 
submitted comment letters in more than one of the three phases of the lease standard-setting process (DP 
2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6), and the value of 0 for those who submitted comment letters in only one 
of the phases of the lease standard-setting process. All of the variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
As an additional test (not reported in tables here for brevity), we repeated the 
estimations using different specifications and alternative measures for the independent 
variables. In terms of profitability, some prior research uses income or profit volatility as 
a proxy to explain the decision to submit a comment letter (Kosi and Reither, 2014; 
Santos and Santos, 2014; Barral Rivada, 2014). The Pearson and Spearman 
correlations show a positive correlation between firms with more profit volatility and the 
decision to lobby in the long term.  
The size variable is a key variable in the study, and there are several ways to 
measure firm size in the literature, for example, through net sales transformed by its 10 
logarithm or its natural logarithm (Jorissen et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2014). We consider 
different alternatives to measure the size variable as the 10 logarithm and natural 
logarithm of operating revenue and assets. The relationship between alternative size 
measures and the decision to lobby in the long term is positive and significant. We also 
repeat the regression using various proxies for other independent variables, considering, 
for instance, the logarithm of firm age and the ratio of total debt to total assets for 
leverage. For industry, we considered the categories used by Gosman and Hanson 
(2000). The results remain similar.  
Pred sign coef p-value
AV_LENGTH (+) 0.048 0.002
AV_SIZE (+) 0.147 0.003
AV_LEV (+) 0.169 0.360
AV_PROF (+) 0.634 0.002
AGE (+) 0.005 0.013
INDUSTRY (+) 0.289 0.075
INSIDERS (?) -0.934 0.010
No. of observations
Pseudo-R2
L2 chi2
Prob > chi2
61.76
0.0000
302
0.1508
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4.6. Conclusion of the chapter 
The requirements of the lease accounting proposal would change the status quo of 
lease accounting and end the majority of off-balance-sheet financing opportunities due 
to operating lease accounting that are taken advantage of by companies in several 
industries. The lease standard-setting project has become very controversial because it 
has generated a substantial number of responses during the lease standard-setting 
process from throughout the corporate environment. Not only have lessee companies 
become involved, which are directly affected by the main changes to make the 
recognition of assets and liabilities from lease contracts compulsory, but also lessors 
have become involved in the process because their destiny is directly linked to the future 
of the lease industry. Although lease contracts continue to have other essential 
advantages, such as tax provisions, flexible financing terms or the transfer of ownership 
risk, the accounting approach is considered decisive for companies in every jurisdiction, 
as our study shows. 
The objective of this chapter has been to identify the determinants of the corporate 
intensity of lobbying in the lease accounting standard-setting process by including both 
quantitative and qualitative variables to expand on previous evidence on lobbying 
behaviour. The sample comprises comment letters submitted by non-financial listed 
companies on the lease standard-setting proposal during three consultation periods: DP 
2009, ED/2010/9 and ED/2013/6. Hence, the analysis of the comment letters during the 
three consultation periods, including the last draft, helps us to draw conclusions from the 
entire process and to expand on the evidence presented in previous studies regarding 
the lease accounting project. For the statistical analysis, we have used an ordered probit 
regression to obtain results regarding lobbying behaviour during the period considered.  
The evidence shows that lobbying intensity is influenced by the length of comment 
letters and other firm characteristics such as firm size, profitability, age, whether the firm 
belongs to a lease-intensive industry and insider ownership. Our results reveal that the 
most powerful companies in terms of size and profitability lobby with more intensity, thus 
confirming the political cost hypothesis advocated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and 
the rational theories of Sutton (1984). The results for firm leverage are mixed, which is 
in line with the debate on the relationship between debt and leases. Firm age has been 
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introduced as a proxy for experience in lobbying activities, which reduces the marginal 
costs of participation.  
We also validate the hypothesis that companies that are most intensively involved 
with leases, which are directly affected by the proposal, devote more resources to 
lobbying, thus supporting the positive accounting theory. Our findings confirm the theory, 
which predicts that self-interested companies have incentives to participate when they 
are considerably affected by potential negative consequences of a proposed standard. 
Finally, the variable insiders, which represents managerial ownership, is negatively 
related to the intensity of lobbying. Although there is evidence to suggest that monitoring 
mechanisms and governance characteristics influence financial reporting, little research 
has been conducted in previous lobbying studies. Thus, the introduction of managerial 
ownership opens an interesting avenue for future research. 
The corporate participants in lease project show similar behaviours in comparison 
with the evidence from other accounting projects, but the intensity in the lease accounting 
project is high because it is one of the most controversial convergence projects, and the 
board has continued to delay publishing the final standard. Many large corporate groups 
have been involved throughout the process to protect their self-interest and to influence 
the outcome by protecting the status quo. These conclusions have implications for 
standard-setters that wish to predict the intensity of lobbying depending on the degree 
of controversy of the standard discussed and the specific characteristics of the project.  
These findings open a number of possibilities for future research. One potential 
direction is to introduce more firm factors and qualitative factors to explore their incidence 
in the lease accounting project. Examining the effects of additional quantitative and 
qualitative factors on a particular accounting standard project may provide a complete 
picture of lobbying behaviour. Another future direction is to expand and solidify the 
results using other accounting projects to also provide a more complete picture of 
lobbying behaviour.  
Chapter 4. Determinants of corporate lobbying intensity in the lease standard-setting process 
162 
Appendix 4.1. Comment letters’ content analysis 
Table 4.12. Pages and percentage of answered question by respondent groups (all documents) 
The group of Big Four presents the biggest average in pages - length (25.83) followed by leasing 
associations (14.57) and by standard-setters (12.69), whereas, non-financial preparers (7.34) and 
bank and insurance companies (6.36) sent the shortest ones. Giner and Arce (2012) show similar 
results in the case of accounting profession, regulators and preparers. Moreover, the accounting 
profession and the standard-setters are also the collectives that response more percentage of 
questions posed by IASB and FASB (both around 60% and 70%).  This outcomes are consistent 
with length results. The Kruskal Wallis test shows statistically significant differences in both 
variables among the participant groups (p < 0.01). 
Mean Std. dev. (min-max) Mean Std. dev. (min-max)
Regulators 10.81 6.48 (2-29) 0.63 0.40 (0-1)
Standard setters 12.69 6.89 (2-29) 0.77 0.28 (0-1)
Other authorities 8.53 5.13 (2-26) 0.47 0.46 (0-1)
Accounting profession 10.07 7.43 (1-46) 0.71 0.38 (0-1)
Professional association 9.27 5.55 (1-26) 0.73 0.35 (0-1)
Worldwide firm 25.83 10.07 (12-46) 1.00 0.02 (0-1)
Domestic Firm 8.19 6.42 (1-31) 0.62 0.42 (0-1)
Public sector auditor 10.20 6.27 (1-22) 0.69 0.46 (0-1)
Non-financial preparers 8.09 7.24 (1-67) 0.40 0.41 (0-1)
Non-financial companies 7.34 6.08 (1-61) 0.39 0.41 (0-1)
Trade associations 8.85 6.99 (1-43) 0.40 0.43 (0-1)
Leasing association 14.57 13.99 (1-67) 0.51 0.43 (0-1)
Financial industry 6.90 6.90 (1-77) 0.33 0.41 (0-1)
Financial companies 6.36 5.98 (1-59) 0.31 0.41 (0-1)
Financial associations 8.45 8.92 (2-77) 0.39 0.42 (0-1)
Users 10.59 10.60 (1-49) 0.42 0.41 (0-1)
Consultants 8.35 8.32 (1-36) 0.35 0.45 (0-1)
Academic 9.14 14.37 (1-72) 0.39 0.41 (0-1)
Individuals 4.56 5.10 (1-26) 0.25 0.37 (0-1)
Krustal - Wallis one-way rank test for average number of pages p = 0.000
Krustal - Wallis one-way rank test for average percentage of answered questions p = 0.000
Group
Pages % of answered questions
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and final thoughts 
This thesis overall aims is to explain lobbyists’ behaviour during the lease accounting 
standard-setting process, conducted jointly by the IASB and FASB, based on country 
factors and corporate characteristics. 
The general objective contains four specific objectives and determines the thesis 
structure. The first two specific objectives constitute the conceptual framework related to 
the lease accounting project and lobbying behaviour. The last two objectives analyse the 
Country and Firm level participation in the leasing accounting project. The objectives are 
summarised as follows: 
Specific objective 1. To analyse the lease proposal from a critical viewpoint, 
identifying main changes respect current standards, critical issues of the proposal 
and understanding the ongoing debate from a conceptual and practical 
perspective. 
Specific objective 2. To examine theoretical framework about constituents’ 
behaviour in accounting standard-setting: incentives and motivations, 
instruments for lobbying, and main empirical evidence.  
Specific objective 3. To examine the influence of institutional, economic, 
cultural, and other social factors of constituents’ origin countries on the intensity 
of participation in the lease project. 
Specific objective 4. To identify explanatory factors that predict firms’ 
behaviour regarding participation intensity in the lease standard-setting process. 
The thesis consists of five chapters, where each objective is described and 
developed. This last chapter summarises the main conclusions reached in the thesis by 
first describing the conclusions related to each objective separately and then offering 
final thoughts to provide consistency to the analysis and considerations of the thesis. 
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The main conclusions of the investigation are detailed below. 
Conclusions: Objective 1 
To explain the current debate in the accounting standards project for leases (1) the 
main doctrinal positions of both the standards setters and the academic research are 
examined, and (2) the key controversial conceptual aspects related to the accounting 
treatment for leases are identified in the project.  
The analysis of the doctrinal positions adopted by standard-setters shows a lack of 
consensus on the accounting criteria for lease recognition in financial statements, 
differing both in their historical evolution and in conceptual approach. The historical 
analysis shows an evolution of lease accounting from not reflecting assets and liabilities 
on the balance sheet to a progressive approach to a full capitalization model. The current 
accounting approach also shows significant differences depending on the jurisdiction. 
The FASB has emphasized the principle of reliability, demonstrated by setting certain 
percentage thresholds to classified leases, as opposed to the IASB standard focusing 
on economic substance over the legal form of contracts. 
Following a review of the empirical evidence, the academic literature has focused 
on analysing the economic impact of capitalizing leases. The results from this research 
confirm the economic effects due to increased assets and liabilities from operating 
leases. There are two main visions in terms of decisions affecting users of financial 
information: those suggesting that a new approach could affect managers’ decision 
making, credit, and market perception; and those arguing that there would be no effect 
because professional investors and credit agencies currently adjust for the effect of off-
balance sheet leases. Standards-setters consider both arguments to defend their new 
approach, wherein companies must be prepared to recognize off-balance sheet leases 
in their own financial statements to improve the information transparency demanded by 
users of financial reports.  
The critical matters in the lease proposal result from a deductive logical analysis. 
The issues in the conceptual discussions around consistency and appropriateness in the 
conceptual framework are: 1) the definition of a lease, due to the importance of 
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distinguishing leases from service contracts in the new scenario; 2) reflecting leases in 
the lessees’ income statement; 3) lessor accounting; 4) renewal periods; and 5) 
contingent payments specified in contracts. 
Conclusions: Objective 2 
There is an appropriate theoretical framework to examine participants’ behaviour 
during the standards-setting process based on three widely accepted theories to study 
accounting lobbying: positive accounting theory, economic theory of democracy, and the 
theory of coalition and group influence. The principal assumption in these theories is that 
lobbyists’ actions aim to protect their self-interests, contrary to standards-setters’ main 
objective focusing on the general welfare.  
Positive accounting theory, postulated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), focuses on 
stakeholders’ underlying motivations to behave opportunistically, linking the unintended 
economic effects of the standard to their corporate characteristics. The economic theory 
of democracy views financial accounting standards setting as a political activity (Zeff, 
2002). Based on the previous work of Downs (1957), Sutton compares the lobbying 
phenomenon with the activity of voting because both share the characteristic of an 
investment good, subject to a cost-benefit equation with a degree of uncertainty. Finally, 
the theory of coalition and group influence examines possible alliances between the 
groups to influence accounting standards (Metcalf Report, 1976). 
In the overview of the empirical application we identify three primary approaches 
focused mainly on: 1) understanding the reasons for participation, 2) understanding 
positions and arguments, and 3) examining the effects that comment letters have on 
regulators. 
Conclusions: Objective 3 
The empirical evidence shows that the country’s characteristics as the institutional 
context, the economic environment, cultural values, and other social factors influence 
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members’ decision to lobby. The analysis is based on the general assumption that 
individuals’ and firms’ behaviour also depends on their home country characteristics.  
The study is based on the analysis of all comment letters submitted in response to 
the three documents issued by the IASB and the FASB before the publication of the final 
lease standard: the discussion paper of 2009, the first exposure draft of 2010, and the 
second exposure draft of 2013, which have received a total of 1,745 comment letters. 
The comment letters were classified according to the country of reference. Comment 
letters are a formal public tool established by regulators and considered a reflection of 
the other invisible lobbying activities. Therefore, they are used as proxy lobby to test the 
research hypotheses. 
Institutional factors such as the degree of investor protection and the level of 
implementation of punishment in the case of non-compliance explain the degree of 
compliance with the accounting standard. Constituents from countries with a higher level 
of control have more incentive to participate in the regulatory process to influence the 
final result. Regarding lease accounting, the country’s level of enforcement also affects 
financial flexibility, for example, by finding alternative solutions such as using operating 
leases to avoid increasing the debt ratio.  
Economic factors indicate the country's wealth and size of their financial systems. 
Companies from countries with larger and more complex economies, like the US or the 
UK, have integrated mechanisms to pressure regulators into their practices. The 
methods are involved in economies of scale achieved by accumulating experience. 
Moreover, the richer a country is, the greater the need for equipment and properties in 
business, where leasing plays an important role. 
Cultural values associated with historical traditions shape citizens mind sets and 
behaviour. Most previous studies suggest that business decisions and business models 
are affected by cultural characteristics. In countries like Japan, whose society is 
considered to have rigid and conservative structures, incentives to lobby decrease 
compared to Western countries like the United States, where the preference for 
professional judgment, innovation, risk, and competition predominates. 
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Regarding the other social factor considered, the degree of IFRS adoption in the 
country under review had no significant effect on the degree of its members’ participation 
in the regulatory process. Further research is required to identify why this is not a factor. 
Finally, lower perceptions of corruption are positively associated with geographical 
lobbying intensity. Facing regulation restrictions such as the new lease accounting 
approach, constituents from countries perceived as corrupt have less motivation to lobby 
than constituents from countries with lower levels of perceived corruption.  
Conclusions: Objective 4 
The findings show that the level of participation intensity is influenced by the length 
of the comment letters and some business characteristics such as size, profitability, age, 
industry, and managerial ownership (when directors own more than 5% of the shares).  
Three degrees of intensity are distinguished in the lobby: the probability that a 
company submits comment letters to only one document (low intensity lobbying), the 
probability that a company submits comment letters to two of the three documents 
published by regulators (medium intensity lobbying), and the probability that a company 
submits comment letters to all documents (high intensity lobbying). The analysis is based 
on comment letters submitted by 306 non-financial listed companies during the three 
consultation periods. Including of the comment letters from the three consultation periods 
aims to capture the whole process, and is an original, innovative contribution to the 
literature on the lease standards-setting process. For statistical analysis, we used an 
ordered probit using the three values above as the dependent variable. 
Our results suggest that the most powerful companies in terms of size and 
profitability are associated with more lobbying intensity, confirming the hypothesis 
related to the political cost. The results for the leverage variable indicate a statistically 
insignificant association with lobbying intensity. One possible explanation may be that 
there is debate in the financial literature about the relationship between debt and leases, 
and whether they are substitutes or complements. The firm’s variable age was 
introduced as a proxy for experience in lobbying, reducing marginal costs of participation, 
and, therefore, the relationship is also positive and significant. We also accept the 
hypothesis that companies in the most affected sector negatively devote more resources 
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to apply pressure. Our results confirm that companies whose economic interests may be 
adversely affected have more incentive to participate. Finally, the fact that managers 
own part of the company, although such participation does not involve control, reduces 
the agency problem and is negatively related to participation.  
Corporate participants in this project have shown that constituents behave in a 
similar way as for other projects, but with more intensity because this project is 
considered one of the most controversial. Large business groups have participated 
throughout the process to protect their own interests and influence the outcome and 
defend the status quo. These findings have implications for accounting standards 
regulators by helping to predict the intensity of pressure from constituents, mainly in 
particularly controversial projects. 
Final thoughts 
The study of lobbying behaviour in the international standard-setting process has 
attracted research interest. Changes in international accounting standards affect 
businesses worldwide. Given the importance of standards, attention has focused on the 
pressure and political forces around regulators. Understanding constituents’ underlying 
motivation to participate in the standards-setting process is important for regulators that 
must focus on setting rules that provide useful information for general decision making 
and not to serve the interests of powerful lobbyists. Nevertheless, participation is 
required as a signal of legitimacy and quality.  
Moreover, the factors that predict increased lobbying intensity in a controversial 
standard such as that related to leases, which change the existing accounting model and 
introduce important changes from the conceptual and practical perspective, determine 
the success of the project. Our results demonstrate that participants, especially 
companies most affected, participate in the process in order to preserve their own 
interests by maintaining the status quo, according to the theoretical framework. Factors, 
such as possessions or experience, establish differences among companies in terms of 
the decision to lobby based on a rational choice. Additionally, this research provides 
evidence that individual resources and expectations are important in decision making, in 
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addition to the context of the country were the interested parties operate. Institutional, 
economic, and cultural factors influence members’ lobbying behaviour.  
The results of our research indicate an interesting phenomenon. Theoretically, 
formal participation methods such as submitting comment letters have been established 
by the IASB and FASB to incentivise the general participation of interested parties 
(political pluralism). Practically, larger profitable listed companies lobby with more 
intensity than small companies, as well as constituents from wealthy and countries with 
high legal enforcement who lobby with more intensity than constituents from other 
countries. Therefore, standards-setters should consider there is no equilibrium among 
interested parties.  
The major limitations of our study affect both empirical analyses. In the first empirical 
study, the primary limitation is that indices considered in the previous literature do not 
cover all of the countries included in the sample. In the second empirical study, an initial 
analysis of listed companies was conducted to verify compliance with the fundamental 
hypothesis. Future research could analyse unlisted companies. We understand that this 
work may be extended by incorporating additional variables and expanding the sample. 
Moreover, further analysis of the content of the comment letters could be interesting and 
provide more qualitative conclusions in the extended work.  
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